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Abstract:  
 
The purpose of this research was to qualitatively study the public’s trust and knowledge of 
unmanned aviation safety through data collection by interviewing research subjects. The 
researcher sought to determine whether the research subjects would be willing to fly as 
passengers in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), and if publicity about the UAS industry, 
its development and integration into the National Airspace System (NAS) have influenced 
their perceptions of UAS safety, which could affect their decision to travel as passengers 
in UAS in the future. The researcher also examined data to identify if any observable 
Dunning-Kruger Effect existed that would suggest if any of the subjects believed they had 
more knowledge about the factors that affect UAS safety than what they knew when 
deciding whether to fly as passengers in UAS.
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Manned aviation can be perceived to be so inherently safe, versus other modes of 
transportation, that few within the public remember the first fatal powered manned aircraft 
accident; an injustice for the sacrifices made in the history of aviation safety. However, it 
remains a representation of how far manned aviation safety has progressed, with regards 
to the public’s perception of manned aviation safety and reliability. The introduction 
section of this dissertation discusses and contrasts manned and unmanned aviation, 
identifies the statement of the problem, defines the purpose of the study, poses research 
questions, explains the significance of the study, and identifies limitations of the study. The 
remaining chapters of this dissertation detail a review of literature, identify the research 
methods, and address research analysis and findings. In conclusion, the researcher 
summarizes the study, answers the main research questions, and makes recommendations 
to improve and advance aviation safety.  
 
Contrasts Between Manned and Unmanned Aviation 
At Kitty Hawk, on the Outer Banks of North Carolina, the National Park Service 
maintains a national monument dedicated to the location where Orville and Wilbur Wright 
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are memorialized in the photograph by photographer John T. Daniels for their achievement 
of being the first to fly a powered manned-aircraft on December 17, 1903 (Crouch, 1989, 
p. 263). The monument not only represents the birthplace of manned powered flight, it also 
represents years of prior development in theoretical and practical engineering designs of 
aircraft. It also represents the development of aviator skills, the establishment of aircraft 
maintenance and preventive maintenance techniques, as well as the development of the 
knowledge in which today’s aircraft accident and aviation safety investigation techniques 
were built upon. 
The history of flight and the concepts of aviation safety trace back to the early 
visionaries whose concepts of flight and aircraft design have made manned aviation safer. 
These early visionaries date as far back as Greek mythology and the concepts of Leonardo 
da Vinci. And, they have continued to build upon subsequent contributors resulting in what 
we know as manned aviation today, a relatively safe mode of transportation in contrast to 
other modes (Locsin, n.d.). 
In the Greek mythology of Daedalus and Icarus, the story details Daedalus’ respect 
for the theoretical dangers of flying too close to the sun because it would certainly melt the 
wax that secured the feathers to the wings that he had created in order to fly (Montgomery 
et al., 2000, pp. 4-5). It also illustrates Icarus’ lack of respect for the hazards associated 
with flying too close to the sun, which ultimately resulted in his death. When the wax 
holding the feathers on the wood structure melted, he was no longer able to fly, and he 
crashed to earth.  
The Greek mythology of Daedalus and Icarus is one of the early theoretical 
accounts of a fatality associated with the hazards of flying, representing man’s early respect 
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for the laws of nature, aerodynamics, and the dangers associated with flight. However, it 
is known that the first fatality in a powered manned aircraft did not occur until September 
17, 1908 when Army First Lieutenant Thomas Selfridge was killed during a test flight with 
pilot Orville Wright (Thomas Etholen Selfridge, 2006). 
Building upon the theoretical concepts of the Greek mythology of Daedalus and 
Icarus, Leonardo da Vinci, who lived from 1452 to 1519, made significant theoretical 
engineering contributions to aviation (Montgomery et al., 2000, pp. 5-6). His design 
illustrations of a theoretical wing structure named the Ornithopter suggested that it could 
be used for flight. And, his writings on observations of wind and nature that described lift, 
thrust, drag, and weight were the forces of flight that would later influence mathematical 
and scientific explanations of aerodynamics, along with the practical fixed wing and 
rotorcraft design structures of today (Montgomery et al., 2000, p. 185). 
It is the concept of this dissertation that manned aviation has progressed from the 
theoretical concepts of Greek Mythology and Leonardo da Vinci to the practical 
applications of the Wright Brothers, which have led to what can be perceived by the public 
to be inherently safe because of the relatively low accident rates of today as compared to 
other modes of transportation. In fact, when compared to flying in a commercial aircraft 
versus driving, a person is more likely to die as a result of a car accident versus an airplane 
accident (Locsin, n.d.).  
In comparison to all modes of transportation within the United States (U.S.), a 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 2015a) press release identified that in 2013 
the aviation industry only realized 443 deaths, 42 in commercial aviation passenger 
transportation, which was a relatively low number when compared to the millions of flight 
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hours flown industry wide. And, aviation was considered to be relatively safe when 
compared to the accident statistics in other modes of transportation, in which there were 
32,719 deaths in highway transportation, 891 in railway, and 615 in marine transportation 
(NTSB, 2015a). Overall, the success of manned aviation safety is a result of U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, 
certification, and oversight of manned aviation operations, maintenance and air traffic 
control. It is perceived that government regulations, and the resultant low accident rates, 
have influenced the public’s perception and trust in manned aviation safety.   
However, aviation has drastically changed within the last twenty years. With new 
technology allowing small unmanned aircraft to be flown by hobbyist and commercial 
operators for such purposes as aerial photography, the future of transporting passengers 
and cargo by manned aircraft can be expected to be replaced by unmanned aircraft. In part, 
it is because of potential decreases in operating costs and expected increases in reliability 
and safety. Naturally, questions arise as to the flying public’s level of knowledge and trust 
of unmanned aviation safety and the potential for its reluctance to fly in unmanned aircraft 
in the future.  
Simply put, the researcher questioned whether the public trusts that unmanned 
aircraft are as safe and reliable as manned aircraft, despite their willingness to travel in 
other modes of unmanned transportation, such as cars, airport trams, elevators, or even 
rides at amusement parks, fairs and carnivals. This researcher’s question also lent itself to 
further proposed inquiry and research, which this dissertation addresses.   
The researcher further questioned the factors that could affect the public’s trust in 
unmanned aircraft safety. Because it was unknown what factors affect the public’s trust 
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prior to conducting this research, it was expected that such factors could have included the 
public’s overall lack of knowledge of manned and unmanned aviation safety.  
As a result, the future of unmanned commercial passenger transportation, and 
unmanned aviation as a whole, were in question to the researcher. This was due to factors 
affecting the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) industry, such as; the federal government’s 
lack of progress in meeting congressional mandates to integrate UAS into the National Air 
Space (NAS); its overall lack of progress in certification of operators and UAS; its lack of 
establishing and tracking UAS accident and incident statistics; the lack of robust oversight, 
compliance and enforcement of UAS operators who are both hobbyist and FAA approved 
operators; and, privacy concerns surrounding UAS. 
Additionally, the researcher questioned if the phenomenon known as the Dunning-
Kruger Effect could influence public perceptions of aviation safety, which suggests that 
people think more highly of their cognitive decision-making abilities even when they have 
limited knowledge in which to make a competent decision (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 
1121). For the purposes of this study, the researcher understood that this phenomenon could 
surface and expose the fact that research subjects could have little or no knowledge of 
factors affecting UAS safety, but still maintain a belief or perceived understanding about 
UAS safety above what they actually know that affects their overall opinion and trust. This 
could affect their willingness to fly as passengers in UAS in the future. It was a research 
objective to identify if such a phenomenon existed that could expose preconceived research 
subject bias and concepts about UAS safety. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The FAA’s mission is to ensure the safest most efficient aerospace system in the 
world (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], n.d.,). At the same time, changes in 
aviation technology have created a surge in UAS capabilities for hobbyist, prospective 
commercial operators, and military operators of UAS, shifting demand from manned 
aircraft to unmanned aircraft to perform similar aircraft missions. These shifts in demand 
for UAS technology can be observed in the projections for greater transition from manned 
aircraft operations to unmanned aircraft missions by the United States Department of 
Defense (Osborn, 2015). These surges are also being seen in civilian aviation and have 
affected the FAA’s ability to stay current with new technology and regulate UAS in an 
adequate and timely manner to meet its stated mission to ensure safety, while at the same 
time ensuring efficiency of the industry (Snead & Seibler, 2016).  
It is noted by the researcher that the FAA failed to meet congressionally mandated 
deadlines of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 in Public Law 112-95 to 
integrate UAS into the NAS by September 2015 (Zara, 2016). As a result of increased 
business interest to develop this new technology to meet increasing product demands, UAS 
have been operated in the United States without safe integration into the NAS, while the 
FAA has continued to develop regulations for operations and policy to regulate UAS within 
the NAS. Unsafe operations of UAS that have occurred are contrary to Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FAR) historically meant for manned aircraft and have resulted in FAA 
compliance and enforcement investigations, civil penalties, and lawsuits against the 
operators.   
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Examples of unsafe UAS operations are found in reports by commercial airline 
pilots of near midair collisions with small UAS, which could pose risk to life and property 
(Berlinger & Cooper, 2015). And, the highly-publicized Pirker vs. FAA enforcement case 
is another example of unsafe UAS operations in which the FAA claimed was reckless and 
endangering by flying a UAS above people. The operator faced a $10,000 fine, however 
appealed the lawsuit, claiming he was acting as a hobbyist, therefore Federal Aviation 
Regulations did not apply. Ultimately, the NSTB law judge who heard the case remanded 
the FAA’s fine, stating that it had not proved the UAS operations were reckless, however 
did cite that the FAA had the purview to pursue the case because it had the authority to 
regulate any aircraft, even small UAS operated by hobbyist, because the operator’s small 
UAS met the statutory definition of an aircraft in accordance with Title 49 of the United 
States Code (U.S.C.), Part 40102. The operator and the FAA settled the case and the 
operator, not admitting guilt, paid a fine of approximately $1,000 (Nicas, 2015).  
As result of the negative publicity that has highlighted unsafe UAS operations, as 
well as the FAA’s delay in safely integrating UAS into the NAS through aircraft and airmen 
certification, air traffic control, and development of regulations for the safe operations and 
maintenance of UAS, the researcher questioned whether the negative publicity has had a 
positive or negative effect on the publics’ perception and trust of unmanned aircraft safety. 
And, the researcher further questioned whether these factors affected the public’s 
willingness to fly as passengers in UAS in the future.  
Prior to conducting this research, relationships between the public’s trust of UAS 
safety and its knowledge of the aspects that affect unmanned aviation safety were not fully 
known by the researcher. As a result, fully exploring, examining and making the research 
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results available to the industry and government was believed to positively affect the future 
of unmanned commercial passenger transportation and its safety. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research was to qualitatively study the public’s trust and 
knowledge of UAS safety through data collection by interviewing research subjects. 
Additionally, the researcher sought to determine whether the research subjects would be 
willing to fly as passengers in UAS, and if publicity of the UAS industry, its development 
and integration into the NAS have influenced their perception of UAS safety, which could 
affect their decision to travel as passengers in UAS. The researcher also examined data to 
identify if any observable Dunning-Kruger Effect existed that would suggest if any of the 
subjects believed they had more knowledge about the factors that affect UAS safety than 
what they knew when deciding whether to fly as passengers in UAS.  
 
Main Research Questions 
In this study, the researcher questioned the research subjects’ level of knowledge 
and trust of UAS safety, their willingness to fly as passengers in UAS, the factors that could 
affect their trust of UAS safety, and whether publicity had a positive or negative effect on 
their perception and trust of unmanned aircraft safety.  The main research questions sought 
to be answered by this research study were: 
1. Do the research subjects trust UAS safety? 
2. What factors affect the research subjects’ trust in UAS safety? 
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3. Do the research subjects know and understand the factors that affect UAS 
safety? 
4. What effect has the publicity of UAS had on the research subjects’ willingness 
to fly as passengers in UAS? 
5. Is there a relationship between the research subjects’ trust and knowledge of 
UAS safety? 
6. Will the Dunning-Kruger Effect be observed in the research findings? 
 
Significance of the Study 
The beneficiaries of this study are the regulatory, public, business, and academic 
interests that are stakeholders in the aviation industry. These beneficiaries will gain a 
greater understanding of the relationship between the public’s knowledge of factors that 
affect safe operations of UAS within the NAS, and the level of trust the public has in UAS 
safety.  
These beneficiaries can utilize this understanding to increase public trust in UAS 
safety and foster its development and progress by taking actions and making corrections to 
the specific aspects of the UAS industry that may contribute to the public’s lack of 
knowledge and mistrust of the reliability and safety of UAS. Of greatest benefit, the 
beneficiaries will have an opportunity to utilize this information to not only make the UAS 
product safer, more reliable, and efficient for public transportation, but to also increase 
public demand for the UAS product. 
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Limitations of the Study 
The researcher acknowledged certain limitations of this research and maintained 
full consideration for ensuring objectivity, credibility and rationality in the analysis and 
findings chapter of this dissertation. It is expected that the acknowledged limitations of the 
research and analysis of findings will generate further research questions and experimental 
study by the beneficiaries of this study. The following limitations were identified by the 
researcher in this study: 
1. A statistical random sample of the population was not obtained and a purposeful 
sample was used instead. For qualitative research methods, small purposeful 
sample sizes from one to 40 are acceptable (Creswell, 2012, p. 209). 
2. It was assumed that all of the research subjects would answer the interview 
questions honestly. 
3. Interviews were conducted by telephone and not in person. Due to the lack of 
availability of all research subjects to participate in the interview process face-
to-face, none of the interviews were conducted in-person and all interviews 
were conducted by telephone to ensure continuity of the study. This limited the 
researcher’s ability to utilize the researcher’s professional experience and 
education in cognitive witness interviewing techniques for analyzing visual 
cues in order to properly time and ask follow-on questions effectively. As a 
result, for these telephone interviews, the researcher utilized limited cognitive 
witness interviewing techniques and focused on audible cues and asked follow-
on questions based on the lack of or limited audible responses to open-end 
questions.  
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Definitions 
Aircraft – any contrivance, as defined by Title 49 U.S.C., Parts 40101-40102, that is 
invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air. 
Aircraft accident – defined by 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830.2, means an 
occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft (to include an unmanned 
aircraft) which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the 
intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person 
suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. 
Aircraft incident – defined by 49 CFR Part 830.2, means an occurrence other an aircraft 
accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft. 
Airship – defined by 14 CFR Part 1.1, means an engine-driven lighter-than-air aircraft that 
can be steered, also known as a blimp. 
Civil aircraft – defined by 14 CFR Part 1.1, means an aircraft that is not a public aircraft. 
Manned aircraft – an aircraft operated with direct human intervention aboard the aircraft. 
Model aircraft – defined by 14 CFR Part 1.1, means an unmanned aircraft that is flown for 
the purposes of recreation or hobby that is capable of sustained visual line of sight 
flight by the person operating it. 
N-number – the aircraft registration number assigned to an aircraft by the FAA. 
Public aircraft – defined by 14 CFR Part 1.1, a government aircraft owned and/or used for 
a government purpose, only carrying crewmembers and not carrying passengers, 
and not operated for compensation. 
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Rotorcraft – defined by 14 CFR Part 1.1, means a heavier-than-air aircraft that depends 
principally for its support in flight on the lift generated by one or more rotors, also 
known as a helicopter. 
Small unmanned aircraft – defined by 14 CFR Part 1.1, means a small unmanned aircraft 
and all of the elements required to control and operate it that includes the 
communication link, ground control station or handheld controller, and the specific 
components used to control it, which are all required to safely and efficiently 
operate it in the national airspace system. 
Unmanned aircraft – defined by 14 CFR Part 1.1, means an aircraft operated without the 
possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft. 
Unmanned aircraft accident – defined by 49 CFR Part 830.2, means an occurrence 
associated with the operation of an unmanned aircraft system that takes place 
between the time that the system is activated with the purpose of flight and the time 
that the system is deactivated at the conclusion of its mission, in which: any person 
suffers death or serious injury; or the aircraft has a maximum gross takeoff weight 
of 300 pounds or greater and sustains substantial damage. 
 
Acronyms 
AGL – Above Ground Level 
AP – Associated Press 
ATC – Air Traffic Control 
ATCT – Air Traffic Control Tower 
CAMI – Civil Aerospace Medical Institute 
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CFR – Code of Federal Regulations 
DHS – Department of Homeland Security 
DME – Distance Measuring Equipment 
DOD – Department of Defense 
DOT – Department of Transportation 
FAA – Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR – Federal Aviation Regulation 
FL – Flight Level 
GPO – Government Printing Office 
IATA – International Air Transportation Association 
ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization 
IFR – Instrument Flight Rules 
ILS – Instrument Landing System 
IRB – Institutional Review Board 
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham  
MEDA – Maintenance Error Decision Aid 
MLS – Microwave Landing System 
MSL – Mean Sea Level 
NAS – National Airspace System 
NHTSA – National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
NM – Nautical Miles 
NSC – National Safety Council 
NTSB – National Transportation Safety Board 
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OSU – Oklahoma State University 
PIC – Pilot in Command 
STC – Supplementary Type Certificate 
SMS – Safety Management System 
TC – Type Certificate 
UAS – Unmanned Aircraft System 
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
U.S.C. – United States Code 
U.S. – United States 
VFR – Visual Flight Rules 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The purpose of this research was to qualitatively study the public’s trust and 
knowledge of UAS safety. Additionally, the researcher sought to determine whether the 
research subjects would be willing to fly as passengers in UAS, and if publicity of the UAS 
industry, its development and integration into the NAS have influenced their perception of 
UAS safety, which could affect their decision to travel as passengers in UAS. The 
researcher also examined data to identify if any observable Dunning-Kruger Effect existed 
that would suggest if the subjects believed they had more knowledge about the factors that 
affect UAS safety than what they knew about those factors when deciding whether they 
would fly as passengers in UAS.  
To obtain a better understanding of these topics in order to conduct a thorough 
analysis of data obtained from the interviews conducted during this research study, as well 
as to obtain a thorough understanding of the level of knowledge of aviation safety that 
research subjects have, this chapter details the researcher’s review of relevant literature as 
it relates to the purpose of this study. As such, the researcher aligned the topics of this 
review of literature chapter with the topics contained within the data collection instrument 
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detailed within the methodology chapter of this dissertation. Specifically, this chapter 
details; manned aviation regulations, small unmanned aircraft regulations, large unmanned 
aircraft regulations, aircraft accident statistics, aircraft accident causes, unmanned aircraft 
human factors, public trust in automation, unmanned aircraft publicity, and the Dunning-
Kruger effect. 
 
Manned Aviation Regulations 
Of topic within the data collection instrument, it was sought to determine if the 
research subjects had any knowledge of manned aviation safety regulations in order to 
contrast and determine if they had any knowledge of unmanned aviation safety regulations. 
This section of the review of literature chapter examines related parts of Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FAR) promulgated for the safety of manned aircraft by the FAA. Contrasts 
to regulations detailed within this section are contained within the Small Unmanned 
Aircraft Regulations and Large Unmanned Aircraft Regulations sections of this chapter.  
It was identified by the researcher during review of 14 Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) pertaining to aviation safety that numerous aircraft, airmen certification, and 
operations regulations were published at the time of this research. Specifically, the 
researcher reviewed these aviation safety regulations to determine; if UAS were as 
technically reliable and safe as manned aircraft; if UAS were licensed the same as manned 
aircraft; if UAS operators were licensed and trained the same as manned aircraft pilots; if 
UAS were allowed to operate in the same airspace as manned aircraft; if UAS mechanics 
were licensed the same as manned aircraft mechanics; and, if UAS were required to be 
maintained the same as manned aircraft.  
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Tables 2.1 through 2.12 list Title 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapters A through N, 
aeronautics and space regulations by part and title, as adapted from the Government 
Printing Office’s (GPO) electronic CFR website for FAR’s (Aeronautics and Space, 2017). 
It is noted by the researcher that the parts under each subchapter are not entirely in 
sequential order and contain gaps in numbering because of reserved numbers by the 
Government Printing Office for publication of future regulatory parts. Similarly, 
subchapters L through M were not published at the time of this research and were listed as 
reserved for future publication. These tables provide an outline for the level and breadth of 
regulations that pertain to manned aviation safety. However, although the researcher 
acknowledges that each table in this section outlines the applicable safety regulations 
within each subchapter by subpart number, not every regulation listed within each table 
will be addressed in detail within this section. Instead, this chapter will detail and drill 
down into the regulatory parts that relate topically to the data collection instrument 
previously addressed within this section.  
In Table 2.1, specific regulations within Title 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapter A are 
listed, which prescribe general requirements and lay the foundational framework for 
aviation language in the aviation safety regulations throughout the remainder of the 14 CFR 
subchapters discussed within this dissertation. Additionally, it standardizes and defines key 
terms used throughout the aviation industry in the United States and establishes general 
requirements for the industry. It also establishes safety management system (SMS) 
requirements for commercial air carrier operators certificated under 14 CFR Part 119 that 
will be discussed in detail later within this section. 
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Table 2.1 
Definitions and General Requirements (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
1 Definitions and Abbreviations 
3 General Requirements 
5 Safety Management Systems 
 
Key terms defined within 14 CFR Part 1 were; aircraft, meaning a device used or 
intended to be used to fly in the air; and unmanned aircraft, meaning an aircraft operated 
without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft.  
14 CFR Part 3 establishes general requirements regarding false and misleading 
statements made in records for type-certificated products and aircraft. It further defines 
airworthy, where Part 1 did not contain a definition of airworthy, as it pertains to the 
airworthiness of the aircraft. Airworthy, within §3, means that an aircraft conforms to its 
type design and is in a condition for safe operation. Type design is further detailed within 
14 CFR Part 21, which is addressed later in this section. 
14 CFR Part 5, established by the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation 
Administration Extension Act of 2010 (2010), or Public Law 111-216, requires commercial 
aircraft operators certificated under 14 CFR Part 119, and subsequently Part 121, to 
maintain an SMS that meets the requirement of Part 5 that is acceptable to the FAA. Key 
parts of an SMS referenced within the regulation are a system that contains safety policy, 
safety risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion. 
In Table 2.2, specific regulations within Title 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapter B are 
listed which prescribe general procedural rules for the public and the FAA. In this 
subchapter, Part 11 applies to the administration and promulgation of aviation safety 
regulations, specifically the issuance, amendment, and repeal of regulations in public 
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rulemaking by the FAA under Title 5 U.S.C., Part 1, Chapter 5, Subchapter 2, Section 553 
for federal rulemaking. 
14 CFR Part 13 specifies regulations for public reporting to the FAA of any 
violations of rules, regulations and orders, as well as the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the 
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, the Airport and Airway Development Act of 
1970, the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, as well as the Airport and Airway 
Improvement Act of 1982. 
Table 2.2 
Procedural Rules (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
11 General Rulemaking Procedures 
13 Investigative and Enforcement Procedures 
14 Rules Implementing the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980 
15 Administrative Claims Under Federal Tort Claims Act 
16 Rules of Practice for Federally Assisted Airport Enforcement Procedures 
17 Procedures for Protests and Contract Disputes 
 
In Table 2.3, specific regulations within Title 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapter C are 
listed which pertain to aircraft, including rotorcraft, propeller and engine certification, as 
well as registration, maintenance and alterations of aircraft and aircraft components. These 
particular regulations lay the foundation for airworthiness and continued airworthiness of 
aircraft to ensure continued airworthiness. 
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Table 2.3 
Aircraft (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
21 Certification Procedures for Products and Articles 
23 
Airworthiness Standards; Normal, Utility, Acrobatic and Commuter Category 
Airplanes 
25 Airworthiness Standards; Transport Category Airplanes 
26 
Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements for Transport Category 
Airplanes 
27 Airworthiness Standards; Normal Category Rotorcraft 
29 Airworthiness Standards; Transport Category Rotorcraft 
31 Airworthiness Standards; Manned Free Balloons 
33 Airworthiness Standards; Aircraft Engines 
34 
Fuel Venting and Exhaust Emission Requirements for Turbine Engine 
Powered Airplanes 
35 Airworthiness Standards; Propellers 
36 Noise Standards; Aircraft Type and Airworthiness Certification 
39 Airworthiness Directives 
43 Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, Rebuilding and Alteration 
45 Identification and Registration Marking 
47 Aircraft Registration 
 
 14 CFR Part 21, pertains to the certification of products and articles, wherein a 
product is defined as an aircraft, engine or propeller, and an article is defined as an 
associated part or component of a product. However, §21.1 provides exception to the 
applicability of this regulation by excluding unmanned aircraft that are subject to §107.  
During review, the researcher identified that §21 is quite extensive in safety 
certification language, promulgating regulatory procedural requirements for the issuance 
and revision of manufacturing design and production approvals, airworthiness certificates 
and airworthiness approvals for products and articles. This section also establishes such 
language as type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC), which are 
associated with a product’s approved type design, or properly altered type certificated state. 
In this section of the regulation, a TC is issued under the FAA’s authority codified in Title 
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49 U.S.C. §44704 when the FAA Administrator determines that a product or article meets 
minimum standards in its design, manufacture, and performance criteria.  
Similarly, under the same authority within Title 49 U.S.C. §44704, and 14 CFR 
Part 21, the Administrator may also issue a STC for an approved revision to a TC. It is key 
to note in §21.31 that a TC is issued to an aircraft under an approved type design, which 
contains all of the FAA approved engineering drawings, specifications, airworthiness 
limitations, instructions for continued airworthiness required in the associated FAR parts 
listed within Table 2.3 for airworthiness standards, as well as associated aircraft inspection 
and maintenance programs. This is noted because the definition of airworthy requires an 
aircraft to meet its type design, as noted in 14 CFR Part 3. 
Although specific airworthiness standards listed in Table 2.3 for FAR Parts 23 
through 33 are only applicable to other than unmanned aircraft, §21 is noted to be the 
foundational certification regulation for the types and categories of aircraft listed within 
§23 through §33. And, these FAR parts also establish airworthiness standards for a specific 
aircraft category’s; aerodynamics, performance, and flight characteristics; controllability 
and maneuverability; structural loading, design and construction requirements specific to 
the category of aircraft; powerplant, system and equipment requirements; as well as aircraft 
operating limitations. 
14 CFR Part 39 establishes airworthiness directive rules that are applicable to 
products and issued by the FAA under two conditions; when a product has an unsafe 
condition, malfunction or deficiency; and the condition, malfunction, or deficiency exists, 
or has the propensity to occur in aircraft having the same type design. 
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14 CFR Part 43 prescribes requirements for the maintenance, preventive 
maintenance, rebuilding, alteration, inspection, and recording of such actions in aircraft, 
engine and propeller maintenance and inspection logbooks. It also describes persons 
authorized to perform such actions and requirements for approval for return to service. 
However, it was noted during review by the researcher, that this regulation is not applicable 
to aircraft subject to regulations contained within §107, which will be detailed later in this 
chapter.  
14 CFR Parts 45 and 47 establish marking and registration requirements for 
products, articles, and life-limited parts. Markings addressed within Part 45 refers to such 
markings on products and articles that ensure traceability to a product’s or article’s type 
design and ensure they are readily identifiable, and more especially identifiable following 
an accident, and any resultant fire or other damage. This regulation is applicable to aircraft 
having a type certificate, thus precluding unmanned aircraft subject to §107.  
Registration of aircraft in accordance with 14 CFR Part 47 is required for operating 
aircraft within the United States, with the exception of certain aircraft operated by 
government agencies. This section also establishes requirements for proof of ownership 
and citizenship. Specific registration requirements for small unmanned aircraft in 14 CFR 
Part 48 will be addressed later in this chapter.  
Table 2.4 lists 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapter D regulations promulgated for the 
certification of airmen who are otherwise defined as pilot flight crewmembers, non-pilot 
flight crewmembers, and airmen who are not flight crewmembers. These regulations 
specify minimum airmen qualification and proficiency requirements to ensure safe aircraft 
operations. 
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Table 2.4 
 
14 CFR Part 61 prescribes regulations for pilots, flight and ground instructors for 
manned aircraft operations. With the exception, §61.1 states the rules governing airmen 
under this part do not apply to those under §107. Similarly, §61.8 states the inapplicability 
to apply operations under §107 as a justification the meet the requirements under §61. 
These regulations detail rules for pilot certification, aircraft type and instrument ratings, 
minimum flight hours, qualification training in flight simulators and flight training devices 
that are detailed in §60, penalties for drug and alcohol abuse, standards for knowledge and 
practical tests, recording of flight time in pilot logbooks, specific medical qualifications, 
proficiency checks, and penalties for falsification of records. The airmen addressed in this 
part were found to be student pilots, recreational pilots, private pilots, commercial pilots, 
air transport pilots, flight instructors, ground instructors, and sport pilots. 
14 CFR Part 63 prescribes airmen standards for non-pilot flight crewmembers; 
flight engineers and navigators. This part specifies rules for related certifications and 
aircraft type ratings, penalties for drug and alcohol abuse, eligibility and minimum 
qualifications, knowledge and skill requirements, testing, and approved training courses. 
14 CFR Part 65 prescribes airmen standards for non-flight crewmembers; air traffic 
control (ATC) tower operators, aircraft dispatchers, mechanics, repairmen, and parachute 
Airmen (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
60 
Flight Simulation Training Device Initial and Continuing Qualification and 
Use 
61 Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors 
63 Certification: Flight Crewmembers Other Than Pilots 
65 Certification: Airmen Other Than Flight Crewmembers 
67 Medical Standards and Certification 
68 
Requirements for Operating Certain Small Aircraft Without a Medical 
Certificate 
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riggers. This part specifies rules for; eligibility and certification; written, oral and practical 
test standards; skill requirement; recency of experience, ratings and privileges; 
authorization; limitations of privileges and certifications; type ratings; and, performance 
standards.  
14 CFR Part 67 prescribes airmen medical standards and certification; first-class, 
second-class, and third-class. These standards require; application; medical examination 
by an aviation medical examiner who is approved by the FAA; pass specific eye, ear, nose, 
throat and equilibrium standards; meet mental, neurological, cardiovascular and general 
health standards; and maintain specific health records in order to maintain a specific 
medical certificate for the airmen certificate being sought. 
In this section of the review of literature, it was noted that 14 CFR Part 68.1 
prescribes an exception to the medical certification requirements of §67 for pilots who 
operate small aircraft, also known as basic med. It was also noted this part became effective 
May 1, 2017, a date after the researcher conducted this research. This regulation lessens 
the restrictions found in previous requirements. And, the part also allows operators of small 
aircraft to operate such aircraft in accordance with §61.113(i) without holding a valid 
medical certificate issued under §67. However, specific conditions under §61.113(i) must 
be satisfied to operate under this rule. In accordance with §68, the operator must complete 
an approved medical education course, obtain a comprehensive medical examination, and 
certify in writing that the operator has no disqualifying medical condition that would cause 
them to operate an aircraft in an unsafe manner. Additionally, in order to operate without 
a valid medical certificate, the following conditions must be met under §61.113(i): 
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• The operator must hold a valid driver’s license issued within the United 
States, 
• the aircraft is certified for six occupants or less, and has a maximum take-
off weight of 6,000 pounds, 
• the aircraft is operated with a maximum of five passengers on board, 
• the aircraft is operated at 18,000 feet or below, 
• the aircraft is operated within the U.S. unless authorized in a country outside 
U.S., 
• the aircraft does not exceed 250 knots, and 
• the pilot logbook is in possession of the pilot. 
Table 2.5 lists 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapter E regulations promulgated for 
classification and use of the national air space (NAS). Part 71, administered by FAA Order 
7400.11A dated August 3, 2016, classifies the NAS into six categories with six distinct 
reporting points. While, §73 and §77 designate special use airspace and rules for safely 
using the navigable airspace. It was noted by the researcher that regulations for governing 
airspace were complex. As a result, the researcher sought and found further guidance 
published by the FAA within FAA Order 7400.11A, and FAA Handbook FAA-H-8083-
254B H-80, which further explained and interpreted these regulations.  
Table 2.5 
Airspace (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
71 
Designation of Class A, B, C, D, and E Airspace Areas; Air Traffic Service 
Routes; and Reporting Points 
73 Special Use Airspace 
77 Safe, Efficient Use, and Preservation of The Navigable Airspace 
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From Figure 2.1, the reporting points are defined in FAA Order 7400.11A, 
paragraph 1001, as physical geographic locations in which aircraft positions must be 
reported and applies to all directions of flight (FAA, 2016a). It is noted that these 
regulations and the supporting FAA administrative order exist for the purposes of air traffic 
control, to include prevention of mid-air collisions. 
The six categories of air space delineated in §71 are Class A, B, C, D, E, and G. At 
the time of this research, the FAA did not publish a Class F airspace within the §71. 
Classification of these areas are illustrated in Figure 2.1, as reflected in Chapter 15 of FAA 
Handbook FAA-H-8083-254B titled, airspace. 
Figure 2.1 
Airspace Classification (FAA, 2016c) 
 
  Class A airspace, further detailed within FAA Order 7400.11A, paragraph 2000, is 
defined as the airspace from 18,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) to flight level (FL) 600, and 
it was noted by the researcher in review of this order that all aircraft operators must operate 
in accordance with instrument flight rules (IFR) and comply with 14 CFR Part 91.135 for 
general operating rules within Class A airspace (FAA, 2016c). Operations in accordance 
with §91.135 require specific aircraft communication and navigation equipment, as well as 
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specific clearance and authorizations from ATC. The researcher identified Class A airspace 
to be most restrictive, with lessening of restrictions from Class B to G, with Class G 
airspace having the least restrictions. The associated FAA handbook and airspace chapter 
contains similar language in the definition of Class A airspace and states it includes the 
airspace extending 12 nautical miles (NM) from the coast of the 48 contiguous states, to 
include Alaska (FAA, 2016c). 
Class B airspace is defined by subpart B, paragraph 3000, of the order. This airspace 
is dependent upon the location near specific major commercial airports (typically a defined 
radius around the airport) within specific major cities that are listed in the order, the 
distance from the surface of the ground, and ceiling limit of MSL height. Additionally, 
operations within these areas require minimum qualifications for the pilot, associated 
adherence to specific operating rules, ATC clearance and authorizations, as well as specific 
aircraft communication and navigation equipment in accordance with 14 CFR 91.131 
general operating rules for Class B airspace (FAA, 2016c). It was identified by the 
researcher that operators are primarily responsible for determining the classification of 
airspace in which they operate and must adhere to specific operating requirements.  
The associated FAA handbook and airspace chapter define Class B airspace to 
generally include the airspace existing from the surface of the ground to 10,000 feet MSL 
around (typically a defined radius around the airport) the nation’s busiest airports (FAA, 
2016c).  
Class C airspace is defined by subpart C, paragraph 4000, of FAA Order 7400.11A. 
These areas consist of cities/airports that are considered other-than-major commercial 
airports, also called primary airports, located in cities in Class C airspace. These cities are 
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listed within the order and detailed in this section. Aircraft operators in Class C airspace 
are subject to the general operating rules under §91.130. Similar to Class B airspace, Class 
C airspace is also defined by the distance from the surface of the ground (typically a defined 
radius around the airport), and ceiling limit of MSL height. It was noted by the researcher 
that, although the order maintains a complete list of cities/primary airports located in Class 
C airspace, the list is too exhaustive and of no added benefit or value to list here in its 
entirety. Instead, the researcher presents the fact that it is incumbent upon any aircraft 
operator to know the specific airspace in which they intend to operate.  
The associated FAA Handbook, FAA-H-8083-254B, further clarifies and defines 
Class C airspace in chapter 15 as the existing airspace from the surface of the ground to 
4,000 feet MSL around affected airports (typically a five NM radius around the airport), 
which host an operational air traffic control tower that is serviced by ATC radar approach 
control, and has a specific number of IFR operations or passenger enplanements (FAA, 
2016c). Additionally, operators must maintain two-way radio communications with ATC 
while operating in this airspace.  
Class D airspace is defined by subpart D, paragraph 5000, of FAA Order 7400.11A. 
Operators of aircraft within this airspace are subject to the requirements of 14 CFR 91.129 
and each area within this airspace contains at least one primary airport as listed within the 
order. It was noted by the researcher that, although the order maintains a complete list of 
areas located in Class D airspace, the list is too exhaustive and of no added benefit or value 
to list here in its entirety. Instead, the researcher presents the fact that it is incumbent upon 
any aircraft operator to know the specific airspace in which they intend to operate. 
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The associated FAA Handbook, FAA-H-8083-254B, further clarifies and defines 
Class D airspace in chapter 15 as generally including the airspace from the surface of the 
ground to 2,500 feet MSL surrounding affected airports hosting an operational air traffic 
control tower. Additionally, operators must maintain two-way radio communications with 
ATC while operating in this airspace. 
Class E airspace is defined by subpart E, paragraph 6000, of FAA Order 7400.11A 
as controlled airspace which is not classified as A, B, C, or D. Although it does not include 
airspace above 18,000 feet MSL, it exists from the surface of the ground, or specified 
minimum altitude, to the adjacent controlled airspace. It was noted by the researcher that, 
although the order maintains a complete list of areas located in Class E airspace, the list is 
too exhaustive and of no added benefit or value to list here in its entirety. Instead, the 
researcher presents the fact that it is incumbent upon any aircraft operator to know the 
specific airspace in which they intend to operate. 
The associated FAA (2016c) Handbook, FAA-H-8083-254B, further clarifies and 
defines Class E airspace in chapter 15 as the controlled airspace that is not classified as A, 
B, C, or D airspace and additionally describes it as a large amount of the airspace over the 
United States and includes the airspace below 14,500 feet MSL. Variations exist, however. 
The handbook also reveals FAA policy that depicts Class E airspace to begin at 14,500 feet 
MSL where no Class E base is defined and includes airspace that is 1,200 feet above ground 
level (AGL), which incidentally exists within most areas of the U.S. For the purposes of 
this paragraph, AGL is defined by the handbook as the vertical distance of an aircraft above 
the terrain that it extends to 17,999 feet and also the airspace above FL600. Flight level, or 
FL, is defined as flight above 18,000 feet. FL 600 is defined at 60,000 feet (FAA, 2016c). 
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Class G airspace is defined by FAA Order 7400.11A as the uncontrolled airspace 
that has not been classified as A, B, C, D, or E airspace. This airspace extends from the 
surface of the ground to Class E airspace. This airspace is not controlled by ATC and pilots 
must adhere to visual flight rules (VFR). 
Table 2.6 lists 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapter F regulations promulgated for general 
air traffic and operating rules. Although the subchapter includes special rules for the 
security control of air traffic under §99, ultralight vehicles under §103, and parachute 
operations under §105, this section will more appropriately address §91, 93, 95, 97, and 
101 as highlighted in Table 2.6. Because of the total volume of regulations contained within 
this subchapter, this section will highlight the subparts as they pertain to manned aircraft. 
Table 2.6 
Air Traffic and General Operating Rules (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
91 General Operating and Flight Rules 
93 Special Air Traffic Rules 
95 IFR Altitudes 
97 Standard Instrument Procedures 
99 Security Control of Air Traffic 
101 
Moored Balloons, Kites, Amateur Rockets, Unmanned Free Balloons, and 
Certain Model Aircraft 
103 Ultralight Vehicles 
105 Parachute Operations 
 
 14 CFR Part 91 generally prescribes regulations promulgated for the operation of 
aircraft in the U.S., including the water extending three nautical miles from its coast. It 
applies to the person operating an aircraft and each person on board an aircraft. As it relates 
to this research, §91 does not apply to unmanned aircraft governed and operated in 
accordance with §107, except for those requirements listed in §§107.13, 107.27, 107.47, 
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107.57, and 107.59. These regulations will be addressed in small unmanned aircraft 
regulations section of this chapter.  
Subparts under §91 address general aircraft operating requirements that define 
aircraft airworthiness, pilot in command (PIC) responsibilities, careless and reckless 
aircraft operations, rules prohibiting the use of drugs and alcohol, and rules that prohibit 
operators from transporting illicit drugs. It lists basic flight rules, containing both visual 
and instrument flight rules. It also lists basic aircraft equipment requirements; special types 
of flight operations; aircraft maintenance, preventive maintenance and alterations; 
requirements for foreign operators of U.S. registered aircraft outside the U.S.; procedures 
for regulatory waivers; and, requirements for fractional ownership of aircraft, or ownership 
of aircraft by more than one entity. 
14 CFR Parts 93, 95, and 97 generally prescribe regulations promulgated for special 
air traffic, altitude standards, and instrument flight rule (IFR) altitudes. Special air traffic 
rules under §93 detail specific rules, definitions, descriptions of flight areas, operating 
procedures, types of operations (aircraft or rotorcraft), communication procedures, 
reservation and allocation of landing and take-off slots at high density airports, minimum 
altitudes, clearance procedures, special rules for commercial operations, filing of flight 
plans, visual flight rules, and instrument flight rules for special air traffic areas. 
14 CFR Part 95 prescribes regulations for aircraft operating under IFR in air traffic 
routes controlled by ATC. These areas also include certain mountainous areas of the U.S. 
to include the states of Alaska and Hawaii, and the territory of Puerto Rico. Part 97 
prescribes regulations for obstacle departure procedures and weather minimums applicable 
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to takeoffs under IFR at civil airports; and, standard instrument approach procedures and 
weather minimums applicable to landing IFR at civil airports. 
14 CFR Part 101 prescribes regulations promulgated for operating moored 
balloons, kites, amateur rockets, unmanned free balloons, and model aircraft. Because this 
regulation is similar to the small unmanned aircraft regulations listed in §107, each type of 
aircraft defined in the applicability section of §101.1 will be detailed here, and the 
remaining regulations within §101 will be briefly examined in the subsequent paragraphs 
of this sections. 
• A moored balloon is a device that is moored, or anchored by attachment, to 
the ground or an object, and is at least six feet in diameter, or has at least a 
115-cubic foot gas capacity. 14 CFR Part 1.1 defines a balloon as a lighter-
than-air aircraft, not driven by an engine, but instead sustains flight by use 
of gas or heater to maintain buoyancy.  
• A kite is device intended to be flown with a similar rope-like, or string-like, 
attachment and weighs a maximum of five pounds. 14 CFR Part 1.1 defines 
a kite merely as a paper, cloth, metal or other material covered framework, 
which is flown at the end of a rope or cable. 
• An amateur rocket is any amateur rocket, except those types used for aerial 
display such as aerial fireworks. 14 CFR Part 1.1 maintains a more thorough 
definition, and §101.1 provides reference to it. It further defines an amateur 
rocket as an unmanned rocket propelled by a motor or motors having a total 
impulse of no more than 889,600 Newton-seconds (combined), which can 
fly no higher than 150 kilometers from the ground. 
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• An unmanned free balloon is defined as a balloon that is not moored and 
carries a payload package of the required regulatory size and weight 
limitations and is suspended by a rope-like device from the balloon. 
• A model aircraft is defined as an aircraft that meets §101.41 and is capable 
of sustained flight. Additionally, it is capable of being flown by the operator 
under visual line of sight conditions, being flown for the purposes of 
recreation or hobby, and not commercial purposes. Further definition listed 
within §101.41 generally limits the weight of a model aircraft to 55 pounds, 
requires the aircraft to be operated in accordance with community or 
nationally recognized organizational and operational standards, so as not to 
interfere with manned aircraft within the airspace, and requires the operator 
to notify an airport operator and ATC tower when the aircraft is operated 
within five miles from an airport. 
Exceptions to these definitions apply, detailed in §101.7, stating that no one may 
operate any of the types of aircraft in a manner that is hazardous, which could harm other 
persons or property. Similarly, no one may drop objects from these types of aircraft if the 
potential exists for harm to other persons or property. 
Further detailing these regulations throughout §101, the researcher identified that 
certain restrictions exist disallowing operators from operating these aircraft within 
prohibited and restricted areas, limiting aircraft altitude without ATC authorization 
dependent upon the type of aircraft, and requiring specific equipment and marking 
requirements dependent upon the type of aircraft. 
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Table 2.7 lists 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapter G regulations promulgated for 
aircraft operations by commercial air carriers and operators holding out for compensation 
or hire. The researcher found these regulations to be quite extensive in regulating safe 
operations of commercial passenger transportation, cargo operations, and other types of 
commercial aircraft operations. The regulations detail applicability of each part to the type 
of commercial operation, define terminologies used in each of these parts, establish 
requirements for flight duty times and rest periods for flight crew under certain types of 
commercial operations, and establish requirements for drug and alcohol testing of airmen.  
These parts also establish certification and operating requirements of air carriers 
and commercial operators, certification and operating requirements for owner/operators of 
large aircraft that have a 20 or more seating capacity, foreign air carrier operating 
requirements, rotorcraft operating requirements involving external-load lifting and 
carrying operations, operating requirements for small commercial on-demand and 
commuter operations, commercial air tours, agricultural operations, and certification of 
airports for operations under these parts. This section will detail these regulations as it 
applies to the topics of this dissertation, the main research questions, and the data collection 
method used to interview research subjects. 
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Table 2.7 
Air Carriers and Operators for Compensation or Hire (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
110 General Requirements 
117 Flight and Duty Limitations and Rest Requirements: Flight crew Members 
119 Certification: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators 
120 Drug and Alcohol Testing Program 
121 Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations 
125 
Certification and Operations: Airplanes Having a Seating Capacity of 20 or 
More Passengers or a Maximum Payload Capacity of 6,000 Pounds or More; 
and Rules Governing Persons on Board Such Aircraft 
129 
Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators of U.S.-Registered 
Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage 
133 Rotorcraft External-Load Operations 
135 
Operating Requirements: Commuter and On Demand Operations and Rules 
Governing Persons on Board Such Aircraft 
136 Commercial Air Tours and National Parks Air Tour Management 
137 Agricultural Aircraft Operations 
139 Certification of Airports 
 
14 CFR Part 110 lists definitions of key terms and abbreviations for commercial 
aircraft operations used interchangeably across any of the parts listed within Subchapter G. 
It is key for the purposes of this dissertation to note that §110.1 specifically defines an 
unmanned aircraft as being operated without direct intervention from a person inside the 
aircraft. 
14 CFR Part 117 contains regulations that establish requirements for a flight crew’s 
flight and duty limitations, flight crew rest periods, and are applicable to conducting 
commercial passenger transportation under §121. The regulation also requires §121 
operators to establish and maintain a fatigue education and awareness training program. 
And, requires these operators, if not meeting these minimum requirements, to obtain 
approval from the FAA to prevent fatigue related accidents and incidents.  
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It is noted by the researcher that Title 49 CFR Part 830.1 defines an aircraft accident 
as an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the 
time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have 
disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the 
aircraft receives substantial damage (Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents 
General Applicability, 2015). The definition also includes unmanned aircraft accidents, 
and the regulation further defines an incident as an occurrence other than an aircraft 
accident.  
14 CFR Part 119 contains regulations promulgated for the certification of air 
carriers and commercial operators under §121, §125 and §135. The regulations establish 
requirements for approved operations specifications, or operational approvals by the FAA, 
a safety management system meeting §5 requirements, maintaining a principle base of 
operations, aircraft leasing arrangements, deviation requirements, minimum management 
personnel positions and descriptions, as well as minimum qualification requirements for 
management personnel.  This part is not applicable to unmanned aircraft operations under 
§107. 
14 CFR Part 120 contains regulations promulgated for the administration of drug 
and alcohol testing of pilots operating aircraft under §119, and air traffic controllers. This 
part also prescribes penalties prohibiting the use of drugs and alcohol by such pilots and 
air traffic controllers, as well as refusal to submit to drug and alcohol testing by these 
airmen, as well as airmen certificated under §63 and §65. Additionally, the part prescribes 
requirements for drug and alcohol testing programs administered by employers of each of 
the applicable airmen under this part. 
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The following regulations under Subpart G were noted to be specific to regulating 
the safety of commercial passenger transport operations of 9 or less passengers and those 
operations in excess of 9 passengers, as well as transporting air cargo. 
• 14 CFR Part 121 Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and 
Supplemental Operations 
• 14 CFR Part 129 Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators 
of U.S.-Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage  
• 14 CFR Part 135 Operating Requirements: Commuter and On Demand 
Operations and Rules Governing Persons on Board Such Aircraft 
These regulations prescribe rules for the certification to operate, and the FAA’s 
approval of operational routes. Additionally, the regulations prescribe rules for establishing 
a quality and operations manual system for safely operating and maintaining control of 
operations and maintenance of aircraft, which require specific manual contents. Aircraft 
requirements, to include minimum aircraft instrument and equipment items, safety items, 
maintenance procedures, preventive maintenance procedures, alterations procedures, 
overhaul schedules, life limited component replacement schedules, airworthiness return to 
service requirements, and aircraft operating limitations are detailed within the regulation. 
Similar to aircraft requirements, the regulations also detail airmen and crewmember 
certification, minimum crew numbers, crew member training and qualifications, flight and 
duty time limitations, and rest times. These regulations also detail required records and 
records retention requirements for all aircraft maintenance, aircrew flight records and 
training, loading, dispatch records, flight releases, airworthiness releases for maintenance 
actions, as well as FAA operating approvals and authorizations, and certification records. 
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The following regulations under Subpart G prescribe requirements for the safety of 
manned aircraft operations that involve specialty use of smaller aircraft and rotorcraft in 
certain types of operations. These regulations establish operating rules and require certain 
certification requirements in order to conduct approved aircraft operations; require specific 
pilot qualification, certificate, rating, and training requirements; aircraft airworthiness and 
maintenance requirements; and, with the exception of operations under §136, preclude the 
transportation of passengers. It was noted by the researcher that unless otherwise noted by 
these regulations to establish more restrictive operating requirements, minimum 
requirements under §91, general operating and flight rules, still applies.   
• 14 CFR Part 133 Rotorcraft External-Load Operations 
• 14 CFR Part 136 Commercial Air Tours and National Parks Air Tour 
Management 
• 14 CFR Part 137 Agricultural Aircraft Operations 
14 CFR Part 139 prescribes regulations for the certification of airports, applicable 
to airports serving scheduled passenger-carrying air carriers with a seating capacity of 9 or 
more passengers, as well as unscheduled passenger-carrying operations with a seating 
capacity of 31 or more passengers. In addition to the certification requirements, these 
regulations also prescribe rules for safe airport operations that covers facilities, equipment, 
navigational aids, personnel, inspection, records, and records retention. The regulation also 
details requirements for developing and maintaining a current airport certification manual, 
which must contain specific content items that includes a grid map of the airport layout, a 
description of the aircraft movement areas, procedure to avoid interruption or failure of 
facilities and navigational aids supporting aircraft when maintenance on facilities and 
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navigational aids are being conducted, procedures for maintaining improved and 
unimproved surfaces, procedures for maintaining airport marking and signage, as well as 
the airport emergency plans and procedures. 
Table 2.8 lists 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapter H regulations promulgated for 
certifying and regulating pilot schools and training centers, as well as aviation maintenance 
schools and aircraft maintenance repair stations. 
Table 2.8 
Schools and Other Certificated Agencies (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
141 Pilots Schools 
142 Training Centers 
145 Repair Stations 
147 Aviation Maintenance Technician Schools 
 
14 CFR Part 141 prescribes regulations for pilot schools, which formally train 
pilots. These regulations detail issuance of pilot school certificates by the FAA, and 
issuance of ratings for recreational, private, commercial, and air transport pilot courses, as 
well as instrument and aircraft type ratings. Additional ratings for flight and ground school 
instructor courses, and refresher courses in each category are also detailed. The regulation 
is specific in detailing requirements for the qualifications, experience, minimum flight 
hours, and certification requirements of airmen conducting training for the pilot school, as 
well as the required aircraft and airport facilities needed to conduct approved training. The 
regulation also details operating rules, records and record retention, and FAA approval of 
the pilot school course curriculum.  
Similar to pilot schools, 14 CFR Part 142 lists regulations promulgated for the 
certification and operation of pilot training centers that conduct training in flight training 
devices, advanced flight training devices, and aircraft simulators as an alternate means of 
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aircraft flight training under §§61, 63, 65, 91, 121, 125, 135, and 137. The regulation lists 
requirements, which are similar to §141, for airmen, facilities, training devices and 
equipment, operating rules, records and records retention, and course curriculum, in order 
to regulate the safety and quality of pilot training. 
14 CFR Part 147 also contains requirements for formally training aircraft 
mechanics. This part lists similar requirements as §141 and §142 for FAA approval and 
certification to conduct training, maintaining adequate facilities and equipment for 
instruction, as well as teaching an approved curriculum to ensure the safety and quality of 
curriculum taught to aircraft maintenance technicians. 
14 CFR Part 145 provides regulations for the safety and quality of maintenance 
conducted by certificated repair stations. These regulations for air agencies are applicable 
to repair stations that perform maintenance, preventive maintenance, major repairs and 
alterations on aircraft, engines, propellers, and components in accordance with §43, as well 
as in accordance with the maintenance and maintenance schedule requirements under §91, 
and §121 and §135 for maintenance conducted on commercial passenger aircraft.  
These regulations prescribe rules for management personnel, supervisory positions, 
persons making airworthiness return to service determinations, quality and final 
inspections. Additionally, the regulations detail the quality and appropriateness of 
facilities, equipment and materials used in performing maintenance under these parts, as 
well as operating rules that include maintaining a current and FAA accepted repair station 
manual and quality control manual with the required content items for conducting 
operations, as well as a training program approved by the FAA. 
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With the exception of §153, Table 2.9 lists 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapter I 
regulations promulgated for administrative regulations for airports that were not considered 
by the researcher to directly impact aviation safety. These regulations, by title, are listed 
within Table 2.9.  
Table 2.9 
Airports (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
150 Airport Noise Compatibility Planning 
151 Federal Aid to Airports 
152 Airport Aid Program 
153 Airport Operations 
155 Release of Airport Property from Surplus Disposal Restrictions 
156 State Block Grant Pilot Program 
157 Notice of Construction, Alteration, Activation, and Deactivation of Airports 
158 Passenger Facility Charges 
161 Notice and Approval of Airport Noise and Access Restrictions 
169 
Expenditure of Federal Funds for Nonmilitary Airports or Air Navigation 
Facilities Thereon 
 
However, the researcher noted that §153 contained language directly requiring free 
and uninterrupted, or unrestricted, access to public-use airports by FAA inspectors on 
official business while bearing a current FAA inspector credential, otherwise known as an 
FAA Form 110A credential and badge. This access includes secured and restricted areas 
of the airport. The researcher notes the implications of these regulations are to grant FAA 
inspectors such access in order to inspect and surveil regulated aircraft operators, airmen 
and aircraft for compliance to applicable aviation safety regulations. 
Table 2.10 lists 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapter J regulations promulgated under 
§170 for the establishment and discontinuance criteria for navigation aids operated and 
maintained by the United States, and non-federal navigation facilities under §171. 
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Table 2.10 
Navigation Facilities (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
170 
Establishment and Discontinuance Criteria for Air Traffic Control Services 
and Navigational Facilities 
171 Non-Federal Navigation Facilities 
 
Regulations under §170.3 sets forth rules for the establishment of air traffic control 
towers (ATCT) after certain qualifications are met, which includes the requirement for the 
airport to be open to the public, whether public or privately owned. Additionally, the airport 
owners or authorities must guarantee that the airport will be open for a period of time to 
amortize the cost of establishing the ATCT, and land must be furnished to the FAA without 
cost to develop the ATCT. Discontinuance of FAA funded service to an ATCT, or the 
withdrawal of an ATCT from the airport as defined by §170.3, occurs when the ATCT 
operations and maintenance costs exceed the present value of the ATCT as detailed with 
§170.15. 
14 CFR Part 171 prescribes rules for the request, minimum certification 
requirements, approval, installation, maintenance and operations, and performance 
requirements for very-high-frequency (VHF) omnidirectional range (VOR) facilities, non-
directional radio beacon facilities, instrument landing system (ILS) facilities, simplified 
directional facilities, distance measuring equipment (DME), VHF marker beacon systems, 
and microwave landing systems (MLS).  
Table 2.11 lists 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapter K regulations promulgated for 
administrative functions of the FAA. With the exception of §183, the researcher notes that 
these regulations do not appear to directly affect aviation safety. It was identified by the 
researcher that the FAA designates, or delegates, some of its responsibilities, in accordance 
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with its authority and administrative rules under §183, to private persons who act as 
representatives of the FAA Administrator. The designees perform such FAA functions as 
examining, inspecting, and testing airmen and airmen applicants, and aircraft in order to 
issue applicable FAA certificates and certifications. These regulations specify minimum 
qualifications, testing, certification, privileges, and oversight of the following designees; 
aviation medical examiners, pilot examiners, technical personnel examiners, designated 
aircraft maintenance inspectors, designated engineering representatives, designated 
manufacturing representatives, and designated airworthiness representatives. These 
regulations also detail organizational designation authorizations for delegation to other 
than private persons to conduct designated functions on behalf of the FAA. 
Table 2.11 
Administrative Regulations (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
183 Representatives of the Administrator 
185 
Testimony by Employees and Production of Records in Legal Proceedings, 
and Service of Legal Process and Pleadings 
187 Fees 
189 Use of Federal Aviation Administration Communication Systems 
193 Protection of Voluntarily Submitted Information 
 
Table 2.12 lists 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapter N regulations promulgated for 
aviation insurance. Though these regulations do not directly affect aviation safety, the 
researcher noted the regulations establish liability for hull losses, as well as injury and other 
property damages related to accidents and associated accident causes, which have resulted 
in regulations establishing the eligibility, basis, types, and types of coverages for such 
losses.  
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Table 2.12 
War Risk Insurance (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
198 Aviation Insurance 
 
After conducting a thorough review of literature of Title 14 CFR, Chapter I, 
Subchapters A through N, aeronautics and space regulations, as detailed in Tables 2.1 
through 2.12, the researcher found that extensive regulations were published by the FAA 
for the purposes of regulating the safe operation of aircraft, specifically manned aircraft for 
the purposes of transporting passengers and cargo. It is expected that certificated airmen 
and operators, from novice to expert, should have a thorough knowledge of these 
regulations, or the familiarity to research these regulations and apply them. However, it is 
expected that non-aviators may or may not have a similar level of knowledge of these 
regulations, or the familiarity to research and apply them. 
 
Small Unmanned Aircraft Regulations 
It was identified by the researcher during review of Title 14 CFR, Chapter I, 
Subchapters A through N, aeronautics and space regulations, that numerous aircraft, 
airmen, certification, and operations regulations were published at the time of this research. 
However, few regulatory parts were observed to be specifically written to regulate the 
operation of civil UAS, in comparison to manned civil aviation regulations.  
As a result, the researcher sought to determine if existing UAS regulations 
addressed whether; UAS were as technically reliable and safe as manned aircraft; UAS 
were licensed the same as manned aircraft; UAS operators were licensed and trained the 
same as manned aircraft pilots; UAS were allowed to operate in the same airspace as 
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manned aircraft; UAS mechanics were licensed the same as manned aircraft mechanics; 
and, if UAS were required to be maintained the same as manned aircraft.  
Tables 2.13 and 2.14 detail Title 14 CFR, Chapter I, Subchapters C and F, 
aeronautics and space regulations that are specific to UAS, more respectively to small 
UAS, as adapted from the Government Printing Office’s electronic CFR website 
(Aeronautics and Space, 2017). However, prior to detailing these parts within Tables 2.13 
and 2.14, the researcher notes that §91 generally prescribes regulations promulgated for 
the operation of manned aircraft in the U.S., including the water extending three nautical 
miles from its coast. It also applies to the person operating an aircraft and each person on 
board an aircraft. As it relates to this research, the researcher found that §91 does not apply 
to unmanned aircraft governed and operated in accordance with §107, except for those 
requirements listed in §§107.13, 107.27, 107.47, 107.57, and 107.59.  
Table 2.13 
Aircraft: UAS Specific (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
Part Title 
48 Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft 
 
Table 2.14 
Air Traffic and General Operating Rules: UAS Specific (Aeronautics and Space, 2017) 
PART TITLE 
107 Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
 
In Table 2.13, 14 CFR Part 48 Subpart A details the FAA’s general registration and 
marking requirements for small unmanned aircraft as defined by §1.1, as well as the 
definition listed within Chapter I of this dissertation. This regulation requires UAS 
operators to meet the registration and marking requirements of either §48, or alternatively 
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meet the registration requirements of §47 and the marking requirements of §45 previously 
discussed in this chapter. For the purposes here, registration means the UAS operator 
submits the proper application for registration and aircraft registration number from the 
FAA.  This regulation further requires small UAS registered within the U.S. and operated 
outside of the U.S. to meet the same alternative registration and marking requirements of 
§47 and §45. 
Two sections within §48 list compliance dates in which hobbyist and commercial 
operators who operate small UAS must register and mark their small UAS. Specifically, 
§48.5 requires hobbyist who operate small UAS as model aircraft and have been doing so 
prior to December 21, 2015, must have complied with the registration and marking 
requirements of either §§47 or 48 by February 19, 2016. For all other hobbyist operators 
of small UAS, compliance became mandatory prior to operation once the regulation 
became effective and after February 19, 2016.  
For other than hobbyist operators of small UAS, the regulation required authorized 
small UAS operators to comply with the §47 registration and marking requirements once 
the regulation became effective in December of 2015. However, beginning March 31, 
2016, small UAS operators were afforded the option of complying with §48 instead of §47. 
Certain requirements were observed in §48 for a person who operates a small UAS 
to be eligible for registration under this part. To be eligible registration, one of the 
following items must be met in accordance with §48.15. The UAS must be appropriately 
registered and marked with the registration number by its owner. Or, the UAS must weigh 
less than 0.55 pounds. Or, the UAS must be owned and operated by the U.S. Department 
of Defense. This part establishes rules for three types of operators; model aircraft operators, 
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other than model aircraft operators, and small UAS operated by the U.S. Department of 
Defense.  
To be eligible for registration under §48.20; the small UAS must not be registered 
in another country; it must be owned by a citizen or legal resident of the U.S., or a foreign 
company that is doing business and operating within the U.S.; or, is a UAS that is owned 
by the U.S., state or local government. Owners must also comply with registration by 
completing required application forms, and submission requirements, unless the owner is 
less than 13 years old. If the owner is less than 13 years old, §48.25 simply requires a 
person at least 13 years old to register the small UAS for the person under 13 years old. 
The researcher observed that the fees associated with registration were $5 per small UAS 
under §48.30. 
Following the general registration and marking requirements of Subpart A to §48, 
Subpart B contained detailed instructions for certificates of registration for both model 
aircraft operators and other than model aircraft operators. This subpart lists detailed 
application requirements under §48.100, as well as requirements for maintaining current 
application information required by §48.100, which includes the name and physical address 
information of the registered owner, and the renewal requirements.  
This subpart also includes the marking requirements previously mentioned within 
this section. Specifically, §48.205 lists the required display and location of the registration 
number issued by the FAA, which requires the owner to maintain the registration number 
in a legible condition, attach it to the aircraft in a method that ensures it remains attached 
while the aircraft is being operated, ensure the registration number is available for 
inspection and that it is visible and accessible without the use of a basic tool to access and 
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view it should it be located inside a compartment. 
Because §48 allows for alternative registration in accordance §47 and marking in 
accordance with §45, this paragraph will briefly contrast the two methods. The researcher 
found the registration methods, or the application and request for registration and 
associated registration number, to be similar between manned aircraft and small UAS. 
However, in contrast to the marking requirements for small UAS listed in §48.205, the 
marking requirements for aircraft under §45.11 were observed to be starkly different. This 
regulation not only addresses marking requirements for the registration number issued by 
the FAA, but also specific aircraft manufacturer information. Manufacturer marking will 
be covered first. 
Specifically, §45.1 requires aircraft manufactured under certain sections of §21 to 
be marked with aircraft manufacturer information on a fireproof identification plate that 
contains the name of the manufacturer, its aircraft model number, its aircraft serial number, 
the FAA type certificate number if the aircraft was manufactured under a type certificate 
number, as well as its production number. The regulation also requires the fireproof plate 
to be secured in a way that it would not likely become unreadable, be removed or destroyed 
during normal operation of the aircraft, or become illegible or removed as a result of an 
accident and any associated accident forces or fire. The regulation also requires this 
fireproof plate to be located and securely attached to the exterior surface of the fuselage of 
the aircraft at or near its tail section as defined in the regulation.  
Slight differences for the required information on, and location of, the data plate 
for manned free balloons, aircraft manufactured prior to March 7, 1988, powered 
parachutes and weight-shift-control aircraft are listed within §45 due to aircraft design 
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differences and criteria.  
14 CFR Part 45 Subpart C also specifies regulations for nationality and registration 
marks. The researcher observed this part to be different than the registration and marking 
requirements under §48.205. Under §45.21 general requirements, aircraft operators are 
prohibited from flying aircraft without legible nationality and registration marks that are 
permanently affixed to the aircraft in colored contrast to their background. 
In contrast to §48 marking requirements for small UAS previously mentioned, 
§§45.23, 45.25, 45.27, and 45.29 establish the requirements for manned aircraft that an 
operator must display the aircraft registration number in the following manner: 
• With a capital letter “N” preceding the registration number issued by the 
FAA. This configuration is also referred to as the N-number.  
• For limited, restricted, light-sport, experimental, or provisionally 
certificated aircraft, a special capital letter must follow the N-number, and 
the word limited, restricted, light-sport, experimental, or provisional must 
be displayed near the cockpit in two to six-inch letters. 
• On fixed-wing aircraft, the N-number must be located horizontally on both 
sides of the fuselage between the wing’s trailing edge and the horizontal 
stabilizer’s leading edge, or horizontally on the vertical tail surfaces. N-
numbers may also be located horizontally on engine nacelles when the 
nacelles are located where N-numbers are supposed to be located on 
fuselage surfaces. 
• On rotorcraft, the N-number must be located horizontally on both surfaces 
of the cabin, fuselage, boom, or tail section of the craft. 
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• On airships, or blimps, the N-number must be located horizontally on the 
right horizontal stabilizer’s upper surface, and on the left horizontal 
stabilizer under surface, with the top of the N-number aligned parallel with 
the leading edge of the stabilizers. 
• On balloons, N-numbers must be located on each side of the balloon’s 
envelope, at its maximum horizontal circumference for spherical balloons, 
and its maximum cross section for non-spherical balloons.  
• On weight-shift-control aircraft and powered parachutes, N-numbers must 
be located on opposite locations of the aircraft fuselage. 
• The height of N-number lettering on fixed-wing aircraft must be 12-inches 
or taller, except for aircraft manufactured before January 1, 1983 which 
may have two-inch lettering until the aircraft are repainted or the N-
numbers are changed or replaced. 
• The height of N-number lettering on gliders must be three inches or taller. 
• The height of N-number lettering on certain experimental aircraft 
certificated under §21.191 may be three-inches or taller, when the aircraft 
has a maximum airspeed that does not exceed 180 knots. 
• The height of N-number lettering on airships and balloons, as listed above, 
must be three-inches or taller. 
• The height of N-number lettering on rotorcraft must be 12-inches or taller, 
except rotorcraft manufactured before December 31, 1983 may have 
smaller lettering in accordance with §45.29(b)(3) until the rotorcraft is 
repainted or the N-numbers are changed or replaced. 
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• The width of N-number letters must be two-thirds as wide as the letter’s 
height. There are exceptions for the number 1, and the letters M and W.  
The number 1 must be one-sixth as wide as the number’s height and the 
letters “M” and “W” may be as wide as the letter’s height.  
In comparison, registration and identification requirements for small UAS are less 
stringent than for manned aircraft, in part due to their size. Overall, the researcher interprets 
§48 to be promulgated for the safety of the NAS through the registration and identification 
of small UAS by minimally holding these operators accountable, with traceability to the 
owner in the event of an unsafe operation or accident. It is noted that, in addition to §107 
small UAS operators, even hobbyists are required to comply with registration and 
identification regulations, and are required to pay a registration fee.  
In Table 2.14, 14 CFR Part 107 details the FAA’s air traffic and general operating 
rules for small unmanned aircraft systems. Within Subpart A, general requirements are 
specified that determine applicability of the regulation, definitions, penalties for 
falsification of records or application for certificates, demonstration of compliance to §107 
regulatory requirements, and accident reporting.  
This regulation applies to civil UAS operated in the U.S., but does not apply to 
commercial air carrier operations, a model aircraft subject to §101 previously addressed in 
this dissertation, or operations conducted in accordance with an FAA approved exemption. 
The researcher notes that an operator may elect to comply with §101 model aircraft 
regulations instead of §107 small UAS regulations if the following conditions are met 
under §101.41 and §101.43. The aircraft must be operated recreationally under visual line 
of sight conditions and not for commercial purposes. The aircraft must weigh no more than 
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55 pounds unless it is designed and tested in accordance with a community-based 
organization’s set of safety standards. The aircraft must be operated in accordance a 
community-based organization’s nationally recognized and administered set of operating 
standards. The aircraft must not be an endangerment to the NAS, and must avoid other 
manned aircraft. And, when operated within five miles from an airport, the operator must 
notify the airport and the applicable ATC tower or center. To administer §107, the FAA 
incorporated key definitions.  
• A control station, which is an aircraft subsystem device used by the operator 
to control the small UAS’s flight path. 
• A small unmanned aircraft, which is an unmanned aircraft that weighs less 
than 55 pounds at take-off. 
• An unmanned aircraft, which is an aircraft operated without pilot 
intervention from within or on the aircraft. 
• A visual observer, which is a person who assists the remote pilot operating 
the unmanned aircraft to see and avoid other aircraft in the NAS. 
Small UAS operators must also report accidents, meeting certain criteria, within 10 
calendar days. Events meeting reporting criteria are; any serious injury or loss of 
consciousness to a person; or, any damage in excess of $500 to property with a value 
greater than $500, other than damage to the small UAS. 
Within 14 CFR Part 107, Subpart B operating rules, §107.12 specifies requirements 
for a remote pilot certificate and small UAS rating. To operate a small UAS, these 
regulations require a person to hold a remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating, be 
supervised by a person holding a remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating and 
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having the ability to take control of the small UAS, or hold a temporary small UAS 
certificate as required by §107.65. 
The regulation also specifies registration, airworthiness, and medical requirements. 
Operators must comply with and keep a copy of the registration certificate with the UAS 
as required by §91.203(a)(2). Prior to flight, the operator must inspect the small UAS and 
ensure it remains in safe condition for flight as required by §107.15 and stop operations in 
the event the UAS operation becomes unsafe. And, the regulation restricts a remote pilot, 
visual observer, or other participants from operating a small UAS if he or she has a medical 
condition that would not allow safe operation of the UAS. 
Under §107.19, the regulation requires designation of a remote pilot in command 
(PIC) either before or during the small UAS flight operation. Similar to a PIC of a manned 
aircraft, the remote PIC of a UAS has the same responsibility and final authority over the 
flight operation, and must analyze the operation and ensure continued safe operations to 
prevent damage or harm to people and property in accordance with applicable aviation 
safety regulations. 
In the event of an in-flight emergency, small UAS operators may deviate from any 
regulation as necessary to deal with the emergency in accordance with §107.21. Following 
the event causing the operator to deviate from regulations under §107.21, the remote PIC 
must, upon request, send a written report to the FAA detailing the event. 
The regulation also specifies rules governing hazardous operations, the use of 
alcohol and drugs, conducting operations at night, visual line of sight, and use of visual 
observers. Under §107.23, operators must not operate in a careless or reckless manner, 
similar to §91 requirements for manned aircraft, so as not to endanger life and property. 
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UAS operators may not drop objects from the aircraft that would create a hazard to life and 
property. 
Additional, safety restrictions are published for the safe operation of small UAS. In 
accordance with §107.25, generally, remote pilots may not operate a small UAS from 
inside a moving aerial, land or water vehicle. Exceptions in the regulation do allow 
operators to remotely operate a small UAS from a moving water or land vehicle, so long 
as it is not operated for commercial purposes, and is not operated above densely populated 
areas. Under §107.27, the FAA precludes small UAS operators from operating UAS while 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, as well as transporting illegal drugs and narcotics.  
Certain operational safety regulations were observed to be published for the safe 
operation of small UAS. Under §107.29, operators are prohibited from flying at night or 
during the hours of twilight. With the exception, they may be operated during hours of 
twilight if they are equipped with anti-collision lights meeting the visibility requirement of 
3 statute miles. Additionally, §107.31 requires operators to adhere to visual line of sight 
rules. The remote PIC, visual observer, and operator must only use corrective lenses to 
correct vision in order to see the small UAS during flight.  
For visual observers, if they are used, §107.33 requires the remote PIC and visual 
observer to maintain direct communication at all times during operations and for the visual 
observer to maintain visual contact with the small UAS at all times in accordance with the 
visual line of sight rules specified in §107.31, and visually assess the airspace for air traffic 
and reposition the small UAS to prevent mid-air collisions with other aircraft.  
Additionally, in accordance with §107.35 operators may not operate more than one aircraft 
at a time. Additionally, operators must adhere to the rules for right-of-way in the NAS in 
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accordance with §107.37 yielding right the of way to all other aircraft, ensuring not to cross 
into its flight path in order to prevent mid-air collisions. Also, the small UAS may not be 
operated above people unless they are a part of the aircraft operation, or they are reasonably 
protected from being struck by the aircraft if they are not participating in operating the 
aircraft. 
Similarly, small UAS may not be operated by carrying hazardous materials aboard 
the aircraft and are prohibited from being operated in airspace classified as B, C, and D; 
and, E airspace for airports without authorization from ATC, and may not be operated in 
such a way that would cause a hazard to take-off, landing and approach traffic patterns. 
Regulations in §107.45 through §107.49 also prohibit small UAS from being 
operated in areas designated as prohibited or restricted, such as military operations areas, 
or areas restricted during large public events such as major sporting events, without prior 
FAA or controlling agency approval. A preflight evaluation and assessment of operating 
conditions of both the aircraft and surrounding airspace must be performed by the remote 
pilot prior to flight that includes assessment of weather, airspace, human bystanders, 
property and other hazards. 
Aside from these operational conditions, certain operating limitations are required 
for small UAS and remote pilots. In accordance with §107.51, remote pilots must adhere 
to the following operating limitations 
• Never exceed a speed of 87 knots. 
• Never exceed an altitude of 400 feet AGL outside of a structure. 
• Maintain a 3-statute mile visibility of the small UAS, and a minimum 
distance of 500 feet below and 2,000 feet horizontally from clouds. 
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14 CFR Part 107 Subpart C specifies requirements for the certification of and are 
applicable to remote pilots seeking a small UAS rating. Similar to regulations for pilots of 
manned aircraft, the subpart specifies denial or suspension of a remote pilot certificate with 
a small UAS rating for drug and alcohol offenses. For operating aircraft under the influence 
of drugs or alcohol specified in §91.17 or §91.19, the penalty is either denial of a remote 
pilot application, or suspension/revocation of a currently issued certificate as deemed 
necessary by the FAA. The subpart also specifies denial of a remote pilot application if 
convicted of an illegal drug/narcotic offense for up to one year from the date of final 
conviction, or suspension/revocation as deemed necessary by the FAA against a currently 
issued remote pilot certificate.  
Refusal to submit to alcohol testing by law enforcement, or to provide the test 
results to the FAA as required by §107.59, results in similar penalties; denial of an 
application for a remote pilot certificate up to one year from the date of the documented 
refusal, or suspension/revocation of a currently issued remote pilot certificate as deemed 
necessary by the FAA. 
To be eligible to receive a remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating, the 
applicant must meet the minimum eligibility requirements, similar to pilots of manned 
aircraft. A remote pilot applicant, under §107.61, must be at least sixteen years old and: 
• Read, speak, write, and understand the English language.  
• Be physically and mentally fit to safely operate the small UAS, and 
• Demonstrate a basic airman knowledge of aeronautics by passing an initial 
test as required by §107.73, which will be addressed in further detail within 
this section. If the applicant holds a current pilot certificate issued under 
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§61, the applicant only has to complete an initial training course meeting 
the subject area requirements of §107.74, in lieu of a basic knowledge test. 
However, student pilots under §61 must demonstrate basic knowledge of 
aeronautics by passing an initial test as required by §107.73. 
Part 107 also requires the person to maintain recency of experience in order to 
operate a small UAS. Within the preceding twenty-four months, a small UAS operator 
must, in accordance with §107.65, pass the initial small UAS knowledge test or recurrent 
test, or pass either an initial or recurrent training course specified above if they currently 
hold a §61 pilot certificate.  
The researcher also identified specific requirements for knowledge testing within 
§107.67 through §107.73. Knowledge test requirements within these regulations specify 
general requirements for proof of eligibility and testing, noting that the minimum passing 
score needed to pass airmen remote pilot examinations is determined by the Administrator 
within the associated FAA Airmen Test Guide, which states that the minimum passing 
score is 70% (FAA, 2017b). 
To ensure operational safety, §107.73 and §107.64 prescribe knowledge areas 
required for initial and recurrent remote pilot airmen knowledge tests and training courses, 
which include knowledge of applicable aviation safety regulations, airspace and airport 
operations, weather, small UAS performance and loading, emergency procedures, crew 
resource management and communications, use of drugs and alcohol, decision-making, 
and airworthiness requirements.  
It was noted that several regulatory exclusions exist for a hobbyist, or model aircraft 
operators. The concept of a model aircraft operator, classification requirements, and 
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operating standards were observed to be addressed in FAA (2016b) Advisory Circular 
(AC) 91-57A, Model Aircraft Operating Standards. In paragraph 6(c) of AC 91-57A, to 
be classified as a model aircraft operator, or hobbyist, the aircraft must only be flown for 
recreational purposes, must not weigh more than 55 pounds unless certified by a 
community-based organization (CBO), must be operated in accordance with industry or 
community-based operational and safety standards, must not pose a safety hazard, must 
avoid other aircraft, and must not be flown within 5 miles from an airport without notifying 
the airport prior to operating the small UAS.  
Additionally, the AC precludes model aircraft operators from flying UAS in areas 
with an active temporary flight restriction, permanent flight restriction, or areas designated 
as prohibited, where published in Notice to Airmen (NOTAMS) by the FAA. The AC also 
notes that the publication merely provides a means of compliance to safety regulations and 
public law, and does not replace such publications. Ultimately, model aircraft operators are 
responsible for complying with applicable regulation and law, and may face civil penalties 
from the FAA for posing safety hazards to other aircraft and for non-compliance to 
applicable regulations and laws. 
In final review of regulations promulgated for the safe operation of small UAS, the 
researcher identified extensive rules in place to regulate safe operation of small UAS that 
are operated in accordance with these regulations; specifically, for commercial purposes. 
However, it was noted that the regulatory exclusions apply to UAS operated for recreation 
or hobby purposes, which pose a certain level of risk to other regulated aircraft that are 
operated within the NAS. In general, by publication of Advisory Circular 91-57C, the FAA 
has allowed the model aircraft industry to regulate itself with limited FAA restrictions 
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through publication of CBO standards, or industry published standards for operation and 
safety of model, recreational, or hobbyist aircraft. 
Additionally, it is expected that certificated remote pilots, from novice to expert, 
should have a thorough knowledge of these regulations, or the familiarity to research these 
regulations and apply them. However, it is expected that non-aviators, and model aircraft 
operators may or may not have a similar level of knowledge of these regulations, or the 
familiarity to research and apply them. 
 
Large Unmanned Aircraft Regulations 
At the time of this research, the researcher found no regulations promulgated 
specifically for large UAS by the FAA within 14 CFR aeronautics and space regulations. 
It is interpreted, unless operated for recreational purposes, that any large UAS flown within 
the United States must be operated in accordance with manned aircraft regulations. Or, the 
operator must seek a waiver or exemption from regulations that cannot be complied with, 
such as rules for right-of-way to see and avoid other aircraft required by §91.113 and small 
UAS regulations requiring remote pilots to adhere to the rules for right-of-way in the NAS 
in accordance with §107.37 to prevent mid-air collisions.  
In general, by publication of Advisory Circular 91-57C, the FAA has allowed the 
model aircraft industry to regulate itself through publication of CBO standards, or industry 
published standards for operation and safety of model, recreational, or hobbyist aircraft, 
with limited FAA restrictions. Specifically, the FAA has designated a weight limit for small 
UAS at 55 pounds, and have allowed model aircraft operators to operate model aircraft in 
excess of 55 when certified and design approved by a CBO. It is interpreted by the 
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researcher that model-aircraft can be operated in excess of 55 pounds if approved by a 
CBO, and operate the UAS in accordance with AC 91-57C. 
 
Manned Aircraft Accident Data and Statistics 
The researcher sought to identify current aircraft accident data and related statistics for 
manned aircraft in order to better understand the resultant data and implications of this 
study. As identified in the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB, 2015b) 
publication of all 2015 transportation fatalities listed in Figure 2.2, fatalities in aircraft 
accidents were significantly lower than other modes of transportation.  
Figure 2.2 
Transportation Fatalities in 2015 (NTSB, 2015b) 
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In review of the data in Figure 2.2, it was noted by the researcher that there were 
less fatalities in aviation accidents than in highway, rail or marine modes of transportation 
in the United States during 2015. Within aviation related accidents, the researcher 
identified that there were nearly 10 times more fatalities in general aviation accidents, 
versus aircraft operated for commercial purposes or foreign/non-US registered aircraft. Out 
of the 415 aircraft related fatalities, 376 occurred in general aviation and only 39 occurred 
in all other categories, including commercial aviation, during 2015. Compared to 2014, 
there was an overall decrease in the total number of aircraft accident related fatalities from 
454 to 415, an overall decrease in the number of general aviation related fatalities from 424 
to 376, while there was an overall increase in the number of fatalities in all other modes of 
aviation related accidents from 30 to 39, that includes commercial aviation (NTSB, n.d.-
b). 
The researcher adapted data contained in Tables 2.15 through 2.18 from the 
NTSB’s (2015c) 2015 preliminary aviation statistics available from the aviation statistics 
section of its website. The data contained within Tables 2.15 through 2.17 denotes §§121, 
135, and general aviation accident and fatal accident data comparative to available 
operational flight hour and departure data. Whereas, Table 2.18 details statistical accident 
rates for each of these types of aviation operations per 100,000 flight hours and departures, 
where the data is recorded and available for NTSB analysis and publication.  
In reviewing the data contained within Tables 2.15 through 2.18, the researcher 
notes that the NTSB indicated that all related information was preliminary, with published 
flight hour and departure data reliant upon data being estimated and published by the FAA 
(NTSB, 2015c).  
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The NTSB noted that the FAA compiles and determines §135 on-demand and 
general aviation flight hour and departure data to be estimated based upon operator 
submission of applicable activity summary surveys. Because the results of these surveys 
were not published until the year following the survey, applicable NTSB statistics reliant 
upon this data were deemed preliminary until it analyzed available FAA data and published 
its summary of annual statistics.  It is also noted by the researcher that data reflecting §135 
on-demand and general aviation departure information is missing in these tables because 
the data was unavailable to the NTSB for analysis and publication (NTSB, 2015c). 
Table 2.15 
 
Table 2.16 
 
 
 
 
2015 Part 121 Accident Data (NTSB, 2015c) 
  
   
Accidents    Fatalities     
14 CFR Part 121 Air 
Carriers All Fatal Total Aboard Flight Hours 
   
Departures    
     Scheduled 27 0 0 0 17,435,000 8,859,000 
     Nonscheduled 1 0 0 0 385,000 119,000 
2015 Part 135 Accident Data (NTSB, 2015c) 
  
   
Accidents    Fatalities     
14 CFR Part 135 Air 
Carriers All Fatal Total Aboard Flight Hours 
   
Departures    
     Commuter 5 1 1 1 343,000 603,000 
     On-Demand 38 7 27 27 3,566,000 - 
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Table 2.17 
 
Of significance, the researcher notes that Table 2.18 contrasts accident and fatal 
accident rates between §§121, 135 and general aviation. The table reflects these statistics 
based upon 100,000 flight hours and 100,000 departures, where the data is applicable and 
available to the NTSB for analysis and publication. Specifically, this table reflects 
0.155/0.260 accidents per 100,000 flight hours for §121 scheduled/nonscheduled air carrier 
operations respectively, and zero fatal accidents; 1.458/1.07 accidents and 0.292/0.20 fatal 
accidents per 100,000 flight hours for §135 commuter/on-demand air carrier operations 
respectively; and, 5.85 accidents and 1.09 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours for 
general aviation operations. 
Table 2.18 
2015 Flight Hour and Departure Accident Statistics (NTSB, 2015c) 
  
   Accidents                              
(per 100,000 flight hours)   
   Accidents                                 
(per 100,000 departures )   
14 CFR Part 121 Air 
Carriers    All       Fatal       All       Fatal    
     Scheduled 0.155 0 0.305 0 
     Nonscheduled 0.260 0 0.840 0 
          
14 CFR Part 135 Air 
Carriers         
     Commuter 1.458 0.292 0.829 0.166 
     On-Demand 1.07 0.20 - - 
          
General Aviation 5.85 1.09 - - 
 
2015 General Aviation Accident Data (NTSB, 2015c) 
     Accidents    Fatalities     
 All Fatal Total Aboard Flight Hours 
   
Departures    
General Aviation 1,209 229 376 373 20,576,000 - 
64 
 
To provide a historical context and a comparable perspective to the accident data 
and statistics for 2015, the researcher also examined historical accident data published by 
the NTSB for the years spanning 2002 through 2014. The years 2012 through 2014 will be 
examined first, followed by the years preceding 2012. Tables 2.19 through 2.21 detail the 
total accidents, fatal accidents and fatalities for the calendar years 2014, 2013 and 2012 as 
adapted from the NTSB’s accident data and statistics websites. 
These tables reflect a sharp decrease in the total number of accidents in all modes 
of aviation from 1,537 accidents in 2012 to 1,291 accidents in 2014.  For §121 aviation 
operations, the tables reflect a slight rise in the total number of accidents over the three-
year period from 27 accidents in 2012 to 29 accidents in 2014. And, although a slight drop 
in the total number of accidents occurred in 2013 to 23 accidents, the only §121 fatal 
accidents that occurred during the three-year period occurred in 2013, in which there were 
two fatal accidents and nine fatalities. 
For §135 operations, the tables reflect no change in the total number of accidents 
in 2014 versus 2012. However, a sharp rise was observed in the total number of accidents 
in 2013, in which 51 accidents occurred. The total fatal accidents and associated fatalities 
also showed an increase, with an increase in the total fatalities jumping from nine in 2012 
to 20 in 2014. While, a resultant sharp rise to 30 fatalities was noted in 2013, which 
coincides with the rise that same year in total accidents and fatal accidents, in which 12 
fatal accidents occurred. 
For general aviation operations conducted under §91, each year reflected a drop in 
the total number of accidents, with a sharp drop noted between the years 2012 and 2014 in 
which there were 1,471 accidents in 2012 and 1,223 in 2014. A small reduction, the total 
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accidents dropped from 1,224 in 2013 to 1,223 in 2014. While, the total fatalities dropped 
from 440 in 2012 to 390 in 2013, with a rise to 424 fatalities in 2014. 
As comparison for each of the years spanning 2012 to 2015, the following total 
numbers of aviation related fatalities were observed in each of these years; 449 fatalities in 
2012, 429 fatalities in 2013, 444 fatalities in 2014, and 415 fatalities in 2015. This data 
reflects an average of 434.25 fatalities per year and a decrease in the total number of 
fatalities in 2015 compared to 2012 by 34 fatalities.  
Table 2.19 
2014 Civil Aviation Accident Data (NTSB, 2016) 
Mode of Civil Aviation Accidents 
Fatal 
Accidents Fatalities 
Part 121 29 0 0 
Part 135 39 8 20 
General Aviation  1,223 257 424 
Total 1,291 265 444 
 
Table 2.20 
2013 Civil Aviation Accident Data (NTSB, 2015d) 
Mode of Civil Aviation Accidents 
Fatal 
Accidents Fatalities 
Part 121 23 2 9 
Part 135 51 12 30 
General Aviation  1,224 222 390 
Total 1,298 236 429 
 
Table 2.21 
2012 Civil Aviation Accident Data (NTSB, 2014b) 
Mode of Civil Aviation Accidents 
Fatal 
Accidents Fatalities 
Part 121 27 0 0 
Part 135 39 7 9 
General Aviation  1,471 273 440 
Total 1,537 280 449 
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In its 2014 publication following a review of aviation accident data for the time 
period spanning 2002 to 2011, titled Review of Civil Aviation Accident Calendar Year 
2011, the NTSB detailed aviation accident data and statistics (NTSB, 2014a). The abstract 
of the report noted that the study involved a review of accidents involving both §§121 and 
135 as well as §91 general aviation aircraft accidents. In 2011, there were a total of 1,553 
accidents. Of which, 282 were fatal accidents resulting in 489 fatalities. The researcher 
notes that the report also identified that 95% of the total aviation accidents, and 94% of the 
fatal aviation accidents, occurred in general aviation. 
In its review of civil aviation accident data for calendar year 2011, the NTSB 
identified key historical data and statistics for §121 commercial aviation for the years 
spanning 2002 to 2011 (NTSB, 2014a). This report identified a four percent increase in the 
total number of flight hours flown during this time period, evidence of steady growth in 
§121 commercial aviation. It also established the §121 accident rate at 1.7 accidents per 
million flight hours flown, a sharp decrease of 27% for 2011 versus 2002. Similarly, it 
established the §121 accident rate at 3.2 accidents per million departures, a sharp decrease 
of 17% for 2011 versus 2002.  
In its review of civil aviation accident data for calendar year 2011, the NTSB 
identified key historical data and statistics for §135 commuter operations for the years 
spanning 2002 to 2011 (NTSB, 2014a). This report identified a 19% increase in the total 
number of flight hours flown during this time period, evidence of significant growth in 
§135 commuter operations. It also identified that the number of §135 commuter operations 
accidents remained at or below seven accidents per year between 2002 and 2011. The 
report contained §135 commuter operations accident statistics in graph and chart format, 
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in which it illustrated statistics that could not be easily identified in numerical detail and 
adequately presented within this dissertation. As a result, the researcher examined the 
accident data and statistics listed in the NTSB’s 2015 preliminary accident statistics report, 
which was previously referenced in this dissertation. 
The researcher identified the following §135 commuter operations accident 
statistics for the years spanning 2002 to 2011 as identified in the NTSB’s (2015c) 2015 
Preliminary Aviation Statistics report. In this segment of aviation from 2002 to 2011, a 
total of 3,034,718 flight hours were flown with the occurrence of 44 accidents, 2 fatal 
accidents, and 4 fatalities, with an average accident rate of 1.467 accidents per 100,000 
flight hours and 0.064 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours (NTSB, 2015c). The NTSB 
indicated that all flight hours were estimated. 
The researcher also identified the following §135 on-demand accident statistics for 
the years spanning 2002 to 2011 as identified in the NTSB (2015c) 2015 Preliminary 
Aviation Statistics report. In this segment of aviation from 2002 to 2011, a total of 
29,885,000 flight hours were flown with the occurrence of 562 accidents, 138 fatal 
accidents, and 362 fatalities, with an average accident rate of 1.73 accidents per 100,000 
flight hours and 0.41 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours (NTSB, 2015c). The NTSB 
indicated that all flight hours were estimated, and flight hour data and accident rate 
statistics for 2011 were unavailable due to FAA recalibration efforts. 
In its review of civil aviation accident data for calendar year 2011, the NTSB 
identified key historical data and statistics for general aviation operations under §91 for the 
years spanning 2002 to 2011. It defined general aviation §91 operations as other than 
§§121, 135 and 139 and consisting of such operations as powered parachutes, other wide 
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ranges of personal flying categories, and some specific types of commercial operations not 
regulated by §121, 135 or 139, such as §61 flight instruction and §137 aerial application 
operations. 
In the report, the NTSB noted that during 2011, general aviation accounted for 92% 
of all civil aviation fatalities in the US, which accounted for 95% of all aircraft accidents 
and 94% of all fatal aircraft accidents (NTSB, 2014a). Additionally, the NTSB noted that 
personal flying accounted for 68% of the general aviation accidents in 2011, which 
involved a wide range of flying activities in various types of airframes. From 2002 to 2010, 
there was also a 27% increase in the total number of personal flight hours, a 24% increase 
in the personal flying accident rate, and a 10% increase in the personal flying fatal accident 
rate.  
The researcher notes that the NTSB report contained accident statistics for general 
aviation operations conducted under §91 in graph and chart format, which illustrated 
statistics that could not be easily identified in numerical detail and adequately presented in 
this dissertation. As a result, the researcher examined the accident data and statistics listed 
in the NTSB’s 2015 preliminary accident statistics report, which was previously referenced 
in this dissertation. 
The researcher identified the following §91 aircraft accident statistics for the years 
spanning 2002 to 2011 as identified in the NTSB (2015c) 2015 Preliminary Aviation 
Statistics report. In this segment of aviation from 2002 to 2011, a total of 212,736,000 
flight hours were flown with the occurrence of 15,883 accidents, 3,021 fatal accidents, and 
5,429 fatalities, with an average accident rate of 6.77 accidents per 100,000 flight hours 
and 1.29 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours (NTSB, 2015c). The NTSB indicated that 
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all flight hours were estimated, and flight hour data and accident rate statistics for 2011 
were unavailable due to recalibration efforts by the FAA.  
Upon review of relevant literature related to aircraft accident statistics, the 
researcher sought to compare the aircraft accident rates with motor vehicle accident rates 
by reviewing a relevant article and related government published information. In 
comparison to automotive accident rates, aviation is a significantly safer mode of 
transportation (Locsin, n.d.). A USA Today article by Locsin (n.d.) addresses the safety of 
air travel versus car travel and details 2008 National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) statistics that identify a motor vehicle accident rate of 1.27 
fatalities per 100 million miles versus a 2008 NTSB statistic for aviation of nearly zero 
accidents per one million miles. The article further cites a study completed by the National 
Safety Council (NSC), which identified the odds of being killed in a motor vehicle accident 
at 1 in 98 for a person’s lifetime, versus 1 in 7,178 in aviation for a person’s lifetime. 
The researcher examined recently published information for the source of these 
statistics and found the article to be relatively accurate, given a change in data over time. 
The researcher validated the USA Today article by reviewing a 2017 publication of the 
NSC’s odds of being killed data referenced in the USA Today article that cited 2008 NSC 
odds of being killed data. In its publication, adjusted for a nine-year change in data, the 
odds of being killed in a motor vehicle crash in 2017 were set at 1 in 114 for a person’s 
lifetime, and the odds of being killed in an aviation accident were set at 1 in 9,821 for a 
person’s lifetime (National Safety Council [NSC], 2017). Similarly, adjusted for a seven-
year change in data, NHTSA published a 2015 motor vehicle fatality rate of 1.12 per 100 
million miles, a rise from 1.08 per 100 million miles in 2014 (National Highway Traffic 
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Safety Administration [NHTSA], 2016). 
Interestingly, the researcher notes that the NSC published the odds of being killed 
in a motor vehicle accident to be greater than being killed in a falling accident (1 in 127), 
an assault by a firearm (1 in 370), a motorcycle accident (1 in 985), an unintentional 
drowning (1 in 1,188), and generally, even an unintentional firearm discharge (1 in 6,905); 
statistically interesting given the political attention given to prevent some of these ways of 
being killed (NHTSA, 2016). The NSC acknowledges that the odds of being killed are 
relative to and affected by a person’s lifestyle, and environmental exposures. 
Of final review of the relevant literature within this section, the researcher notes a 
study published by the FAA examining the percentage of operational human factor causes 
in all general aviation fatal aircraft accidents from 1990 to 2000, in which there were a total 
of 3,256 fatal accidents and 11,180 non-fatal accidents during the 11-year period 
(Wiegmann et al., 2005, p. 8). The researchers, Wiegmann et al. (2005), found that 
approximately 80% of both fatal and non-fatal general aviation accidents were caused by 
errors in pilot skill-based human factors (p. 8). 
Similarly, an article published in Boeing magazine described Boeing’s 
Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) that it provides to the industry for use to 
investigate and prevent maintenance and inspection errors in its commercial aircraft and 
related products that are used worldwide (Rankin, 2007). Boeing cites a safety report 
published in 2003 by the International Air Transportation Association (IATA) that notes a 
study of 93 aircraft accidents in which 26% were determined to be caused by maintenance 
error (Rankin, 2007). The IATA study supports research that Boeing conducted which 
found that 80% of all aircraft accidents in today’s era of aviation are caused by human 
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factors in operation, maintenance, air traffic control and manufacturing versus 1903 when 
80% of aircraft accidents were caused by aircraft and equipment failure and 20% were 
caused by human factors (Rankin, 2007).  
 
Unmanned Aircraft Accident/Incident Data and Statistics 
The researcher sought to identify current aircraft accident data and related accident 
statistics for civil unmanned aircraft in order to better understand the resultant data and 
implications of this study. The researcher acknowledges that regulations were only 
published for small UAS at the time of this research. Additionally, the researcher 
acknowledges that the FAA authorized UAS operations under certificates of waiver or 
authorization (COA) to operators prior to and after publication of the small UAS regulation 
(FAA, 2017a). 
However, in review of accident data publically available on the NTSB’s website, it 
was identified that civil UAS accident rates and statistics were not available at the time of 
this research. Additionally, search criteria for categories of aircraft within the NTSB 
aviation accident database did not include unmanned aircraft as a searchable category 
under categories of aircraft, leaving researchers to rely fully upon the keyword search 
option to retrieve accidents with unmanned related terminology or the lack of such 
unmanned related terminology (NTSB, n.d.-a).  
Of further observation during this review of relevant literature, the researcher 
identified that the NTSB did not track and publish flight hour data for UAS, similar to 
general and commercial aviation, in which to derive a UAS accident rate or statistic for 
any civil UAS (small or large) during the time of this research. Furthermore, without 
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meaningful statistical accident rate information, it became apparent that it was realistically 
unknown if UAS were any more or less safe than the other modes of aviation that have 
published aircraft accident statistics. This lends itself to the researcher’s recommendation 
for the government to track this data, determine an applicable accident rate, and conduct 
further research into the comparison of UAS accident rates versus other modes of aviation 
in order to determine if UAS are any more or less safe than other modes of aviation. 
As a result of the lack of published UAS accident statistics, and to better understand 
the resultant data and implications of this study, the researcher examined the aviation 
accident and synopsis database on the NTSB’s website to determine if any aircraft 
accidents involved unmanned aircraft or were recorded as an unmanned aircraft related 
accident (NTSB, n.d.-a). To do this, the researcher conducted a keyword search using six 
common terms related to unmanned aircraft between the dates January 1, 2002 to 
September 26, 2017. The common terms searched were drone, UAS, unmanned, UAV, 
remote pilot, and remote control, which yielded the following results. 
1. A keyword search using the term “drone” retrieved zero accident reports. 
2. A keyword search using the term “UAS” retrieved six accident reports: 
o On January 27, 2014, aircraft accident number DCA14CA043 was 
assigned to a public unmanned General Atomics MQ-9 aircraft. The 
aircraft accident was caused by a generator electrical failure, 
resulting in a controlled ditching. No injuries occurred. 
o On July 26, 2013, aircraft accident number DCA13CA172 was 
assigned to a public unmanned NASA Ames Research Center Sierra 
aircraft. The aircraft accident was caused by an engine failure under 
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weather conditions conducive to carburetor icing. No injuries 
occurred.  
o On May 10, 2013, aircraft accident number DCA13CA088 was 
assigned to a public unmanned General Atomics MQ-9 aircraft. The 
aircraft accident was caused by the remote pilot’s improper landing 
flare. No injuries occurred. 
o On February 19, 2009, aircraft accident number DCA09FA028 was 
assigned to a public unmanned General Atomics MQ-9 aircraft. The 
aircraft accident was caused by the remote pilot’s improper flare on 
landing under a tail wind. No injuries occurred. 
o On November 6, 2008, aircraft accident number DCA09FA009 was 
assigned to a public unmanned General Atomics MQ-9 aircraft. The 
aircraft accident was caused by the remote pilot’s improper flare 
during landing. No injuries occurred. 
o On April 25, 2006, aircraft accident number CHI06MA121 was 
assigned to a public unmanned General Atomics Predator B aircraft. 
The aircraft accident was caused by the remote pilot’s failure to 
follow the established checklist resulting in engine fuel starvation, 
as well as the lack of a flight instructor in the Ground Control Station 
to manage all of the aircrew. No injuries occurred. 
3. A keyword search using the term “unmanned” retrieved seven accident 
reports, of which five were duplicated from the previous “UAS” keyword 
search results. The non-duplicated accidents are noted here: 
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o On June 6, 2016, aircraft accident number DCA16CA197 was 
assigned to unmanned Facebook UK LTD Aquila aircraft. The 
aircraft accident was caused by a wing structural failure due to wind 
gusts causing the aircraft to exceed airspeed limitations and the 
autopilot’s capabilities to maintain constant airspeed within the 
aircraft’s operating limitations. No injuries occurred. 
o On May 1, 2015, aircraft accident number DCA15CA117 was 
assigned to unmanned Titan Aerospace Holdings Inc. Solara 50 
aircraft. The aircraft accident was caused by wing structural failure 
due to the aircraft exceeding aircraft airspeed operating limitations. 
No injuries occurred. 
4. A keyword search using the term “UAV” retrieved one accident report, of 
which it was duplicated from the previous “unmanned” keyword search 
results. The duplicated accident will not be noted here. 
5. A keyword search using the term “remote pilot” retrieved zero accident 
reports. 
6. A keyword search using the term “remote control” retrieved zero accident 
reports. 
Because the NTSB did not publish UAS accident statistics available to the public 
at the time of this research, the researcher sought to identify UAS incident data published 
by the FAA. The researcher found limited information in report format spanning the time 
period between November 13, 2014 to August 20, 2015, in which the FAA report indicated 
there were 764 UAS incidents in the United States (FAA, 2015). The report indicated no 
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injuries in any of the 764 incidents, and consisted of such incidents as either pilot or public 
sightings of UAS in the NAS, or near other aircraft in the NAS (FAA, 2015). 
 
Aircraft Accident Causes 
Upon reviewing published aircraft accident data and statistics, the researcher 
sought to identify common themes in the causes of aircraft accidents to better understand 
the resultant data and implications of this study. Several sources of information were 
reviewed in order to capture a broad perspective on accident causes. The sources reviewed 
were; the book titled, Accident Investigation Manual published in 1948 by the 
Northwestern University Traffic Institute; the book titled, Aircraft Accident Investigation 
written in 2006 by Wood and Sweginnis; the book titled, Aircraft Accident Reconstruction 
and Litigation written in 2011 by McCormick and Papadakis; and the report titled, 
Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents of Worldwide Operations from 
1959 to 2016 published in 2017 by Boeing Commercial Airplanes.  
First, the researcher identified that the science of accident investigation precedes 
the modern era of aviation safety of today, which is extensively regulated for safety and 
accident prevention by the FAA as identified within previous sections of this chapter. In 
its book published in 1948, titled the Accident Investigation Manual, the Northwestern 
University Traffic Institute details procedures for highway traffic accident investigation, 
determination of causal factors, and final report construction and publication. It was noted 
that the book cited literary sources in accident investigation photography techniques dating 
back to as early as 1930 from the U.S. War Department (Accident Investigation Manual, 
1948, p. 166). The researcher also notes that photography is still a basic tool in modern 
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aircraft accident investigation today (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006, p. 43).  
Additionally, the Accident Investigation Manual (1948) identifies a basic principle 
and philosophy of investigation. The philosophy that accidents are not accidents. Instead, 
they are occurrences that are caused by several factors and because of that, they can be 
reduced (Accident Investigation Manual, 1948, p. 9). They can be reduced, in part, because 
it identifies that accidents are caused by circumstances it represents as human error, such 
as reckless driving, speeding, drunk driving, and disobeying traffic signs (Accident 
Investigation Manual, 1948, p. 9). The book also delves into what can be perceived as a 
modern systems theory of accident investigation to determine probable cause. It was 
interpreted that system means all inputs, or lack of inputs, to the accident sequence. 
The book describes the circumstances surrounding an accident to be multi-causal 
(Accident Investigation Manual, 1948). It illustrates this concept with a scenario in which 
a man leaves a bar at night, he is drunk, he fails to use the vehicle headlights, he is speeding 
to get to his destination, it is misting rain and the street is wet, a pedestrian dressed in dark 
clothes enters his driving path, he had not maintained his vehicle brakes properly prior to 
the accident, his car skids and it cannot stop when he or she applies the brakes, and he hits 
and kills the pedestrian (Accident Investigation Manual, 1948, p. 10). The notion of such 
circumstantial accident prevention holds that no single input to the accident sequence 
caused the accident. Even the pedestrian was causal to the accident. Under this notion, if 
one contributing factor had been eliminated from the accident sequence, the accident might 
not have occurred. In this scenario, the human is at the center of every input to the resultant 
accident.  
With this notion, however, the researcher identified one fundamental difference 
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between the book’s system theory on accident prevention and the systems theory on 
accident prevention of today. The Northwestern University Traffic Institute states that 
accident investigation is the foundation of accident prevention, with educating the public 
on safety, engineering, and enforcement being important approaches to safety and accident 
prevention (Accident Investigation Manual, 1948, p. 16). However, as identified in the 
aviation safety regulations of today, specifically the promulgation of 14 CFR Part 5 
requirements for §121 operators to develop and maintain a safety management system, it 
appears that the system philosophy of today to prevent accidents has shifted to one with a 
foundation in safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance and safety 
promotion. The researcher notes these principles are similar to what the book determines 
to be important approaches to accident prevention, but not foundational in concept as the 
book noted; safety education, engineering, and enforcement were merely important 
approaches to accident prevention. In review of this literature, the researcher identified four 
categories of accident causes; the man, the machine, the environment, and the system in 
which the accident occurred. 
Secondly, the researcher examined a modern era aircraft accident investigation 
book, titled Aircraft Accident Investigation, written in 2006. The authors of this book also 
detailed the notion that accidents are not the result of a single cause, rather multiple causes, 
in what was termed a system of aggravating causes (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006, p. 9). The 
book details technical procedures for investigating aircraft accidents in all areas of the 
system in which the accident occurred, which includes the pilot in properly operating the 
aircraft, the manufacturer in properly designing and manufacturing the aircraft, the 
mechanic in properly maintaining the aircraft, as well as the aircraft systems that include 
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its propulsion, structural, electrical, hydraulic, instrumentation, landing gear, primary and 
secondary flight control, pneumatic, fuel, and other miscellaneous systems. The book also 
details techniques and procedures specifically for investigating environmental and human 
factor related aircraft accidents.  
In the area of environmental, the book details procedures for investigating airfield, 
air traffic control, and weather inputs to the accident sequence (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006, 
pp. 171-174). In the area of human factors, the book details procedures for determining 
pilot and mechanic qualifications and experience, which begins with the most basic of 
investigation techniques; determining if the pilot or mechanic were certificated by the 
FAA, which would be initial evidence that the pilot or mechanic were initially qualified to 
either fly or maintain the aircraft (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006, pp. 165-169). The book also 
contains a separate chapter on human factors that details the aero-medical examiner’s role 
in determining the health and physical condition of the pilot, and identifying if drug or 
alcohol use may have contributed to the accident (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006, pp. 183-185). 
In review of this literature, the researcher identified four categories of accident causes; the 
man, the machine, the environment, and the system in which the accident occurred. 
A review of the third book yielded similar results as it did for previous books on 
accident investigation causes. Accidents causes can be placed into four categories; the man, 
the machine, the environment, and the system in which the accident occurred. In the book 
titled, Aircraft Accident Reconstruction and Litigation, the authors have compiled a guide 
for attorneys and experts to reconstruct accident scenarios and litigate aircraft accident 
related legal cases, describing an aircraft as a complex system that operates within a larger 
system, in which the environment, air traffic control, human error in operating and 
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maintaining the aircraft, or an aircraft malfunction can be causal to an accident 
(McCormick & Papadakis, 2011, p. 3). The book examines aircraft systems, air traffic 
control and weather environment, human error, and human factors. Specifically, it contains 
a chapter that clearly identifies accident causes in two basic categories; human errors and 
aircraft system failures (McCormick & Papadakis, 2011, pp. 113-121). Under the human 
error category, the book also clearly ties human error in judgement to nearly every aspect 
of environmental and system causes of an accident sequence.  
For example, if weather were a factor in an aircraft accident, the book makes the 
argument that the pilot should not have flown, or that he or she may have received faulty 
air traffic control or weather reporting information, all human factor causes (McCormick 
& Papadakis, 2011, p. 113). Similarly, the book makes the argument that the manufacturer 
or maintainer may be at fault for failed aircraft components due to such human factors as 
faulty design, maintenance, inspection, or development of maintenance and inspection 
procedures and scheduling intervals.  
Lastly, the researcher also identified information published by an aircraft 
manufacturer, which cited accident statistics and causes of commercial jet aircraft 
accidents from 1959 to 2016 based upon data and statistics adapted from other government 
published sources. The Boeing Commercial Airplanes (2017) company published its 
report, titled Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents of Worldwide 
Operations from 1959 to 2016, that discussed and primarily illustrated accident summaries 
in graph and chart format by types of operation, severity of injury to persons and damage 
to property, and statistical accident rate information for commercial jet aircraft based on 
data and accident rate information published by the NTSB. 
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 Because accident data and statistical information was previously discussed within 
this dissertation, the report’s statistical information will not be addressed here as it would 
duplicate information previously identified. However, related to this section of the 
dissertation, the researcher notes that the Boeing Commercial Aircraft company published 
information within its report from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
Commercial Aviation Safety and Common Taxonomy Team. Boeing notes this team is 
made up government, industry, manufacturers, commercial operators, and pilot 
associations from around the world and is chartered to establish common language and 
definition taxonomies for the industry to use in accident and incident database and 
reporting systems.  
This team is also focused on categorizing accident occurrences from 2007 to 2016 
into principle categories to identify common causes, so the industry can focus accident 
prevention efforts on targeted causes (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2017). The report 
identified the following principle categories; abnormal runway contact, controlled flight 
into terrain, fire and smoke not related to impact, loss of control in-flight, midair and near 
midair collisions, ground handling, runway excursions and incursions, aircraft system and 
component failures and malfunctions, unknown, other, and undershoot or overshoot of the 
runway (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2017).  In review of the principle categories within 
this literature, the researcher identified four categories of accident causes; the man, the 
machine, the environment, and the system in which the accident occurred. 
 
Unmanned Aircraft Human Factors 
The researcher notes that the aircraft accident causes listed in the previous section 
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for manned aircraft did not directly and specifically address unmanned aircraft. Although, 
the machine, the environment and the system in which an accident occurs can be similarly 
causal to an unmanned aircraft accident. However, the human factors associated with the 
pilot, or man, who operates the unmanned aircraft remotely are unique to remotely 
operating an unmanned aircraft. 
As a result, the researcher sought to identify the human factors related to unmanned 
aircraft in order to better understand the resultant research data and implications of this 
study by examining relevant government and academic research. The government research 
reports included; a study summarizing UAS accident and incident data that focused on 
human factors; a study on UAS human factors in accidents involving flight-control 
malfunctions; and, a study detailing sensory information for unmanned aircraft operators. 
The researcher also reviewed academic research that examined the visual acuity, or ability, 
of a pilot of a manned aircraft to detect small unmanned aircraft. 
First, the researcher examined the government research study completed by the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) titled, A 
Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Accident/Incident Data: Human Factors Implications 
(Williams, 2004). This research study examined unmanned aircraft accident data from the 
United States Department of Defense. Specifically, the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force. 
The author noted that military reports and data were limited and some provided insufficient 
information in some instances (Williams, 2004, p. 4). 
The study examined accident data for the Global Hawk, Hunter, Pioneer, Predator, 
and Shadow UAS, citing human factors as causal for a varying 21% to 68% of the accidents 
across all aircraft platforms, which identified that many of the identified accidents could 
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have been prevented by better analysis of the human system interfaces and procedures 
(Williams, 2004, p. 1). The study also noted that electromechanical system failure was the 
most prevalent cause, whereas aircraft system failure was attributed to 33% to 67% of the 
accidents across all aircraft platforms (Williams, 2004, p. 5). The report identified the 
following human factors related to the UAS accidents. 
• Aircrew coordination 
• Alerts and alarms 
• Display design 
• External pilot landing error 
• External pilot takeoff error 
• Pilot-in-command issues 
• Procedural error 
• Weather related 
The report notes that where an operational error was caused by the design of the 
aircraft or procedures to operate it, those too were considered human factor causes. For 
instance, the report noted that the Hunter and Pioneer UAS had known design issues 
making the aircraft difficult to fly by external means, resulting in aircraft control issues. 
Similarly, where human system interfaces attributed to the accident, those too were 
considered human error. Often times, the author of the research report notes that the 
designers and developers of the aircraft were not primarily aircraft manufacturers, leading 
to systems interfaces that were not designed similar to manned aircraft.  Only the Predator 
UAS had system interfaces that were similar to manned aircraft as noted by the author. 
Second, the researcher examined the government research study completed by the 
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Federal Aviation Administration’s CAMI titled, Human Factors Implications of 
Unmanned Aircraft Accidents: Flight-Control Problems (Williams, 2006). This research 
report identified the human factors associated with three common UAS flight control 
issues. These human factors were identified as; 
• External Pilot difficulties with UAS controls. 
• External Pilot difficulties with transfer of control. 
• Design problems with flight control automation. 
The author of the report explains that external pilot difficulties with UAS controls 
are due to an inconsistent mapping of the UAS controller to aircraft flight control 
movement, and subsequent aircraft response (Williams, 2006, p. 2). Further explained, the 
researcher notes basic monitoring of small UAS flight attitude, altitude, heading and 
position by visual line of sight with a hand held remote controller, similar to those used 
hobbyist, can be problematic when the aircraft changes direction. Such as, when the aircraft 
changes direction from flying away from the operator to flying towards the operator. An 
inconsistent mapping, in this instance, does not account for the change in direction, relative 
to the operator’s perspective (Williams, 2006, p. 2). The author of the report suggested to 
eliminate the external pilot all together by fully automating small UAS, as a solution to this 
problem (Williams, 2006, p. 5). 
The author of the report also explained the problems associated with the transfer of 
control from one remote pilot to another. The author noted the occurrence of military UAS 
accidents involving transfer of control, in which, the receiving remote operators were 
unaware of such factors as inoperable systems, or incorrectly configured switches and 
controls, ultimately leading to the accident (Williams, 2006, p. 3). And, the report 
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suggested, as a solution, for UAS designers to design control displays with standard critical 
flight control system information that is readily available to transferring and receiving 
operators, and to standardize transfer procedures for matching flight control system 
information between receiving and sending stations as solutions to eliminate the problem 
of transfer of control (Williams, 2006, p. 5). 
The author of the report also explained the problems associated with flight control 
automation. The author’s focus of problems with flight control automation were with the 
inability of automation systems to predict and couple every problem encountered with 
correct solutions, while maintaining adequate system information for the remote pilot to 
notice flight control anomalies and take appropriate corrective actions in a timely manner 
to prevent accidents (Williams, 2006, p. 4). The author suggested two solutions to this 
problem; design better system information interfaces for remote pilots to identify and 
properly react to flight control anomalies when flight control automation has failed to 
maintain controlled flight. And, adequately design flight control automation systems with 
appropriate responses to flight control problems, admittedly a challenging engineering task 
according to the author (Williams, 2006, pp. 5-6). 
Third, the researcher examined the government research study completed by the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s CAMI titled, Documentation of Sensory Information in 
the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Williams, 2008). The research report 
examines the sensory information not available to remote pilots of UAS and how the lack 
of this sensory information has led to UAS accidents (Williams, 2008, p. 1). The report 
also examines the human senses as they are applicable to manned aircraft, in order to give 
a perspective of the hazards that the lack of sensory information presents to unmanned 
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aircraft. 
Five of the human sensory capabilities, or senses, aid a pilot in flying a manned 
aircraft. Smell provides the pilot the indication of smoke, fire and other dangerous 
abnormalities that require immediate emergency action procedures. And, sight allows the 
pilot to visually see outside the aircraft to detect and avoid other aircraft and remain in 
visual meteorological conditions (VMC) if he or she is not properly rated for flying in 
instrument conditions, as well as other hazards such as ice accumulation on wing surfaces. 
Sight also aids in other pilot functions, such as visually scanning the instrument panel 
inside the cockpit for visual cues on the health and performance of the aircraft.  
Hearing allows the pilot to detect abnormal engine performance, such as changes 
in propeller and engine revolutions per minute (RPM), as well as engine ignition system 
misfires and knocking. Hearing also aids the pilot in detecting audible warning horns and 
sirens located inside the aircraft that warn the pilot of abnormal aircraft conditions and 
performance such as stalls and air traffic collision avoidance warnings.   
The sense of touch, also called the haptic or tactile sense, aids the pilot to detect 
changes in the sense of feel of aircraft flight controls, engine and airframe performance. 
Specifically, the author of the report notes proprioceptive and kinesthetic information that 
primarily aids the pilot to fly the aircraft. Where, “proprioception is the sensing of changes 
in the muscles and tendons of the body” (Williams, 2008, p. 4), “kinesthetic information is 
information regarding body movement, as perceived by the muscles, tendons, and joints of 
the body” (p. 4). The sense of changes in gravitational, directional and acceleration forces 
are crucial to maintaining control of the aircraft by reacting to the changes with the 
appropriate flight control inputs. However, the associated vestibular information can result 
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in spatial disorientation, which will be addressed next. 
The vestibular system is located within a person’s inner ear, and its function is to 
maintain the body’s equilibrium (Antunano, n.d.). However, vestibular illusions can result 
in spatial disorientation, which account for 5-10% of the accidents in general aviation 
(Williams, 2008, p. 5). Such accidents are caused by not maintaining aircraft control 
resulting in what the author of the report called; “the graveyard spin, graveyard spiral and 
Coriolis illusion” (Williams, 2008, p. 6). For the pilot, the proprioceptive and kinesthetic 
inputs to the senses can be received as immediate and noticeable changes that are felt 
immediately in yoke and rudder pedals movements, as well changes in gravitational and 
acceleration forces felt by the body (Williams, 2008, p. 4).  
However, a vestibular illusion can result in a symptom called the leans that is 
caused by the pilot not sensing gradual and prolonged changes of approximately 2 degrees 
per second in gravitational, rotational, directional and acceleration forces of the aircraft 
indicating the aircraft is not flying straight and level or maintaining proper heading 
(Williams, 2008, p. 5). The author notes that such illusions occur when there is a lack of 
visual references relative to the horizon, which leads the pilot to perceiving that the aircraft 
is straight and level when it is not. 
The author identified the sensory inputs for pilots of manned aircraft. However, the 
author notes that vision is the primary sensory information for remote pilots of UAS 
because they primarily rely on aircraft system health information through electronic 
displays (Williams, 2008, p. 1). For manned aircraft pilots, the available sensory 
information allows for better sense and detection of hazards outside the aircraft, as well as 
insid
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and instrumentation. With less sensory information available, remote pilots are at a 
disadvantage to detect and diagnose system malfunctions, which has led to 15% to 20% of 
the UAS accidents analyzed by the author (Williams, 2008, p. 20). 
Last, the researcher reviewed the academic research study titled, Seeing the Threat: 
Pilot Visual Detection of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Visual Meteorological 
Conditions, which examined the visual acuity, or ability, of manned aircraft pilots to detect 
small UAS (Loffi, Wallace, Jacob, & Dunlap, 2016). The researcher chose to review this 
academic research study because it aligned with the aspect of identifying unique human 
factors related to UAS. Specifically, it aligned with the unique human factor of manned 
aircraft pilots being able to visually detect UAS in the NAS and avoid mid-air collisions, 
which leads to publicity about UAS safety and ultimately affects the public perception of 
UAS safety. Which, is the topic of this dissertation. The purpose of Loffi, Wallace, Jacob, 
and Dunlap’s (2016) academic research study was to identify if a general aviation pilot’s 
visual acuity, or ability, was an adequate means of detecting small UAS while operating 
under VMC (p. 1). 
The researcher recalls from the review of relevant literature, in the unmanned 
aircraft accident/incident data and statistics section of this chapter, that between November 
13, 2014 and August 20, 2015, the FAA reported there were 764 UAS incidents in the 
United States of pilot or public reported sightings of UAS being operated near manned 
aircraft in the NAS, posing a mid-air collision hazard (FAA, 2015). This equates to 
approximately 85 reported incidents per month nationwide during the nine-month time 
period. Loffi et al.’s (2016) academic research study noted similar data identifying that 
“between November 2014 and January 2016, the FAA recorded 1,346 pilot sightings and 
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near-misses of UAS platforms—nearly 100 per month” during the 14-month period (p. 1). 
The academic research study also detailed other UAS encounter studies that analyzed 921 
near miss incidents between UAS and manned aircraft. Which revealed, 58.8% occurred 
near airports, 90.2% occurred 400 feet above ground level and higher, 21.2% occurred 
within 50 feet or less of aircraft to UAS separation, and 8.6% resulted in the manned aircraft 
pilot avoiding the UAS to prevent a mid-air collision (Loffi et al., 2016, p. 2). 
In posing their research questions, the researchers further identified the hazard of 
midair collisions, related to integrating UAS into the NAS, being due to the lack of an 
aircraft electronic system to detect UAS. Leaving the safety of the NAS reliant upon the 
pilot’s visual ability of detection and avoidance, whose reliability is unknown (Loffi et al., 
2016, p. 1). Loffi et al. (2016) posed the following research questions in their academic 
research study (p. 7): 
1. What is the mean distance in which an aware pilot can reliably visually 
detect a converging sUAS platform under visual meteorological conditions? 
2. Is there a substantial difference in detectability of fixed-wing vs quadcopter 
UAS platforms? 
3. Is there variability between a pilot’s perceived visual distance from a UAS 
and their actual distance? 
4. Based on the FAA’s model for Aircraft Identification & Reaction Time, 
would pilots have adequate time to evade a UAS collision? 
To answer these research questions, the research methods utilized a small manned 
aircraft operated by research subject pilots. The pilots were asked by the researchers to 
visually detect a small UAS within the airspace in or around the aircraft’s flight path while 
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operating under VMC, and were also required to estimate the distance the small UAS was 
from the pilot’s manned aircraft (Loffi et al., 2016, pp. 7-8). A small quadcopter UAS with 
3.24 square feet of visible surface area and a small fixed-wing UAS with 5.27 square feet 
of visible surface area were also used for the study (Loffi et al., 2016, p. 12). 
The researchers established six scenarios for the pilots to detect a small UAS during 
their flight; 1) a scenario in which no small UAS was located in the surrounding airspace, 
2) a scenario in which a hovering quadcopter was located on the left side of the aircraft, 3) 
a scenario in which a hovering quadcopter was located on the right side of the aircraft, 4) 
a scenario in which a quadcopter would be transitioning from the left to the right side of 
the aircraft, 5) a scenario in which a quadcopter would be transitioning from the right to 
left side of the aircraft, and 6) a scenario in which a fixed-wing UAS would be circling 
ahead of the aircraft’s flight path (Loffi et al., 2016, p. 8). A total of 20 flights were 
conducted for a total of 13 flight hours with 119 experimental scenarios completed as 
identified in this paragraph (Loffi et al., 2016, p. 11).  
In presenting the results of the study and detectability of the small UAS, Loffi et al. 
(2016) noted that the pilots were capable of detecting the small UAS during 40.3% of the 
total 119 scenarios; in further detail, during 36.8% of the quadcopter scenarios and 87% of 
the fixed-wing scenarios (p. 11). When estimating the distance from the small UAS, the 
pilots generally overestimated their distance from the smaller quadcopter UAS and 
underestimated their distance from the larger fixed-wing UAS when the researchers 
compared pilot estimates to the actual distance based on GPS coordinates for each aircraft 
(Loffi et al., 2016, p. 17). The researchers provided answers to each of the four research 
questions at the conclusion of the study.  
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The researchers answered the first question posed during the research study, “What 
is the mean distance in which an aware pilot can reliably visually detect a converging sUAS 
platform under visual meteorological conditions?” (Loffi et al., 2016, p. 7). The 
researchers’ results identified that the smaller quadcopter UAS was more difficult to detect 
than the larger fixed-wing UAS at distances beyond 0.10 statute miles and the detection 
rates within 0.10 statute miles varied between 26.3% and 57.9% detectability (Loffi et al., 
2016, p. 19). Compared to the smaller quadcopter UAS, Loffi et al. (2016) noted that the 
larger fixed-wing UAS was significantly easier to detect, with an 84.2% detectability rate 
within 0.493 statute miles (p. 19). However, the overall results of the study were 
inconclusive to fully answer this research question. 
The researchers answered the second question posed during the research study, “Is 
there a substantial difference in detectability of fixed-wing vs quadcopter UAS platforms?” 
(Loffi et al., 2016, p. 7). The researchers addressed the differences in detectability between 
the smaller quadcopter UAS and the larger fixed-wing UAS. It was identified that the fixed-
wing UAS had a detection distance that was 500% greater than the smaller quadcopter 
UAS and was likely due to the larger visible surface area as previously addressed in this 
section of the dissertation (Loffi et al., 2016, p. 22).  
The researchers answered the third question posed during the research study, “Is 
there variability between a pilot’s perceived visual distance from a UAS and their actual 
distance?” (Loffi et al., 2016, p. 7). As previously stated in this section of the dissertation, 
when estimating the distance from the small UAS, the pilots generally overestimated their 
distance from the smaller quadcopter UAS and underestimated their distance from the 
larger fixed-wing UAS when the researchers compared pilot estimates to the actual 
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distances based on GPS coordinates (Loffi et al., 2016, p. 17). The researchers noted this 
in the conclusion section of the study and indicated it to be a significant finding because 
small UAS, with smaller visible surface areas, represent the majority of small UAS used 
for commercial and hobbyist purposes (Loffi et al., 2016, p. 22).  
The researchers answered the fourth question posed during the research study, 
“Based on the FAA’s model for Aircraft Identification & Reaction Time, would pilots have 
adequate time to evade a UAS collision?” (Loffi et al., 2016, p. 7). The researchers noted 
that “pilots require at least 12.5 seconds to detect, process, and perform required evasive 
maneuvers to avoid an airborne collision threat” (Loffi et al., 2016, p. 22). As previously 
identified in this section, the researchers’ results identified that the smaller quadcopter UAS 
was more difficult to detect than the larger fixed-wing UAS at distances beyond 0.10 statute 
miles and the detection rates within 0.10 statute miles varied between 26.3% and 57.9% 
detectability (Loffi et al., 2016, p. 19).  
Compared to the smaller quadcopter UAS, Loffi et al. (2016) noted that the larger 
fixed-wing UAS was significantly easier to detect, with an 84.2% detectability rate within 
0.493 statute miles (p. 19). Based on the detectability range of 0.10 statute miles for smaller 
quadcopter UAS, and 0.493 statute miles for larger fixed-wing UAS, the researchers 
determined that the pilot of a manned aircraft would unlikely have time to detect and 
respond to a collision threat from the smaller quadcopter UAS versus the larger fixed-wing 
UAS if traveling at the same relative airspeed of 100 knots, whereas the pilot would require 
3.12 seconds to respond to the smaller UAS versus 15.42 seconds for the larger UAS (Loffi 
et al., 2016, pp. 22-23). 
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Public Trust in Automation 
The stated purpose of this research was to qualitatively study the public’s trust and 
knowledge of UAS safety through data collection by interviewing research subjects. 
Previous sections of this chapter examined the topics of aviation safety that aligned with 
purpose of gaining an understanding of the research subjects’ level of knowledge about 
aviation safety.  
The purpose of this section is to better understand the resultant research data and 
implications of this study by examining relevant academic research as it aligns with the 
research question that sought to determine the factors that affect the research subjects’ trust 
in UAS safety. As a result, the researcher reviewed the following relevant literature; an 
academic research study of public perceptions of UAS; an academic research study of 
factors that influence the public to fly as passengers in UAS; an academic research study 
of cultural differences in public perceptions about aircraft auto-pilot systems; and, an 
academic paper on public fear of UAS published in an industry journal. 
The first review of relevant literature that will be examined is a quantitative 
academic research study titled, Public Perceptions of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Tam, 
2011). Tam (2011) identified that the purpose of the research was to quantitatively examine 
the perceptions the public has about UAS used for transporting people and cargo in 
commercial operations, with a key research focus to identify if there were any Pearson 
correlations between the public’s familiarity of UAS and perceptions they had about UAS 
safety (p. 12). 
Tam’s (2011) research methodology consisted of using a data collection instrument 
in the form of a questionnaire disseminated to 170 and voluntarily completed by 158 male 
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and female faculty members of a university and an international organization for aviation 
industry professionals who were over the age of 18 years old, had knowledge of aviation 
travel and represented the air traveling consumers’ demographics (pp. 8-9).  
The results of Tam’s (2011) research are illustrated in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. The 
researcher of this dissertation notes that Figure 2.3 relates to questions as they pertain to 
Tam’s research subjects’ support of UAS passenger transportation and Figure 2.4 relates 
to questions as they pertain to the research subjects’ support of UAS cargo transportation. 
The researcher of this dissertation also notes that the same questions were asked in each 
category of transportation, as noted in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. 
Figure 2.3 
Support of Unmanned Passenger Transportation (Tam, 2011, p. 10) 
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Figure 2.4 
Support of Unmanned Cargo Transportation (Tam, 2011, p. 11) 
 
 
Tam (2011) described the demographic make-up of the research subjects as; 60% 
were male and 40% were female; 53% were between the ages of 50 to 64 years old; 29% 
were between the ages of 35 to 49 years old; 12% were between the ages of 25 to 34 years 
old; 4% were over the age 65 years old; and, 2% were between the ages of 18 to 24 years 
old (p. 9). Additionally, Tam (2011) identified that 98% of the research subjects indicated 
that they flew at least once a year (p. 9), yet the research subjects’ average familiarity of 
UAS was “little to moderate knowledge” and only five of the 158 research subjects 
indicated they were experts in the field of UAS (p. 11). 
 Figures 2.3 and 2.4 explained, Figure 2.3 shows that a majority of Tam’s (2011) 
research subjects did not support UAS for passenger travel unless a pilot was on board to 
monitor the operation of the UAS. However, Figure 2.4 shows the opposite was true for 
the research subjects’ support of UAS used in cargo operations without a pilot onboard, 
but they had even greater support of UAS for cargo operations if a pilot were onboard to 
monitor the operations of the UAS. Tam also calculated the Pearson Correlation R2 value 
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to determine if any correlation existed between a research subject’s gender and their 
familiarity with UAS, which yielded the result that a R2 value of 0.21 for male research 
subjects  “weakly suggested” that males had more familiarity with UAS than female 
research subjects; and similarly, there was no correlation between a research subject’s 
gender and age, versus their willingness, or likelihood, to fly as a passenger in a UAS (Tam, 
2011, pp. 13-14). Overall, Tam (2011) cited that resultant Pearson Correlation calculations 
completed during the study for all research subjects indicated “no significant correlation” 
between their familiarity and willingness or likeliness to fly as passengers in UAS (p. 12). 
The research subjects expressed concerns about the absence of a pilot onboard a 
UAS and the fidelity of automated UAS systems. The specific concerns identified were; 
the absence of a pilot to react to emergency situations and either take control of the UAS, 
or mitigate the situation and redirect the automated UAS operations (Tam, 2011, p. 14). 
Tam (2011) also noted that besides a pilot physically being onboard the aircraft to mitigate 
emergency situations, including security incidents and threats, the subjects also indicated 
the need for redundant fail-safe redundant systems that have been proven as safe as manned 
aircraft systems (pp. 13-14).  
In summary, Tam (2011) recommended that a pilot physically be onboard to 
mitigate emergency situations in order to increase the willingness and likelihood of 
passengers to fly on the UAS because 77% of the research subjects supported flying on a 
UAS under these conditions, while 90% of the research subjects supported UAS cargo 
operations under these conditions (p. 15). 
The second review of relevant literature that will be examined is a quantitative 
academic research study of factors that affect passenger decisions to fly on unmanned 
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aircraft titled, Analysis of Factors that may be Essential in the Decision to Fly on Fully 
Automated Passenger Airliners (Vance, 2014). The purpose of Vance’s (2014) research 
was to identify the “trust, safety and cost” factors that affect passenger decisions to fly on 
fully automated unmanned aircraft (p. 8).  
Vance (2014) utilized a Bayesian statistical reference and Design of Experiments 
method, or fractional factorial survey, to quantitatively analyze outside historical research 
data against new research data captured during the study by utilizing the fractional factorial 
survey to determine the sample population’s statistical willingness to fly as passengers on 
unmanned aircraft (p. 160). Utilizing a web-based survey, the demographic make-up of 
research subjects consisted of men and women over the age of 18 years-old who had 
experience flying as passengers on commercial aircraft (Vance, 2014, p. 48). However, 
Vance (2014) acknowledged that the diversity of the research subjects did not match U.S. 
population census data or represent the general public because; there were 
disproportionately more research subjects in the 49 to 67-year-old age group than the other 
age groups; 520 out of the 1,506 research subjects worked in the aviation field, while 316 
out of the 520 were pilots; and, 568 out of the 1,506 research subjects worked in the science, 
mathematical, and engineering professions (pp. 162-163). 
The results of Vance’s (2014) study revealed three “statistically significant” 
variables with the potential to influence the research subjects’ decisions to fly as passengers 
on unmanned aircraft, which were; displayed service provider characteristics; automation 
sophistication; and, system response to interruptions (p. 164). Described as having the most 
influence on a research subject’s decision to fly as passengers on an unmanned aircraft, 
displayed service provider characteristics is defined as the trust that research subjects had 
97 
 
in the “moral integrity, technical competence and fiduciary responsibility” (Vance, 2014, 
p. 164) of an airline operating as an unmanned airliner.  
Described as having the second most significant influence on a research subject’s 
decision to fly as a passenger on an unmanned aircraft, automation sophistication is defined 
as the “quality and reliability” (Vance, 2014, p. 39) of the UA’s automated systems to 
operate and continue to operate safely and predictability. Described as having the third 
most significant influence on a research subject’s decision to fly as a passenger on an 
unmanned aircraft, Vance (2014) defines system response to interruptions as the UA’s 
system’s ability to respond to such interruptions as; unexpected system errors, 
malfunctions and mechanical failures; adverse weather phenomenon; and, criminal actions 
that includes “rogue air traffic system participants and terrorists” (p. 34) activities. 
Vance’s (2014) research also revealed qualitative comments that are applicable to 
the results of this research study. Vance (2014) indicated that 1800 open-ended comments 
were received from the research subjects and were organized in descending order 
beginning with most frequently observed of the six most common themes; human pilot 
presence on the aircraft; endorsement by the aviation community of the reliability of the 
automated system; safety and security measures to prevent cyber-attacks and threats; 
sophistication of automation technology to replication human pilot capabilities; mistrust of 
government oversight and policy; and rejection of automation of unmanned aircraft 
systems (pp. 172-176) 
The third review of relevant literature that will be examined is a quantitative 
academic research study titled, Passengers from India and the United States Have 
Differential Opinions about Autonomous Auto-Pilots for Commercial Flights (Rice et al., 
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2014). The purpose of the research study was to investigate and compare American and 
Indian research subjects’ comfort and trust levels, as well as their willingness to accept 
autonomous aircraft systems and remotely controlled aircraft (Rice et al., 2014, p. 6). The 
researchers hypothesized that 1) the research subjects would have greater negative 
perceptions about automated and remotely controlled aircraft versus completely manned 
aircraft, that 2) Indian research subjects would more readily accept completely automated 
and remotely controlled aircraft than American research subjects (Rice et al., 2014, p. 6), 
and 3) the research subjects would have greater negative perceptions when their own 
children were affected than when colleagues were affected (Rice et al., 2014, p. 8) 
The researchers used an online survey instrument to interview 201 research subjects 
that consisted of 104 subjects from the United States, 51 males and 53 females with an 
average age of 31.01 years old, and 97 subjects from India, 64 males and 33 females with 
an average age of 31.34 years old (Rice et al., 2014, p. 4). The researchers’ survey 
instrument contained a Likert scale to measure the research subjects’ level of comfort and 
trust of automation within the range of categories from “Extremely Uncomfortable, 
Distrust, and Unwilling” to “Extremely Comfortable, Trust, and Willing” (Rice et al., 2014, 
pp. 4-5). 
This study also defined the differences between a collectivist culture versus an 
individualistic culture, which aligned with and supported the research and reasoning behind 
the research hypotheses. Rice et al. (2014) identified that the Indian culture is a collectivist 
culture, which tend to be more interdependent in perspective of the self by having a greater 
concern for others, which influences decision making when it affects others (p. 2). The 
concept of collectivism influences trust in the Indian culture; so much so, that individuals 
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tend to have blind trust in a particular situation when it is expected, known or anticipated 
that the collective culture has trust in the situation (Rice et al., 2014, p. 2). It was understood 
from review of this literature that these types of cultures have greater concern for the 
community-based interests than their own individualistic self-interests. According to the 
literature, the opposite is true for individualistic culture, such as the United States culture. 
It was understood from reading this study that individualistic cultures have greater 
tendencies to hold higher regard for self-interests than community-based interests, which 
influences trust and decision making. Rice et al. (2014) also referenced a collectivist and 
individualistic cultural index with a range of one to 100, one being the least individualistic 
and 100 being the most individualistic; India scored a 48, which was identified to be 
moderately collectivist; while, the United States scored a 91, which was identified to be 
highly individualistic (p. 2). Interestingly Guatemala scored a six, otherwise identified to 
be highly collectivist (Rice et al., 2014, p. 2). 
The results of their research identified that, overall, the research subjects from both 
countries were more comfortable, more trusting and willing to accept a human pilot versus 
automated aircraft systems, while the research subjects from the United States had more 
positive perspectives about human pilots, but more negative perspectives about autopilot 
systems and remotely controlled aircraft when compared to research subjects from India 
(Rice et al., 2014, p. 5). Similarly, both United States and Indian cultures had more negative 
perspectives when a particular situation included their own children (Rice et al., 2014, p. 
6). 
The researchers also found that the collectivist culture influenced the Indian 
research subjects’ level of acceptance and trust of automation more than the United States 
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research subjects, which is a glimpse into the cultural differences that support the 
researchers’ hypothesis that Indian research subjects would more readily accept completely 
automated and remotely controlled aircraft (Rice et al., 2014, p. 9).  
The fourth review of relevant literature that will be examined is an academic paper 
published in the Journal of Law Enforcement titled, the Fear of Drones: Privacy and 
Unmanned Aircraft (Friedenzohn & Mirot, 2013). The academic paper examined research 
and literature surrounding UAS and drone terminology as it relates to the topic of the law-
abiding public’s privacy and legal concerns in law enforcement’s use of unmanned aircraft 
for the purpose of aerial photography to capture data during monitoring of a criminal’s 
illegal activity (Friedenzohn & Mirot, 2013, p. 1). At the center topic of the paper were the 
public’s concerns about the serious implications to the rights of law abiding citizens to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure by law enforcement in its aerial monitoring of 
unlawful activities by suspected criminals, thus creating public fear of government 
applications of unmanned aircraft technologies. The concern is based on the use of the term 
drone, versus UAS, because of the stigma associated with the term drone. 
Friedenzohn and Mirot (2013) assessed an Associated Press’ (AP) poll of public 
opinions about privacy and law enforcement’s use of drone technology for surveillance (p. 
2). In its 2012 poll, the AP found that 35% of those polled had privacy concerns over law 
enforcement’s use of drones, 24% were somewhat concerned with privacy, while 36% had 
no concerns for privacy (Friedenzohn & Mirot, 2013, p. 2). In their assessment of the same 
AP poll, Friedenzohn and Mirot (2013) noted that it contained inconsistencies in its data 
collection and was thus misleading in its overall results because of inconsistencies in 
applying terminologies in the survey questions (p. 2).  
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The AP poll data reflected that 48% of those polled were in support of law 
enforcement’s use of UAS while 36% were not in support of law enforcement’s use of 
UAS (Friedenzohn & Mirot, 2013, p. 2). However, Friedenzohn and Mirot (2013) noted 
that the AP poll inconsistently applied drone terminology across the survey questions, 
specifically using it in privacy concern questions while using UAS terminology instead of 
drone terminology in questions regarding support of using UAS for law enforcement 
purposes, which they deemed counterproductive to empirical research because it 
potentially created research subject biases due to the negative stigma associated with drone 
terminology (p. 2). 
Friedenzohn and Mirot (2013) note that even though the US Constitution contains 
language detailing the public’s right to the freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, 
and that there is also legal precedence established by case law that supports the US 
Constitution’s language prohibiting law enforcement’s unreasonable search and seizure of 
property without warrants based on probable cause (p. 5), a certain fear of drones taking 
aerial pictures without a warrant exists that causes a hysteria in the public when the term 
drone is used (p. 1). Similarly, this same fear has existed when aircraft have been flown 
over private property to observe illegal activity without a search warrant, but was later 
upheld by case law that established precedence.  
Such case law establishing legal precedence to conduct aerial surveillance without 
a search warrant, later upheld by the US Supreme Court, includes California v. Ciraolo in 
1986 when law enforcement used a helicopter to fly above a house whose occupants were 
suspected of growing marijuana behind a tall fence that blocked direct view of the plants 
from the ground (Friedenzohn & Mirot, 2013, p. 6). With the helicopter being flown 
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lawfully in accordance with aviation safety regulations, law enforcement was able to 
conduct aerial surveillance without a search warrant to capture aerial photos of the 
marijuana plants being grown behind the tall fence, thus leading to law enforcement 
obtaining a search warrant to enter the property, seize 73 marijuana plants, conduct an 
arrest and convict the grower (Friedenzohn & Mirot, 2013, p. 6).  
Regardless of whether drones are flown legally or illegally by law enforcement in 
accordance with aviation safety regulations, the paper depicts the use of drones with 
negative descriptive drone terminology as being primarily and covertly used in ominous 
military applications and constantly publicized as such in the media, thus influencing a 
negative public perception of drones. However, it also depicts the use of unmanned aircraft 
technology with positive descriptive UAS terminology, thus influencing positive public 
perception. Interesting insights into the influence that publicity has over public perception 
of drones and unmanned aircraft, the topic of the paper leads to the next topic within this 
dissertation; unmanned aircraft publicity. 
 
Unmanned Aircraft Publicity 
As addressed in the previous section of this dissertation, public perception of UAS 
and drones can be influenced by safety, reliability and security. Because of this, negative 
media publicity about UAS and drones was examined and detailed in this section of the 
dissertation for the researcher to gain a perspective about the influences it may have in the 
following categories; safety, reliability, and security. At the time of this study and beyond, 
the researcher acknowledges that countless internet media articles were available to the 
research subjects and the researcher from mainstream news websites, non-mainstream 
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news websites, and independent news websites.  
As a result of the volume of information available, the researcher randomly selected 
articles about safety, reliability, and security from these types of sources to render a 
perspective on influential media that was and is available for review by the public. 
Although a limited number of sources were reviewed, the researcher believes that 
conducting a limited review satisfactorily establishes the needed perspective for the 
researcher that; negative media about the safety, reliability and security of UAS and drones 
does exist, it exists in amounts too numerous to count, and it is available to the public. 
Thus, reviewing countless negative media articles would provide little overall added value 
to this study and would require an extensive amount of time. The first category that will be 
examined is safety. 
Publicity was shown to target the perceived safety threats that UAS pose to the 
public, and other aircraft operators in the NAS, as an accident waiting in some instances to 
mere unauthorized sightings in others. This paints a broad picture for the public that UAS 
are more dangerous than government accident statistics actually reveal. The researcher 
recalls that the unmanned aircraft accident statistics previously addressed in this 
dissertation revealed a lack of government data to not only compare accident rates of UAS 
to manned aircraft, but to also establish a known accident rate for UAS in which to base 
comparisons in the first place. Yet, articles published by the media paint a negative image 
without source data comparison of accident statistics to objectively determine if UAS and 
drones are any more or less safe than manned aircraft. Similarly, negative media makes 
safety determinations without proper classification and categorization as an accident, 
incident or occurrence, such as what the Guardian published in 2015 when it painted a 
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picture that unauthorized drone sightings in the first eight months of 2015 had risen from 
238 during the entire year of 2014 to 650 by August 2015 (“US Plans,” 2015).  
While these numbers were published by the Guardian, the researcher recalls that no 
known civil UAS or drones operated by civil operators were classified as being involved 
in an aircraft accident or fatal accident during the time period previously addressed in this 
dissertation according to the NTSB aircraft accident database. However, a few public or 
government UAS accidents were recorded with no associated fatalities. It is recalled by the 
researcher that incident statistics previously identified in this dissertation revealed 
sightings of unauthorized UAS and drone operations, but none were classified as being 
involved accidents or caused accidents either, so it is not clear if unauthorized operations 
actually pose as high a safety risk as it is perceived in media articles such as the one 
published by the Guardian. In fact, one could argue that with no life onboard the 
unauthorized operation of a UAS, the operation of manned aircraft could actually pose a 
greater risk to life than an unmanned aircraft or drone. 
Other media reports reflect UAS and drone sales to be outpacing manned aircraft 
sales at an alarming and prolific rate, suggesting that the government cannot handle the 
level of additional safety risk imposed on the NAS by the sheer number of additional UAS. 
One article identified that the sales volume of UAS and drones by consumers in 2014 was 
200,000 per month worldwide at nearly $720 million in reported sales, while the sales 
numbers were predicted to double in 2015 and reach nearly $4.5 billion by 2020 (Barry & 
Calix, 2015). While the implications of such information leaves readers the implied 
message that the government will be task saturated in regulating the safety of UAS, current 
statistics do not reveal the risk to be as high as the media perceives it to be, possibly 
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influencing bias in public opinion about the safety of UAS without consideration for risk-
based decision making founded in data and data comparison. 
Another method of sensationalizing UAS and drone safety was found to be through 
endorsement. One such internet article identified a bona fide aircraft accident investigator, 
Australian Senator Barry O’Sullivan, who openly warned the public that large numbers of 
fatalities could be expected to occur before drones were appropriately regulated due to the 
surge in the number of UAS and drones that entered and began being operated in the 
airspace with manned aircraft (Mizen, 2017).  
Mizen (2017) cited that, based on O’Sullivan’s credentials of investigating aircraft 
accidents for 20 years, drones posed a catastrophic mid-air collision hazard, yet the author 
did not provide correlative studies between bird strikes and drone or UAS strikes to show 
that drones or small UAS were any more or less of a catastrophic safety hazard and resultant 
risk than birds were to manned aircraft in the NAS. The researcher considered the lack of 
full and accurate reporting to be nothing more than sensationalism and not objective and 
empirical analysis by the author.  
The researcher also notes another internet article about the safety of UAS, or 
drones, which indicates to the reader that a “tragic accident” involving a midair collision 
between a drone and a commercial aircraft was imminent because of the prolific number 
of drones being operated hazardously (Thomas, 2016). Thomas (2016) reported that there 
were 23 near misses in the United Kingdom between April and October during 2015, 
posing a serious risk. Thomas also went on to write that globally, drone operators are 
“routinely ignoring” common operating limitations of flying no higher than 400 feet AGL 
and no closer than five miles from an airport. Additionally, Thomas cited cases in which 
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drones were sighted within 50 feet of manned aircraft by the pilot of a manned aircraft. 
However, the author did not reference relevant literature, as previously addressed within 
this dissertation, detailing limitations of pilot visual acuity to identify small UAS or drones 
at altitude, while operating at approach airspeeds, thus decreasing the credibility of the 
report empirically. However, the article did appear as sensationalism to the reader. 
The next type of negative media publicity that will be examined is on the topic of 
UAS or drone reliability. Again, the researcher found countless articles on this topic. First, 
the researcher identified a negative article about the reliability of the U.S. military’s Gray 
Eagle, an Army UAS similar to the Air Force Predator that was plagued with system 
reliability and system failures. Beckhusen (2012) reported that the U.S. Army purchased 
164 Gray Eagles in its UAS program beginning in 2011 and scheduled through 2022 at a 
cost of “hundreds of millions of dollars”. Yet, despite the poor reliability of all of the 
aircraft’s systems, the Army continued the program after numerous system failures that 
resulted in aircraft accidents (Beckhusen, 2012). Of significance, Beckhusen (2012) 
reported the U.S. Army continued the program, despite an average system failure rate of 
one system failure for every 25 flight hours when the originally expected failure rate was 
one system failure every 100 flight hours.  
The researcher also identified a second article about the reliability of military UAS 
or drones. Whitlock (2016) wrote that a “mysterious surge” (para. 2) in U.S. Air Force 
mishaps involving the Reaper drone occurred in 2015. The Reaper, used for combat 
operations by the Air Force to target enemy and terrorist threats in the Middle East, suffered 
electrical system failures causing the loss of aircraft power resulting in accidents, or what 
the author described as “sudden electrical failures that have caused the 2 ½ -ton drone to 
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lose power and drop from the sky” (Whitlock, 2016, para. 3).  
The author also sensationalized the secrecy surrounding the national security of 
classified accident reports as “shrouding the extent of the problem and keeping details” 
from the public, however the author noted he was able to obtain declassified accident 
reports under the Freedom of Information Act request for information from the U.S. 
government (Whitlock, 2016). Whitlock (2016) cited that 24 Reaper drones were involved 
in accidents during 2015, double the number from previous years, and a total of 237 Reaper 
accidents occurred between 2001 and 2015. The researcher highlights the fact that 
Whitlock reported that there were no fatalities in any of the Reaper accidents. This data 
appeared to be unbiased, empirical, transparent, well rounded and fact based, and 
correlated to UAS and drone accident data and statistics previously addressed within this 
dissertation.  
The researcher also reviewed other articles related to the reliability of military UAS, 
besides the Reaper. One specific article provided the statistical information that not only 
compared the accident rates between UAS, but also compared those accidents rates against 
manned aircraft. Although the overall military UAS or drone accident rates fell from 62.06 
accidents per 100,000 flight hours in 2001 to 5.13 accidents per 100,000 flight hours in 
2011, the overall UAS accident rate was still higher than rates for manned aircraft such as 
the 3.89 accident rate for the F-16 (Hansen, Zeller, & Austin, 2017). Hansen, Zeller, and 
Austin (2017) also noted that the unmanned Global Hawk aircraft had a 15.16 accident rate 
that was nearly three times the accident rate than the manned U-2 spy aircraft that flew 
similar reconnaissance missions.  
The researcher also identified an internet article detailing the reliability of small 
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UAS or drones that are operated for recreational or hobbyist purposes. Teschler (2016) 
wrote about the poor reliability of gas engines, specifically the engine’s carburetor, as the 
factor limiting hobbyist UAS or drones to 200 hours of reliable flight time. And, the author 
went on to state that the cause of these limitations was the result of smaller parts and 
vacuum orifices that were both harder to adjust and clean, and were more sensitive when 
subjected to vibrations that affect engine/carburetor tuning (Teschler, 2016).  
The last area of negative media and publicity about UAS and drones is security. 
Security meaning UAS can be used specifically for criminal purposes and also meaning 
the physical or virtual vulnerabilities of UAS systems to malicious hackers who can take 
control of the UAS in flight. Of greatest credibility, the researcher identified government 
published information about the threats that UAS pose to the public, specifically UAS used 
for criminal purposes. 
The researcher found that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
published on its website that UAS or drones are used for legitimate purposes, such as 
commercially, hobby and recreation, firefighting and law enforcement, and research 
(Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2017). However, it also acknowledged its 
concern that these devices can be used by terrorists and other criminals to conduct such 
malicious and criminal activity as illegal spying, carrying weapons or dangerous payloads 
such as explosives or chemicals used to attack the public or government, as well as simple 
public disruption and harassment of people, property, and government and law 
enforcement agencies (DHS, 2017). 
Similarly, the researcher found other sources of information about the security 
threats that UAS and drones pose to the public. Crawford (2016) wrote that terrorists 
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organizations such as Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) are researching new ways 
to use drones to deliver weapons of mass destruction and mass casualties, such as chemical 
and biological weapons, and even nuclear weapons. The article also credited ISIS with a 
successful attack on Kurdish military using a drone carrying explosives to kill and injure 
soldiers (Crawford, 2016). Although the attack occurred in the Middle East, the implication 
of the article for the researcher was that the technology can be used by organized criminals 
and terrorist groups, and lone individuals domestically here in the United States. 
The second area of security that will be addressed is the physical or virtual 
vulnerabilities of UAS systems to malicious hackers who can take control of UAS in flight. 
Sperry (2012), in a CNN article, wrote that “it wouldn't take much effort to hijack a drone 
over U.S. airspace and use it to commit a crime or act of terrorism.” The author went on to 
identify that global positioning system (GPS) technology currently exists in off-the-shelf 
format that can be used to electronically hijack a sophisticated and expensive UAS, but 
specifically noted small drones are even more vulnerable to malicious attack due to 
unencrypted software and GPS navigation information (Sperry, 2012). Sperry also wrote 
that as drones proliferate in numbers, the natural progression of their use will result more, 
and more, into such illegal activity as spying on homes, backyards and areas typically 
meant to be private, and the government must regulate their manufacture and use due to 
the privacy issue they create. And, because of sophisticated camera and small UAS 
technology, drones that are available to the public are exceptional tools for invading 
privacy (Forrest, 2015).  
The researcher also identified articles detailing the criminally nefarious use of 
drones to carry illegal drugs across the border of Mexico into U.S. by drug cartels, as well 
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as gangs using drones to deliver illegal drugs and contraband into prisons (Barry & Calix, 
2015).  
The New York Times also published a similar article on the security threat that 
drones pose to the public. In 2016, it stated that the “FAA is not equipped to regulate 
another big drone-related issue: privacy” (New York Times Editorial Board, 2016). In the 
article, it cited a 2014 survey in which 63 percent of the population was concerned that 
drones would cause harm in the NAS. The concerns being, threats to privacy and other 
airplanes. 
The last two articles about UAS and drone security reviewed by the researcher were 
the most sensational, soliciting public fear and accusations of Chinese espionage against 
the U.S. government and its citizens, supporting the DHS’s acknowledgment of its concern 
for drone security as published on its website. The first, an independent and non-
mainstream internet source, Cawley’s (2015) article titled the “5 Unstoppable Drone 
Security Threats You Should be Aware of” was a solicitation for public fear of drones and 
the potential threat to pose to the public and government.  
The author identified five realistic threats that drones pose to security; 1) drones 
with cameras, 2) drones with weapons, 3) drones with the capability of hacking computer 
systems, 4) private drones that operated behind secure law enforcement and firefighting 
boundaries, 5) drones operated by terrorists and criminals. The author placed blame for 
these threats primarily on the accessibility of this technology by the manufacturers and on 
the government by the lack of oversight and regulations. The researcher found each of these 
threats plausible and realistic in nature, given the ingenuity of humankind to enhance base 
technology and make it better, or more sinister, than its originally intended purpose.  
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The last article by Rivett-Carnac (2016) about Chinese espionage against the U.S. 
government and its citizens was examined by the researcher. The researcher recalls the 
DHS’s acknowledgment of its concern for drone security as published on its website, which 
this article relates to, and the researcher also considered a solicitation for public fear of 
UAS and drones. DJI, the Chinese manufacturer of DJI Phantom, and also considered the 
world’s largest drone manufacturer, was reported by Bloomberg to be handing over data 
collected by its drones at the request of the Chinese government (Rivett-Carnac, 2016). 
The data includes GPS location information, video and still imagery, and related flight 
data, as well as owner information. The article did not define the scope of customers 
affected by the government request, or whether it included U.S. customers of the DJI 
products. The researcher recalls from previously discussed review of relevant literature in 
this dissertation the privacy implications that drones pose to the public at the hands of the 
government collection of information without proper warrant. The implications of this 
article, if true, represent a significant threat to civil liberties of U.S. citizens to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure. 
  
Dunning-Kruger Effect 
As previously identified in this dissertation, the researcher questioned if the 
Dunning-Kruger Effect could influence public perceptions of aviation safety, which 
suggests that people think more highly of their cognitive decision-making abilities even 
when they have limited knowledge in which to make a competent decision (Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999, p. 1121). As a result, the researcher reviewed the study by Kruger and 
Dunning (1999) published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology titled, 
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Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence 
Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments (p. 1121). 
Kruger and Dunning (1999) maintained the belief and assumption that under-
skilled people overestimate and maintain higher opinions about their skills and abilities 
than do skilled people in a particular knowledge area, suffering the ability to realize the 
incompetence brought about by the lack knowledge or skill (p. 1121). The result is an 
incorrect assumption of competence. The authors conducted four studies to examine the 
effects of this predicted phenomenon, finding that the incompetent person experiences two 
negative results from overestimated assumptions about their skills or knowledge level; 1) 
they experience errors in judgement, choice, and skills, and 2) they lose the opportunity to 
learn from their errors because they do not realize the errors due to their incompetence 
(Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 1121).  
The research pair explained this phenomenon with the relatable example of being 
competent to read, write, and detect grammatically correct sentences. The premise being 
that, in order to detect errors in grammatically incorrect sentences, one must be competent 
in reading and writing grammatically correct sentences in the first place. Kruger and 
Dunning (1999) also termed this an “imperfect self-assessment” (p. 1122). In that, an 
average person sees themselves as above average, when in fact they are either average or 
less than average, but fail to recognize it, which leads the incompetent to believe and 
overestimate that they are performing well (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 1122). 
Kruger and Dunning (1999) focused their research and predictions on these 
competence and metacognitive skills, which are the foundational knowledge and 
subsequent experiences one has about one’s personal cognitive abilities. The authors 
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predicted these to be lacking in the incompetent person, which is a required skill for 
correctly assessing one’s own abilities (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 1122). In reviewing 
the study, the researcher identified Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) four predictions based on 
their beliefs and assumptions about the metacognitive abilities of incompetent people (p. 
1122): 
1. People who are incompetent will overestimate their own cognitive abilities 
more than those who are competent. 
2. People who are incompetent will be less likely than people who are 
competent to recognize competence in themselves and others. 
3. People who are incompetent will be less likely than people who are 
competent to learn from assessing the performance of other people, in order 
to assign a correct assessment of self-performance. 
4. People who are incompetent can become competent by being taught about 
their errors, which provides them with the needed metacognitive skills to 
properly assess self-performance. 
The research pair conducted four research studies to test these predictions.  The first 
was a study of humor, the second was a study of logic, the third was a study of grammar 
and the English language, and the fourth was a follow-on study of logic. In each study, 
Kruger and Dunning (1999) required the research subjects to assess their own competence, 
their estimation of their competence was tested, and in each study the research pair 
predicted that the research subjects would overestimate their competence, but be unaware 
of poor competence (p. 1123).  
114 
 
The first study, of humor, examined the research subjects’ ability to assess their 
skills at estimating the reaction of other people to jokes, by assessing a series of written 
jokes and determining if the jokes were either funny or not funny. The study included 
professional comedians to assess if the jokes were funny, or not. Then, the research 
subjects’ assessments of jokes were compared to the assessments of the professional 
comedians.  
In their predictions, Kruger and Dunning (1999) predicted that the research subjects 
would overestimate their ability to recognize jokes that would be funny to other people and 
they would not realize their incompetence (p. 1123). The results of the study revealed that 
the research subjects actually over-estimated their competence at recognizing funny jokes 
to be in the 66th percentile, whereas their actual performance was in the 12th percentile, 
which reflected a severe overestimation of competence (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 
1124). In summary of the results of the first study, Kruger and Dunning (1999) affirmed 
prediction one, and of greatest importance, identified that the incompetent research subjects 
were “utterly unaware of their incompetence”, thus affirming prediction two (p. 1124).  
The second study, of logic, Kruger and Dunning (1999) focused on two objectives; 
1) validating the result of the first study, and 2) comparing the perceptions of the research 
subjects (p. 1124). The first objective, to validate the first study, focused on intellectual 
competence rather than social competence as in the first study. Focusing on intellectual 
competence and logic skills allowed the research pair to compare the competence of the 
research subjects based on their actual logic skills, verses perceived social ability. The 
research pair concluded that the first study of humor had research limitations because what 
was funny could be perceived as subjective. Focusing on logic, however, allowed the 
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research pair to subject the research subjects to questions with definitive correct and 
incorrect responses (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 1124). Thus, Kruger and Dunning 
subjected the second group of research subjects to questions based on legal school 
admission test questions that contained definitive right and wrong responses.  
The second research objective, to compare the perceptions of the research subjects, 
allowed the research pair to comparatively measure the second group of research subject’s 
ability to compare their competence against the competence of other research subjects in 
the same group. Effectively, it established their perception of who was right, then compared 
their responses to the reality of who was actually right and wrong. This objective aligned 
with prediction three.  
As in the first study, the second group of research subjects over-estimated their 
competence to be in the 66th percentile, when their actual performance fell in the 12th 
percentile. The results also revealed the incompetent research subjects’ inability to properly 
assess the competence of other research subjects. In summary of the results of the second 
study, Kruger and Dunning (1999); 1) met the first objective by validating the results of 
the first study, affirming predictions one and two, and 2) met the second objective to 
measure the research subjects’ ability to assess the competence of others, thus affirming 
prediction three (p.1125). 
The third study, of grammar and English language skills, required the research 
subjects to complete a self-assessment measuring their predicted competence in the 
standards and rules for their written use of the English language.  Additionally, the subjects 
were also required to rate their competence to recognize the competence of other research 
subjects by examining their written use of the English language to determine if they 
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followed established standards and rules for language use. This allowed the research pair 
to establish competence in the use of language, and the ability to recognize the correct or 
incorrect use of language skills of other people. Additionally, the research pair were able 
to assess the ability of the research subjects’ ability to identify their own incompetence.  
In summary of their research, the research pair found the study to validate the 
results of the first two studies. In that, Kruger and Dunning (1999) observed the bottom 
quartile subjects to similarly overestimate their competence and demonstrate significant 
deficiencies in metacognitive skills to not only identify incompetence in their own abilities, 
but others as well, thus affirming predictions one and two (p. 1127). Additionally, the 
research study also affirmed the third predication in that, the incompetent research subjects 
failed to recognize their own incompetence and believed their performance was above 
average (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 1127). 
The fourth study, a follow-on study of logic ability, used a fourth group of research 
subjects, with the overall objective to “manipulate competence” in an effort to determine 
if the subject’s metacognitive skills could be improved, thus aligning with prediction four 
(Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 1128). Kruger and Dunning (1999) administered a logic test 
with problem solving and association tasks to the research subjects, required them to assess 
their own competence level in problem solving and association, then immediately trained 
half of the research subjects on problem solving and association, and lastly required all of 
the research subjects to grade their responses as either correct or incorrect (p. 1128).  
In summary of their research, Kruger and Dunning (1999) found that training the 
incompetent research subjects in problem solving and association made them more 
competent at recognizing their own incompetence, and also increased their self-
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performance and overall competence in problem solving and association, thus affirming 
prediction four (p. 1129). Overall, the research pair were able to affirm each of their four 
research predictions.  
In conclusion, the researcher of this dissertation notes the purpose of this research 
was to qualitatively study the public’s trust and knowledge of UAS safety. Additionally, 
the researcher sought to determine whether the research subjects would be willing to fly as 
passengers in UAS, and if publicity of the UAS industry, its development and integration 
into the NAS have influenced their perception of UAS safety, which could affect their 
decision to travel as passengers in UAS. The researcher also examined data to identify if 
any observable Dunning-Kruger Effect existed that would suggest if any of the subjects 
believed they had more knowledge about the factors that affect UAS safety than what they 
knew about those factors when deciding whether they would fly as passengers in UAS.  
To obtain a better understanding of these topics in order to conduct a thorough 
analysis of data obtained, as well as to obtain a thorough understanding of the level of 
knowledge of aviation safety that the research subjects have, this chapter detailed the 
researcher’s review of relevant literature as it related to the purpose of this study. As such, 
the researcher aligned the topics of this review of literature chapter with the topics 
contained within the data collection instrument detailed within the methodology chapter of 
this dissertation. Specifically, this chapter detailed; manned aviation regulations, small 
unmanned aircraft regulations, large unmanned aircraft regulations, aircraft accident 
statistics, aircraft accident causes, unmanned aircraft human factors, public trust in 
automation, unmanned aircraft publicity, and the Dunning-Kruger effect. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The researcher submitted the required Oklahoma State University (OSU) 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) application, obtained approval from the IRB to complete 
this research study, and collected data from August 3 to October 10, 2016. Reference 
Appendix A for IRB approval. This chapter details the research methodology used by the 
researcher during this study. Specifically, it details the sampling population, the subject 
selection methodology, subject recruitment, the data collection method, the data collection 
instrument, and ethical considerations. 
 
Sampling Population 
Qualitative data collection is dependent upon what Creswell (2012) describes as 
purposeful sampling of a population by intentionally selecting research subjects in order to 
learn about the central concepts, themes or phenomenon of the study (p. 206). The 
researcher utilized Creswell’s purposeful sample method by identifying a typical sample 
of the public who 1) did not have a technical background in manned or unmanned aviation, 
but was aware of the concepts of manned and unmanned aircraft and may or may not have 
flown in manned aircraft, and 2) did have a technical background in manned or unmanned 
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aviation.  
 
Subject Selection Methodology 
The researcher utilized the purposeful typical sampling method to identify the 
initial number of research subjects, and then utilized what Creswell (2012) defines as a 
snowball sampling method, in which the initial research subjects recommended other 
people who fit the purposeful typical sampling profile identified by the researcher. In these 
methods, Creswell (2012) defines an adequate number of subjects for purposeful sampling 
as a range from one to 40 (p. 209). Creswell (2012) also states that it is acceptable to stop 
data collection if further data collection reveals saturation, defined as the point where the 
researcher determines that no new information will be obtained by additional data 
collection (p. 433). 
The typical sample method used by the researcher was planned to identify the first 
one to 10 subjects, and the snowball sample method was planned to be used to identify the 
remaining number of subjects utilizing the interview questions in the data collection 
method and data collection instrument sections of this chapter. However, the actual number 
of purposeful and snowball subject sample sizes differed from the original plan due to the 
willingness of purposeful sample subjects to recommend snowball sample recruit contacts, 
and the willingness of snowball sample recruit contacts to participate in the study. As a 
result, the inverse of the original plan occurred and a greater number of purposeful sample 
subjects participated versus the number of snowball sample subjects. The research subject 
demographics, and procedures used to recruit research subjects are detailed within the next 
section of this chapter.  
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Subject Recruitment 
The researcher attained saturation of data, and stopped further recruitment at a total 
of 25 subjects who willfully participated in this study. The researcher utilized the 
purposeful typical sampling method to identify 22 research subjects, by identifying the 
subjects from personal and professional contacts who were directly known by the 
researcher to fit the purposeful typical sample profile.  The snowball sampling method 
resulted in identifying three research subjects. Reference Table 3.1 following the next 
paragraph for research subject selection totals. 
The researcher recruited subjects by emailing a subject recruitment letter, Appendix 
B, and informed consent document, Appendix C, prior to each subject’s participation in 
the study. The researcher received an informed consent document signed by each research 
subject prior to conducting an interview and collecting data. Reference the appendix 
section for these documents. Table 3.2 lists the observed demographics of the research 
subjects who participated in this study.  
Table 3.1 
Research Subject Selection 
Purposeful Sample Snowball Sample Total Research Subjects 
22 3 25 
 
Table 3.2 
Research Subject Demographics 
Sex Age Ranges 
18-35 36-50 Over 50 Total 
Male 0 11 4 15 
Female 2 3 5 10 
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 During subject recruitment, the researcher failed to receive responses from 11 
recruit contacts. As a result, these recruit contacts were not interviewed. Reference Table 
3.3 for non-interviewed recruit contact totals. A total of 6 purposeful sample recruit 
contacts and a total of 5 snowball sample recruit contacts failed to respond to the requests 
to be interviewed by the researcher. Reference Tables 3.4 and 3.5 for the demographics of 
non-interviewed purposeful and snowball sample recruit contacts.  
Table 3.3 
Non-Interviewed Recruit Contacts 
Purposeful Sample Snowball Sample Total Recruit Contacts 
6 5 11 
 
Table 3.4 
Non-Interviewed Purposeful Sample Recruit 
Contacts   
Sex Age Ranges 
18-35 36-50 Over 50 Total 
MALE 0 0 1 1 
FEMALE 0 3 2 5 
 
Table 3.5  
Non-Interviewed Snowball Sample Recruit Contacts   
Sex Age Ranges Unknown 
Male 5 
Female 0 
 
Data Collection Method 
Creswell (2012) describes the process for collecting, analyzing and interpreting 
qualitative data to include; 1) collecting data by recording interviews, 2) preparing recorded 
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data from interviews by transcribing it into meaningful written text, 3) reviewing the 
transcribed data to identify central themes and categories, and 4) coding the central themes 
and categories for analysis and interpretation detailed in the final dissertation report (p. 
237). The researcher utilized this process for data collection. 
The researcher conducted telephone interviews, which ranged from an approximate 
half-hour to an hour-and-a-half, with each typical and snowball sample subject until 
saturation of data occurred. Interviews were conducted by telephone from the researcher’s 
home office and audio from each interview was recorded. The researcher also developed 
and used an IRB approved interview guide. The guide was used to ask each subject the 
same open-ended and closed-ended interview questions.  
Because of the qualitative design of this study, both open-ended and closed-end 
questioning generated further follow-on questions from the researcher and the research 
subjects in order to gain further clarification of either the research subjects’ responses to 
the questions, or to clarify the questions for the research subjects. These follow-on 
questions generated a data rich environment for the researcher to complete this study, 
which will be detailed in the analysis and findings chapter of this dissertation. Reference 
Appendix D for the interview guide and Appendix A for the IRB approval letter.  
The data collection interview questions were designed and used to determine the 
following; if the subjects trusted UAS safety; if the subjects had a knowledge of factors 
that affected UAS safety; if the subjects believed any other factors affected their trust of 
UAS safety; if the subjects believed that UAS publicity affected their trust of UAS safety; 
and overall, if the subjects were willing to fly as passengers in UAS. The results are detailed 
within the analysis and findings chapter of this dissertation.  
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Data collection methods used to identify the research subjects’ knowledge of UAS 
safety focused on specific factors the researcher knows affect UAS safety based on the 
researcher’s technical experience and professional education in the field of aviation safety; 
which are, FAA regulations, certification, and oversight of manned and unmanned aircraft, 
operations, and airworthiness.  
Within the analysis and findings chapter of this dissertation, the researcher details 
the results of the process that Creswell (2012) describes for collecting, analyzing and 
interpreting qualitative data. Following the collection of data, the researcher prepared the 
recorded data from interviews by transcribing it into meaningful written text, reviewed the 
transcribed data to identify central themes and categories, and coded the central themes 
and categories for analysis and interpretation detailed in the final dissertation report. The 
following sections within this chapter identify the data collection instrument used during 
this study, and ethical considerations and measures taken to preserve the validity of data 
and integrity of the research process. 
 
Data Collection Instrument 
The researcher used a two-part data collection instrument and asked each research 
subject to respond to each interview question and statement. The duration of each interview 
session ranged from an approximate half-hour to an hour-and-a-half in length. Only one 
interview session was used to complete the interview process for each subject. 
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First Part: Open-Ended Interview Questions and Statements 
1. Please describe your background, experience and education in aviation. [Ask if the 
male or female research subject to further describe their age as between (1) 18-35; 
(2) 36-50; and (3) over 50] 
2. Can you describe your level of trust in manned aircraft safety? 
3. Can you describe your level of trust in unmanned aircraft safety? 
4. What factors affect your trust of unmanned aircraft? 
5. What factors affect your trust of manned aircraft? 
6. Can you describe your knowledge of factors that affect unmanned aircraft safety? 
7. Can you describe your knowledge of factors that affect manned aircraft safety? 
8. Can you describe what has been publicized about UAS by the government and 
media, and how this publicity has affected your opinions about UAS? 
 
Second Part: Follow-on Closed-Ended Questions 
1. Are you an aircraft pilot or mechanic? 
2. Do you, or anyone you know operate UAS? 
3. How often do you fly as a passenger in a commercially manned aircraft? 
4. Are UAS regulated and overseen for safety the same as manned aircraft? 
5. Are UAS considered to be as technically reliable and safe as manned aircraft? 
6. Are UAS licensed the same as manned aircraft? 
7. Are UAS operators licensed and trained the same as manned aircraft pilots? 
8. Are UAS allowed to operate in the same airspace as manned aircraft? 
9. Are UAS mechanics licensed the same as manned aircraft mechanics? 
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10. Are UAS required to be maintained the same as manned aircraft? 
11. Would you volunteer to be the first person to fly in an unmanned aircraft? 
12. If proven safe and reliable, would you fly as a passenger in an unmanned aircraft? 
13. Would you recommend another person who may be suitable for this study? 
 
Ethical Considerations 
Pursuant to OSU IRB procedures, and in order to prevent harm to the research 
subjects, data collected during this study was not, and will not be made a part of any record 
that can be linked to any of the research subjects, and none of the subjects were misled or 
deceived in any way to further this research study. The sampling population did not include 
members of any special population as defined by the OSU IRB policy, and no subjects 
were under the age of 18.  
At no time during this research study were any of the research subjects exposed to 
stress or risks that were greater than what the research subjects would normally encounter 
during their normal and daily physical or psychological activities. Similarly, because 
biological sampling was not conducted, physical conditioning and/or issuance of any life 
sustaining food, water and drugs necessitating medical clearance was not required. At no 
time during this research study were the research subjects exposed to offensive, 
threatening, or degrading material, nor were they offered inducements to participate in this 
study that could be perceived as compensation to participate. 
To meet IRB intervention, environment, and subject manipulation requirements, 
the researcher utilized the approve IRB informed consent document to notify the research 
subjects of confidentiality and risks associated with participation in the qualitative question 
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and answer interview process. Reference the appendix section for these documents 
approved by the IRB. At no time during this research study did the researcher manipulate 
the subjects or the environment, and no exposure-outcome research was performed in this 
qualitative study. 
The 23 purposeful sample research subjects who participated in this study were 
known to the researcher, while the three snowball subjects who participated were not 
known by the researcher. In order to protect the identity and well-being of each research 
subject, the researcher has stored and will keep all informed consent documents and audio 
recorded responses to interview questions for the following specified time period. 
Before recording, transcribing, coding and categorizing of data, the name of each 
research subject was replaced with a research subject number and each associated research 
subject number corresponds to the associated research subject’s responses to their 
interview questions. Audio recordings did not contain personally identifiable information, 
and instead contained the research subject number instead of any subject names or 
personally identifiable information. Similarly, subject names do not correspond to 
responses to any interview questions. 
All informed consent documents, audio recordings and transcripts are and will be 
kept secure in the researcher’s residence, locked in a fire proof safe for a period of three 
years. After three years, the information will be destroyed. Informed consent documents 
have not, and will not be made available to anyone other than the researcher and the 
Dissertation Committee Chair. During the records retention time period, research subject 
numbers and the associated transcribed written text will be made available for review by 
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the Oklahoma State University, the Dissertation Committee, and outside researchers 
seeking to validate research results.  
To maintain credibility and validity of the research methods and data, the researcher 
commissioned the services of a third party to transcribe interview audio data into 
meaningful written text for researcher coding and categorizing of data into central themes. 
The audio files sent to the transcriptionist did not contain any personally identifiable 
information, and instead contained the research subject number associated with the audio 
files. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research was to qualitatively study the public’s trust and 
knowledge of UAS safety through data collection by interviewing research subjects. The 
researcher sought to determine whether the research subjects would be willing to fly as 
passengers in UAS, and if publicity of the UAS industry, its development and integration 
into the NAS have influenced their perception of UAS safety. The researcher also 
examined data to identify if any observable Dunning-Kruger Effect existed that would 
suggest if any of the subjects believed they had more knowledge about the factors that 
affect UAS safety than what they knew when deciding whether to fly as passengers in 
UAS.  
To gain a greater understanding of these topics and conduct a more thorough 
analysis of the research data, the researcher conducted a review of relevant literature as it 
relates to the purpose of this study. As such, the researcher aligned the topics of the review 
of literature chapter with the topics contained within the data collection instrument detailed 
within the methodology chapter. Specifically, the review of literature contained topics in 
manned aviation regulations, small unmanned aircraft regulations, large unmanned aircraft 
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regulations, aircraft accident statistics, aircraft accident causes, unmanned aircraft human 
factors, public trust in automation, unmanned aircraft publicity, and the Dunning-Kruger 
effect. 
This section of the dissertation details the analysis of the data that was collected 
during research interviews utilizing the data collection instrument. Specifically, the chapter 
details the demographics of the research subjects, analyzes the results of the data collection 
instrument, and discusses research findings related to common themes of the research. The 
demographics of the research subjects will be analyzed first. 
 
Demographics 
As detailed in the methodology chapter of this dissertation, the researcher recruited 
25 research subjects that consisted of 22 purposeful sample subjects and three snowball 
sample subjects. Tables 4.1 and Table 4.2 lists the sample types, and observed age and sex 
demographics of the research subjects who participated in this study. This demographic 
data was captured during the first open-ended interview question/statement of the first part 
of the data collection instrument, which asked the male and female subjects to further 
describe their age as either 18-35, 36-50, or over 50. Further education and experience 
demographics of the research subjects are detailed in the next section of this chapter, which 
analyzes the results of the data collection instrument. 
Table 4.1 
Research Subject Selection 
Purposeful Sample Snowball Sample Total Research Subjects 
22 3 25 
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Table 4.2 
Research Subject Demographics 
Sex Age Ranges 
18-35 36-50 Over 50 Total 
Male 0 11 4 15 
Female 2 3 5 10 
 
Data Collection Instrument Analysis 
The data collection instrument consisted of two parts. The first part contained eight 
open-ended interview questions and statements. The second part contained 13 follow-on 
closed-ended questions. This section details and analyzes the results of each research 
question, within each part, of the data collection instrument.  
The researcher notes that qualitative descriptive language is used throughout this 
section to consistently and qualitatively describe the number of research subjects in each 
of the two research subject categories that were observed in question number one of the 
first part of the data collection instrument; the 12 subjects without a background, 
experience and education in aviation; and, the 13 subjects with a background, experience 
and education in aviation. These qualitative descriptions are referenced within Table 4.3. 
The first part of the data collection instrument, the open-ended interview questions, will be 
examined first.  
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Table 4.3 
  Descriptors of Research Subject Quantity 
Descriptor Without Background in Aviation With Background in Aviation 
Some 2 to 3 out of 12 2 to 4 out of 13 
Few 4 out of 12 5 out of 13 
Less than half 5 out of 12 6 out of 13 
Half / Slightly 
more than half 6 out of 12 7 out of 13 
Majority 7 out of 12 8 out of 13 
Most 8 to 10 out of 12 9 to 11 out of 13 
Nearly All 11 out of 12 12 out of 13 
 
First Part: Open-Ended Interview Questions and Statements 
1. Please describe your background, experience and education in aviation.  
This question asked the research subjects to describe their background, experience 
and education in aviation. The responses for background and experience in aviation were 
categorized in the following common themes; 1) yes, the research subject had a background 
and experience in aviation; or 2) no, the research subject did not have a background and 
experience in aviation. These categorical themes were analyzed throughout each question 
of the data collection instrument. 
Based on the research subjects’ qualitative responses, their responses were further 
categorized as either having an identified background or experience in aviation as a pilot, 
mechanic, or other capacity. Other was identified as someone having a background or 
experience in aviation as either a flight attendant, an airline ticketing and loading agent, air 
traffic controller, or someone who provided administrative support in aircraft accident 
investigations. 
Responses to education were also categorized into common themes. The responses 
were categorized as none, academic, and/or technical. Academic was identified as either 
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college undergraduate, or college graduate degrees in aviation subject matter. Technical 
was identified as training in aviation vocational subject matter. The research data reflected 
the following information. 
It was observed that 12 of the research subjects indicated they had no background, 
experience, or education in aviation.  
• Seven (7 out of 12) research subjects were observed to be male (six between 
the ages of 36-50 and one who was over 50). 
• Five (5 out of 12) subjects were observed to be female (two between the 
ages of 18-35, two between the ages of 36-50, and one who was over 50).  
• None (0 out of 12) indicated they were a pilot or a mechanic.  
It was observed that 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background 
and experience in aviation, which will be examined here. Some subjects also indicated they 
had aviation education, which will be examined after this section. 
• Eight (8 out of 13) of the research subjects were observed to be male (five 
between the ages of 36-50, and three who were over the age of 50). 
o Of the eight male research subjects, three indicated they had a 
background and experience in both piloting manned aircraft and in 
aviation maintenance (one had experience operating large 
unmanned aircraft and one had experience operating a small UAS).  
o Of these eight male research subjects, five indicated they only had 
experience in aviation maintenance.  
• Five (5 out of 13) subjects were observed to be female (one between the 
ages of 36-50 and four who were over the age of 50).  
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o Of the five female subjects, one was a commercial aircraft flight 
attendant, one was an airline ticket and loading agent, one was an 
air traffic controller, one was a commercial pilot, and one provided 
administrative support in airmen toxicology investigations of 
aircraft accidents.  
As previously noted, the responses to education were also categorized into common 
themes. But, 12 out of 25 research subjects indicated they had no education in aviation. 
The research data for the remaining 13 research subjects reflected the following 
information. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background and 
experience in aviation:  
• Twelve (12 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated having technical 
and/or academic education in aviation subject matter 
o All (12 out of 12) indicated they had aviation technical education. 
o Four (4 out of 12) indicated they also had additional undergraduate 
and graduate college academic degrees in aviation related subject 
matter.  
• One (1 out of 13) subject, the airline ticket and loading agent, indicated 
having neither. 
It is noted that all 25 research subjects indicated they had previously flown as 
passengers in a commercial aircraft, while some had flown as passengers in small non-
commercial aircraft.  
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2. Can you describe your level of trust in manned aircraft safety? 
This question asked the research subjects to describe their level of trust in manned 
aircraft safety and generated qualitative responses from most of the research subjects. This 
question also led to follow-on questions for the researcher to clarify the question for the 
research subjects, or for the research subjects to clarify their responses for the researcher. 
Specifically, clarification centered around whether manned aircraft meant large or small 
manned aircraft.  
Most of the subjects who had a background and experience in aviation had a general 
awareness of the distinction between large aircraft used in commercial aviation and small 
aircraft used in general aviation. As a result, these subjects either asked the researcher to 
clarify if the question referred to large or small aircraft, or they clarified the question 
themselves and made the distinction in their responses. Some of the research subjects who 
did not have a background and experience in aviation asked the researcher to clarify the 
question. For the remaining subjects, they made no distinction between large and small, so 
the researcher asked the subjects to clarify their responses.  
As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, 12 of the 
research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or education in aviation 
subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background, 
experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. For this question, the research data 
reflected the following information for large and small manned aircraft.  
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Large Manned Aircraft 
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter:  
• Most (8 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated they had a high level 
of trust in large, or commercial, manned aircraft safety.   
• A few (4 out of 12) subjects indicated they had a medium level of trust in 
large, or commercial, manned aircraft safety.  
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience 
and/or education in aviation subject matter:  
• Nearly all (12 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they had high 
level of trust in large, or commercial, manned aircraft.  
• One (1 out of 13) subject indicated a low level of trust. 
 
Small Manned Aircraft 
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter:  
• A few (4 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated they had a high level 
of trust in small, or general aviation, manned aircraft safety.  
• Some (3 out of 12) subjects indicated they had a moderate level of trust in 
small, or general aviation, manned aircraft safety. 
• Some (2 out of 12) indicated they had a low level of trust in small, or general 
aviation, manned aircraft safety. 
136 
 
• Some (3 out of 12) had no opinion about small manned aircraft safety due 
to lack of knowledge. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience 
and/or education in aviation subject matter:  
• Some (3 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they had a high level 
of trust in small manned aircraft safety.  
• One (1 out of 13) subject indicated a medium level of trust in small manned 
aircraft safety. 
• Less than half (6 out of 13) indicated a low level of trust in small manned 
aircraft safety. 
• Some (3 out of 13) had no opinion about small manned aircraft safety due 
to lack of knowledge. 
This question also generated qualitative data that readily identified common themes 
around trust in manned aircraft safety. The common themes were; the man (the human 
component), the machine (the mechanical component), the environment (weather, other 
external non-manmade phenomenon, etc.), the system (ATC, training processes and 
procedure, airports, safety regulations, regulatory oversight, operator processes and 
procedures, etc.), and security (malicious acts, and those things affected by malicious acts, 
and the processes and procedures in place to reduce malicious acts). It is noted that these 
common themes align with the common themes identified within the review of literature 
chapter of this dissertation.  
Though the research subjects expressed comments identifying these common 
themes, this question did not expressly solicit a response to identify common themes. As a 
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result, the researcher did not draw distinct conclusions about any particular level of 
knowledge the subjects had or did not have based on their comments. 
As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, 12 of the 
research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or education in aviation 
subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background, 
experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data reflected the 
following information around the common themes. 
 
Common Themes 
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter:  
• One (1 out of 12) of the research subjects identified two of the common 
themes in manned aircraft safety; the man and the machine.  
• A majority (7 out of 12) of the subjects identified one; three identified the 
man and four identified the machine.  
• A few (4 out of 12) did not provide a response as in depth as the other 
subjects, and did not identify any common themes as a result.   
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience 
and/or education in aviation subject matter:  
• One (1 out of 13) of the research subjects identified all five common themes 
in manned aircraft safety; the man, the machine, the environment, the 
system and security.  
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• One (1 out of 13) subject identified four; the man, the machine, the 
environment, and the system.  
• Some (3 out of 13) identified three; the man, the machine and the system.  
• A few (5 out of 13) identified two; the man and the machine.  
• Some (2 out of 13) identified one; one subject identified the man and one 
subject identified the machine.  
• One (1 out of 13) did not provide a response as in depth as the other subjects, 
and did not identify any common themes as a result.   
3. Can you describe your level of trust in unmanned aircraft safety? 
Similar to question two, question three asked the research subjects to describe their 
level of trust in unmanned aircraft safety, and generated qualitative responses from most 
of the research subjects. This question also led to follow-on questions for the researcher to 
clarify the question for the research subjects, or for the research subjects to clarify their 
responses for the researcher. Specifically, clarification centered around whether unmanned 
aircraft meant large or small unmanned aircraft. The only distinction made by the 
researcher in clarifying the difference between large and small was a comparison of a small 
unmanned aircraft to that of a hobbyist or small drone. Some research subjects equated 
large unmanned aircraft to be comparable to a large military unmanned aircraft and even 
the size of a large commercial aircraft capable of carrying passengers.  
As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, 12 of the 
research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or education in aviation 
subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background, 
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experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data reflected the 
following information around large and small UAS. 
 
Large UAS 
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• One (1 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated a high level of trust for 
large unmanned aircraft safety.  
• One (1 out of 12) subject indicated a medium level of trust. 
• Most (8 out of 12) indicated a low level of trust.  
• Some (2 out of 12) indicated no level of trust.  
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience 
and/or education in aviation subject matter:  
• A few (5 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they had a high level 
of trust for large unmanned aircraft safety.  
• A few (5 out of 13) subjects indicated they had a medium level of trust. 
• One (1 out of 13) indicated a low level of trust.  
• Some (2 out of 13) indicated no level of trust. 
 
Small UAS 
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter:  
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• One (1 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated a high level of trust in 
small unmanned aircraft safety.  
• Less than half (5 out of 12) of the subjects indicated a medium level of trust. 
• A few (4 out of 12) indicated a low level of trust.  
• Some (2 out of 12) indicated no level of trust. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience 
and/or education in aviation subject matter:  
• One (1 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated a high level of trust in 
small unmanned aircraft safety.  
• Some (4 out of 13) of the subjects indicated a medium level of trust. 
• Some (4 out of 13) indicated a low level of trust. 
• Some (4 out of 13) indicated no level of trust. 
Question three also generated qualitative data that readily identified common 
themes as noted in question two. However, it was centered around trust in unmanned 
aircraft safety. The common themes were; the man, the machine, the environment, the 
system, and security. Though the research subjects expressed comments identifying these 
common themes as in question two, this question did not expressly solicit a response to 
identify the common themes. As a result, the researcher did not draw distinct conclusions 
about any particular level of knowledge the subjects had or did not have based on their 
comments. 
As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, 12 of the 
research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or education in aviation 
subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background, 
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experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data reflected the 
following information centered around these common themes. 
 
Common Themes 
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Some (3 out of 12) of the research subjects identified two of the common 
themes in unmanned aircraft safety; the man and the machine.  
• One (1 out of 12) subject identified one common theme; the man.  
• Most (8 out of 12) did not provide a response as in depth as the other 
subjects, and did not identify any common themes as a result.   
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience 
and/or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Slightly more than half (7 out of 13) of the research subjects identified three 
common themes in unmanned aircraft safety; five identified the man, the 
machine and the system; one identified the man, the system, and security; 
and, one identified the machine, the system and security.  
• Some (3 out of 13) of the subjects identified two common themes; the man 
and the system.  
• Some (3 out of 13) did not provide a response as in depth as the other 
subjects, and did not identify any common themes as a result. 
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4. What factors affect your trust of unmanned aircraft? 
Question four asked the research subjects to identify the factors that affect their 
trust of unmanned aircraft. The question generated qualitative data that readily identified 
common themes as noted in question two and three. Similar to question three, the responses 
centered around trust in unmanned aircraft. The common themes were; the man, the 
machine, the environment, the system, and security. Specifically, however, the question 
directly solicited for comments identifying general common themes of trust in unmanned 
aircraft regardless of their size, unlike questions two and three. As a result, the researcher 
was able to capture data to draw distinct conclusions about the general level of knowledge 
the subjects had or did not have about the factors that affect their trust in unmanned aircraft. 
As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, 12 of the 
research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or education in aviation 
subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background, 
experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data reflected the 
following information. 
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter:  
• Most (8 out of 12) of the research subjects identified two common themes 
as factors that affect their trust of unmanned aircraft; five identified the man 
and the machine; one identified the man and the system; one identified the 
machine and the system; and, one identified the machine and security.  
• Some (3 out of 12) of the subjects identified one common theme; two 
identified the man and one identified the machine.  
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• One (1 out of 12) did not provide a response as in depth as the other subjects, 
and did not identify any common themes as a result.   
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience 
and/or education in aviation subject matter: 
• One (1 out of 13) of the research subjects identified four of the common 
themes as factors that affect their trust of unmanned aircraft; the man, the 
machine, the environment, and the system.  
• Less than half (6 out of 13) of the subjects identified three common themes; 
the man, the machine and the system.  
• Less than half (6 out of 13) identified two common themes; five identified 
the man and the machine, and one identified the man and the system. 
 
5. What factors affect your trust of manned aircraft? 
Question five asked the research subjects to identify the factors that affect their trust 
of manned aircraft. The question generated qualitative data that readily identified common 
themes as noted in question four. In contrast to question four, however, the responses 
centered around trust in manned aircraft. The common themes were; the man, the machine, 
the environment, the system, and security. Specifically, however, the question directly 
solicited for comments identifying general common themes of trust in manned aircraft 
regardless of their size, unlike questions two and three. As a result, the researcher was able 
to capture data to draw distinct conclusions about the general level of knowledge the 
subjects had or did not have about the factors that affect their trust in manned aircraft. 
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As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, 12 of the 
research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or education in aviation 
subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background, 
experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data reflected the 
following information. 
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter:  
• Less than half (5 out of 12) of the research subjects identified three common 
themes as factors of trust in manned aircraft; two identified the man, the 
machine, and the system; two identified the man, the machine, and security; 
while, one identified the man, the environment, and security.  
• Less than half (5 out of 12) of the subjects identified two common themes; 
one identified the man and the machine; one identified the man and the 
system; two identified the man and security; while, one identified the 
machine and the environment.  
• A few (2 out of 12) identified one common theme; the machine. 
• The researcher observed that one subject identified a factor within the 
system category of common themes, which is notable to highlight here. The 
subject indicated that the aesthetical appearance of a commercial aircraft, 
or its general appearance, was a factor in trusting that the aircraft was safe. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience 
and/or education in aviation subject matter:  
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• Some (2 out of 13) of the research subjects identified five common themes 
as factors of trust in large manned aircraft; the man, the machine, the 
environment, the system, and security.  
• Some (3 out of 13) of the subjects identified four common themes; one 
identified the man, the machine, the environment, and the system; two 
identified the man, the machine, the system and security.  
• Slightly more than half (7 out of 13) identified three common themes; three 
identified the man, the machine, and the system; and four identified the man, 
the machine and security.  
• One (1 out of 13) indicated one common theme as a trust factor in large 
manned aircraft.  
• It was also observed by the researcher that eight (8 out of 13) subjects 
identified security as a common theme in trust of manned aircraft. In all 
instances regarding comments about security, the qualitative responses 
were in reference to 14 CFR Part 121 commercial aircraft operations. 
 
6. Can you describe your knowledge of factors that affect unmanned aircraft safety? 
Question six asked the subjects to describe their level of knowledge about the 
factors that affect unmanned aircraft safety. As identified in question four, these noted 
common themes were identified as the man, the machine, the environment, the system and 
security. Based on the number of common themes each research subject identified in their 
qualitative response to the question, the researcher assigned a qualitative descriptor to 
describe their perceived level of knowledge about unmanned aircraft safety. The research 
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subjects were assigned the following descriptors of knowledge levels in Table 4.4 based 
on the number of common themes they identified in their qualitative response. 
 
Table 4.4 
  Descriptors of common theme knowledge level  
Descriptor  Definition 
Novice One common theme identified in qualitative response 
Intermediate Two common themes identified in qualitative response 
Advanced Three common themes identified in qualitative response 
Expert Four common themes identified in qualitative response 
Superior Five common themes identified in qualitative response 
 
As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, 12 of the 
research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or education in aviation 
subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background, 
experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data reflected the 
following information. 
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Some (3 out of 12) of the research subjects identified one common theme 
and were assigned a level of Novice; two identified the man and one 
identified the system.  
• Most (9 out of 12) of the subjects described no level of knowledge.  
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
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• Some (2 out of 13) of the research subjects identified five of the common 
themes and were assigned a level of Superior; the man, the machine, the 
environment, the system and security.  
• One subject (1 out of 13) of the subjects identified four common themes and 
was assigned a value of Expert; the man, the machine, the environment, and 
the system.  
• Some (2 out of 13) identified three common themes and were assigned a 
level of Advanced; the man, the machine, and the system.  
• Some (4 out of 13) identified two common themes and were assigned a level 
of Intermediate; two identified the man and the machine; one identified the 
machine and the system; and, one identified the man and system.  
• One subject (1 out of 13) identified one common theme and was assigned a 
level of Novice; the man.  
• Some (3 out of 13) of the subjects described no level of knowledge. 
 
7. Can you describe your knowledge of factors that affect manned aircraft safety? 
Question seven asked the subjects to describe their level of knowledge about the 
factors that affect manned aircraft safety. Similar to question 6, based on the number of 
common themes each research subject identified in their qualitative response to the 
question, the researcher assigned a qualitative descriptor from Table 4.4 to describe their 
perceived level of knowledge about manned aircraft safety.  
As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, 12 of the 
research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or education in aviation 
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subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background, 
experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data reflected the 
following information. 
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter:  
• Some (2 out of 12) of the research subjects identified two of the common 
themes and were assigned a level of Intermediate. One identified the man 
and the machine, and one identified the machine and security.  
• Less than half (5 out of 12) of the subjects identified one common theme 
and were assigned a level of Novice. Four identified the man and one 
identified the machine.  
• Less than half (5 out of 12) of the subjects described no level of knowledge. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Some (3 out of 13) of the research subjects identified five common themes 
and were assigned a level of Superior; the man, the machine, the 
environment, the system and security. 
• Some (2 out of 13) of the subjects identified four common themes and were 
assigned a level of Expert; the man, the machine, the environment and the 
system.  
• Some (4 out of 13) identified three common themes and were assigned a 
level of Advanced; the man, the machine and the system.  
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• Some (3 out of 13) identified two common themes and were assigned a 
level of Intermediate; two identified the man and the machine, and one 
identified the machine and the system.  
• One (1 out of 13) identified one common theme and was assigned a level 
of Novice; the man. 
 
8. Can you describe what has been publicized about UAS by the government and media, 
and how this publicity has affected your opinions about UAS? 
Question 8 asked the research subjects to describe publicity they have observed 
about UAS and how it has affected their opinions about UAS. The qualitative data was 
categorized into common themes previously identified within this section; the man, the 
machine, the environment, the system and security. Additionally, the researcher captured 
and categorized the qualitative data identifying how publicity has affected the research 
subjects’ opinions about UAS. These were categorized as either “positive”, “negative”, or 
“neutral”. 
The researcher observed that two of 25 subjects were unaware of any government 
or media publicity about UAS and will not be further analyzed, while 11 out of the 25 
subjects recalled specific publicity that affected their opinions, and the remaining 12 
subjects had formed opinions about UAS based on a conglomerate of publicity without 
being able to fully articulate any specific publicity that affected their opinion. 
The data captured in this question will first be analyzed based on the positive and 
negative effects that specific publicity has had on the research subjects’ opinions, and the 
resultant common themes associated with the publicity. Then, the data will be analyzed 
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based on the positive and negative effects that the conglomerate of publicity has had on the 
research subjects’ opinions, and the resultant common themes associated with the publicity. 
 
Positive and Negative Effects of Specific Publicity 
The research data for those research subjects (11 out of 25) who indicated that 
specific publicity affected their opinions, which consisted of four subjects in the first 
category and seven subjects in the second category, reflected the following qualitative 
information. 
As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, in the first 
category, 12 of the research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or 
education in aviation subject matter. While in the second category, 13 of the research 
subjects indicated they had a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject 
matter.  
In the first category, or the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no 
background, experience, or education in aviation subject matter, four (4 out of 12) indicated 
that specific publicity has had an effect on their opinions. These were categorized as 
“positive” and “negative”.  
• One (1 out of 12) research subject indicated specific publicity about 
Amazon’s efficient use of drones that positively affected their opinion about 
increases in technology and efficiency for mail and package delivery, and 
was therefore categorized as “positive”. 
• Three (3 out of 12) subjects indicated specific publicity about the use of 
drones and UAS by the military and Amazon, which has created new 
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opportunities for malicious use in terrorism and spying. These subjects 
indicated that the publicity had a negative effect on their opinions, and were 
therefore categorized as “negative”. 
In the second category, or the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a 
background, experience, or education in aviation subject matter, seven (7 out of 13) 
indicated specific publicity that has had an effect on their opinions. These were categorized 
as “positive”, “negative” and “neutral”. 
• One (1 out of 13) research subject indicated specific publicity about the 
FAA’s new requirement for operators to register drones which positively 
affected the subject’s opinion about increases in drone safety, and was 
therefore categorized as “positive”. 
• Three (3 out of 13) subjects indicated specific publicity that negatively 
affected their opinions, and was therefore categorized as “negative”. These 
were UAS and drone use by the military and Amazon, which has created 
new opportunities for malicious use in terrorism and spying. As well as, 
delayed publication of regulations by the FAA, which decreases safety by 
increasing hazards for mid-air collisions. 
• Three (3 out of 13) subjects also indicated they observed similar publicity 
as in the previous paragraph, but it had a neutral effect on their opinions, 
and was therefore categorized as “neutral”. These were; publicities about 
UAS and drone use by the military and Amazon, which has created new 
opportunities for malicious use in terrorism and spying; and, delayed 
152 
 
publication of regulations by the FAA which decreases safety by increasing 
hazards for mid-air collisions. 
 
Positive and Negative Effects of the Conglomerate of Publicity 
The research data for those research subjects (12 out of 25) who indicated that the 
conglomerate of publicity affected their opinions, which consisted of six subjects each of 
the two categories, reflected the following qualitative information. 
As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, in the first 
category, 12 of the research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or 
education in aviation subject matter. While in the second category, 13 of the research 
subjects indicated they had a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject 
matter.  
In the first category, or the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no 
background, experience, or education in aviation subject matter, six (6 out of 12) subjects 
indicated that a conglomerate of publicity negatively affected their opinions and were 
therefore categorized as “negative” in the following common themes. 
• Two (2 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated that publicity about the 
man and security negatively affected their opinions.  
• Two (2 out of 12) subjects indicated that publicity about the man negatively 
affected their opinions. 
• One (1 out of 12) indicated publicity about the man negatively affected their 
opinions. 
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• One (1 out of 12) indicated that publicity about the system negatively 
affected their opinions.  
In the second category, or the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a 
background, experience, or education in aviation subject matter, six (6 out of 13) subjects 
indicated that a conglomerate of publicity negatively affected their opinions and were 
therefore categorized as “negative” in the following common themes. 
• One (1 out of 13) research subject indicated that publicity about the man, 
the machine, the system and security had negative effects on opinions.  
• One (1 out of 13) subject indicated that publicity about the man, the machine 
and the system had negative effects on opinions. 
• One (1 out of 13) indicated that publicity about the man, the machine and 
security had negative effects on opinions. 
• One (1 out of 13) indicated that publicity about the system and security 
negatively affected their opinions. 
• Two (2 out of 13) indicated publicity about the system had negatives effects 
on their opinions.  
Thus far, this section detailed the first part of the data collection instrument, which 
consisted of eight open-ended interview questions and statements. The second part, the 
follow-on closed-end questions, will be examined next. As previously noted, the qualitative 
language used throughout this section to consistently and qualitatively describe the number 
of research subjects will follow the qualitative descriptions referenced within Table 4.3.  
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Second Part: Follow-on Closed-Ended Questions 
1. Are you an aircraft pilot or mechanic? 
Question one asked the research subjects if they were an aircraft pilot or mechanic 
in order to specifically align with the subjects’ responses to question one of the first part 
of the data collection instrument. As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection 
instrument, 12 of the research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or 
education in aviation subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had 
a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data 
reflects the following information.  
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter.  
• None (0 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated they were a pilot or a 
mechanic.  
• This data aligned with responses to question one of the first part of the data 
collection instrument. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter.  
• Some (3 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they were a pilot. 
• A few (5 out of 13) subjects indicated they were a mechanic.  
• One (1 out of 13) indicated they were both a pilot and mechanic. 
• Some (4 out of 13) indicated they were neither.  
• This data aligned with responses to question one of the first part of the data 
collection instrument. 
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2. Do you, or anyone you know operate UAS? 
Question two asked the research subjects to identify if they, or anyone they knew, 
has operated a UAS. As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, 
12 of the research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or education in 
aviation subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background, 
experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data reflects the 
following information.  
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Less than half (5 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated that they had 
not operated a UAS and neither had anyone they knew.  
• A few (4 out of 12) of the subjects indicated that they knew someone who 
operated a small UAS or drone.  
• Some (3 out of 12) indicated they, and someone they knew, operated a small 
UAS or drone. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter:  
• Two (2 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they had not operated a 
UAS and neither had anyone they knew.  
• Less than half (6 out of 13) of the subjects indicated that they knew someone 
who operated a small UAS or drone.  
• Two (2 out of 13) indicated that they had operated a small UAS or drone.  
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• Two (2 out of 13) indicated that they had operated both large and small UAS 
or drones, and knew someone who had operated both large and small UAS 
or drones.  
• One (1 out of 13) indicated they had operated small UAS or drones, and 
knew someone who operated both large and small UAS or drones. 
 
3. How often do you fly as a passenger in a commercially manned aircraft? 
Question three asked the research subjects to identify how often they fly as 
passengers in a commercially manned aircraft to establish their amount of exposure to the 
air transportation system as passengers. This section uses qualitative language to 
consistently, and qualitatively, describe this frequency using the descriptive terms based 
on the commercial air travel frequency listed in Table 4.5.  
Table 4.5 
   Descriptors of Air Travel Frequency 
Frequent Infrequent Rarely None 
4 or more times 
per year 
2 to 3 times per 
year 
Has flown, but less than 
infrequently        Never 
  
As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, 12 of the 
research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or education in aviation 
subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background, 
experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data reflects the 
following information.  
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter:  
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• Some (3 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated they flew as passengers 
in commercially manned aircraft on a frequent basis.  
• Some (3 out of 12) of the subjects indicated they flew as passengers in 
commercially manned aircraft on an infrequent basis. 
• Half (6 out of 12) indicated they rarely flew as passengers in commercially 
manned aircraft. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter:  
• Less than half (6 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they flew as 
passengers in commercially manned aircraft on a frequent basis.  
• Some (4 out of 13) of the subjects indicated they flew as passengers in 
commercially manned aircraft on an infrequent basis. 
• Some (3 out of 13) indicated they rarely flew as passengers in commercial 
manned aircraft. 
The previous questions within this data collection instrument examined the research 
subjects’ background, experience and education in aviation, their level of trust in both 
manned and unmanned aircraft safety, their general knowledge of factors that affect 
aviation safety, how UAS publicity has affected their opinions about UAS, as well as the 
frequency in which they are exposed to commercial air transportation by flying as 
passengers in commercially manned aircraft. Question four through 10 of the second part 
of this data collection instrument examined the research subjects’ specific knowledge of 
technical requirements in comparison of the operation and maintenance of both manned 
and unmanned aircraft. Question four will be examined first. 
158 
 
4. Are UAS regulated and overseen for safety the same as manned aircraft? 
Question four specifically asked the research subjects if UAS were regulated and 
overseen for safety the same as manned aircraft. Their responses were categorized as either 
“I don’t know”, “No”, or “Yes”. As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection 
instrument, 12 of the research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or 
education in aviation subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had 
a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data 
reflects the following information.  
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Most (10 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated they did not know. 
• Two (2 out of 12) of the subjects indicated no.  
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter:  
• Some (4 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they did not know.  
• Less than half (6 out of 13) of the subjects indicated no.  
• Two (2 out of 13) indicated yes.  
• One (1 out of 13) indicated yes, they are regulated the same. But no, they 
are not overseen the same. 
 
5. Are UAS considered to be as technically reliable and safe as manned aircraft? 
Question five specifically asked the research subjects if UAS were as technically 
reliable and safe as manned aircraft. Their responses were categorized as either “I don’t 
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know”, “No”, or “Yes”. As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection 
instrument, 12 of the research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or 
education in aviation subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had 
a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data 
reflects the following information.  
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Half (6 out of 12) of research subjects indicated they did not know. 
• A few (4 out of 12) of the subjects indicated no. 
• Two (2 out of 12) indicated yes. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Two (2 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they did not know. 
• A majority (8 out of 13) of the subjects indicated no. 
• Some (3 out of 13) indicated yes. 
 
6. Are UAS licensed the same as manned aircraft? 
Question six specifically asked the research subjects if UAS were licensed the same 
as manned aircraft. Their responses were categorized as either “I don’t know”, “No”, or 
“Yes”. As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, 12 of the 
research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or education in aviation 
subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background, 
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experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data reflects the 
following information.  
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Most (9 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated they did not know. 
• Some (3 out of 12) of the subjects indicated no. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Less than half (6 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they did not 
know. 
• Less than half (6 out of 13) of the subjects indicated no. 
• One (1 out of 13) indicated yes. 
 
7. Are UAS operators licensed and trained the same as manned aircraft pilots? 
Question seven specifically asked the research subjects if UAS operators were 
licensed and trained the same as manned aircraft pilots. Their responses were categorized 
as either “I don’t know”, “No”, or “Yes”. As previously noted in the analysis of this data 
collection instrument, 12 of the research subjects indicated they had no background, 
experience, or education in aviation subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects 
indicated they had a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. 
The research data reflects the following information.  
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
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• A majority (7 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated they did not 
know. 
• Less than half (5 out of 12) of the subjects indicated no. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Most (9 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they did not know. 
• Two (2 out of 13) of the subjects indicated no. 
• Two (2 out of 13) indicated yes, they are licensed the same. But no, they are 
not trained the same as manned aircraft pilots. 
 
8. Are UAS allowed to operate in the same airspace as manned aircraft? 
Question eight asked the subjects if UAS are allowed to operate in the same 
airspace as manned aircraft. Their responses were categorized as either “I don’t know”, 
“No”, or “Yes”. As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection instrument, 12 
of the research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or education in 
aviation subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had a background, 
experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data reflects the 
following information.  
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• A majority (7 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated they did not 
know. 
• A few (4 out of 12) of the subjects indicated no. 
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• One (1 out of 12) indicated yes. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Some (4 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they did not know. 
• Less than half (6 out of 13) of the subjects indicated no. 
• Some (3 out of 13) indicated yes. 
 
9. Are UAS mechanics licensed the same as manned aircraft mechanics? 
Question nine specifically asked the research subjects if UAS mechanics were 
licensed the same as manned aircraft mechanics. Their responses were categorized as either 
“I don’t know”, “No”, or “Yes”. As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection 
instrument, 12 of the research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or 
education in aviation subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had 
a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data 
reflects the following information.  
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Most (10 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated they did not know. 
• Two (2 out of 12) subjects indicated no. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Slightly more than half (7 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they 
did not know. 
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• A few (5 out of 13) of the subjects indicated no. 
• One (1 out of 13) indicated yes. 
 
10. Are UAS required to be maintained the same as manned aircraft? 
Question ten specifically asked the research subjects if UAS were required to be 
maintained the same as manned aircraft. Their responses were categorized as either “I don’t 
know”, “No”, or “Yes”. As previously noted in the analysis of this data collection 
instrument, 12 of the research subjects indicated they had no background, experience, or 
education in aviation subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects indicated they had 
a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. The research data 
reflects the following information.  
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Most (10 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated they did not know. 
• Two (2 out of 12) of the subjects indicated no. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Slightly more than half (7 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they 
did not know. 
• A few (5 out of 13) of the subjects indicated no. 
• One (1 out of 13) indicated yes. 
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11. Would you volunteer to be the first person to fly in an unmanned aircraft? 
Question eleven specifically asked the research subjects if they would volunteer to 
be the first person to fly in an unmanned aircraft. The premise being, if the UAS were not 
yet proven safe and reliable, they would fly onboard the maiden voyage to test its safety 
before passengers and paying passengers could embark on an unmanned flight. Hence the 
use of the phrase “first person” instead of “first passenger”. Their responses were 
categorized as either “Yes”, “No”, or “Maybe”. As previously noted in the analysis of this 
data collection instrument, 12 of the research subjects indicated they had no background, 
experience, or education in aviation subject matter. While, 13 of the research subjects 
indicated they had a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject matter. 
The research data reflects the following information.  
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Two (2 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated yes. 
• Most (8 out of 12) of the subjects indicated no. 
• Two (2 out of 12) indicated maybe. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Two (2 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated yes. 
• Slightly more than half (7 out of 13) of the subjects indicated no. 
• Some (4 out of 13) indicated maybe. 
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12. If proven safe and reliable, would you fly as a passenger in an unmanned aircraft? 
Question twelve specifically asked the research subjects if they would be willing to 
fly as a passenger in a UAS. The premise being, once proven a safe and reliable method of 
transportation, passengers and paying passengers would be allowed to fly in UAS. Their 
responses were categorized as either “Yes”, “No”, or “Maybe”. As previously noted in the 
analysis of this data collection instrument, 12 of the research subjects indicated they had 
no background, experience, or education in aviation subject matter. While, 13 of the 
research subjects indicated they had a background, experience and/or education in aviation 
subject matter. The research data reflects the following information.  
Out of the 12 research subjects who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
•  A majority (7 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated yes. 
• Less than half (5 out of 12) of the subjects indicated maybe. 
Out of the 13 research subjects who indicated they had a background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter: 
• Most (11 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated yes. 
• Two (2 out of 13) of the subjects indicated maybe. 
 
13. Would you recommend another person who may be suitable for this study? 
As detailed in the methodology chapter of this dissertation, this question was used 
to solicit and generate potential candidates for snowball sample subjects from both 
purposeful sample and other snowball sample subjects. As previously noted in Table 4.1 
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of this chapter, this question only yielded three snowball sample subjects, which will not 
be analyzed further. 
The next section of this chapter addresses the research findings captured from the 
data collection instrument and its analysis, as well as findings identified during the 
researcher’s review of literature that was detailed in the review of literature chapter of this 
dissertation.  
 
Research Findings  
The previous sections of this analysis and findings chapter have detailed the 
demographics of the research subjects and analyzed the results of the data collection 
instrument. This section discusses ten findings related to the following four common 
themes identified during review of relevant literature, and from the researcher’s analysis 
of the data collection instrument; 1) findings related to review of relevant literature; 2) 
exposure of the research subjects to the manned air traffic system; 3) factors that affect 
research subject trust in unmanned aviation safety; and, 4) the research subjects’ perceived 
knowledge of factors that affect unmanned aviation safety. 
 
Findings Related to Review of Relevant Literature 
Following the review of relevant literature, the researcher identified three findings. 
The findings that were identified were; 1) inaccurate government data to accurately 
calculate a general aviation accident rate; 2) lack of government data to accurately calculate 
a civil UAS accident rate; and, 3) common themes for aircraft accident causes. Finding one 
will be examined first. 
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Finding 1 
The first finding that was identified during the review of relevant literature was the 
FAA’s method of collecting flight hour data that the NTSB uses to calculate general 
aviation accident rates. The researcher identified, within the manned aircraft accident data 
and statistics section of the review of literature chapter of this dissertation, that the FAA’s 
methods do not accurately capture flight hour activity data for general aviation as it does 
for Parts 121 and 135 commercial air carriers. As a result, the data in which the NTSB 
estimates general aviation accident rates are calculated based on voluntary submission of 
flight hour activity summaries by operators, which can be reported late, not reported at all, 
or contain inaccurate flight hour data (NTSB, 2015c). 
The activity summary, known as the General Aviation and Air Taxi Activity 
(GAATA) Survey, allows operators the opportunity to voluntarily complete and submit 
flight hour activity data to the United States Department of Transportation. According to 
its 2005 safety report, the NTSB identified that general aviation operators are not required 
to report this information as Part 121 and 135 commercial air carriers, however the NTSB 
still relies on this estimated information to calculate estimated aircraft accident statistics 
for reporting to the industry, the public and Congress (NTSB, 2005, p. iv). 
Because this information is used for public policy, law and rule making by the 
government, the NTSB identified this as a deficiency and an area for improvement. In its 
2005 safety report, the NTSB identified the FAA’s inaccurate data collection and operator 
reporting methods, and recommended that the FAA develop a more accurate method of 
capturing flight hour data, require all operators to report the required flight hour data, and 
develop a method to verify the accuracy of data that is reported by general aviation 
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operators (NTSB, 2005, p. 27). 
The researcher notes the related impacts of this finding are an inaccurate assessment 
and comparison of accident rates within aviation and across multiple modes of 
transportation. Resultantly, it is ultimately unknown if general aviation is any more, or less, 
safe than other modes of transportation, to include modes within aviation. So, public policy, 
law and rule making dependent upon this data may be focused in the wrong area of 
transportation accident prevention. Additionally, inaccurate aircraft accident statistics can 
have a misleading effect on public perceptions of general aviation safety.  
As detailed in the recommendations section of chapter five, the researcher 
recommends that the government track this data accurately instead of estimating it, 
determine the applicable accident rate, and conduct further research into the comparison of 
general aviation accident rates to other modes of aviation in order to determine if general 
aviation is any more or less safe, then focus policy and rule making appropriately. Finding 
two will be examined next. 
 
Finding 2 
The second finding that was identified during review of relevant literature was the 
lack of aircraft accident statistics for civil unmanned aircraft. The researcher identified, 
within the unmanned aircraft accident/incident data and statistics section of the review of 
literature chapter, that the FAA did not track and publish flight hour data for UAS, similar 
to estimated general aviation and actual commercial aviation flight hour data. As a result, 
the NTSB did not publish UAS accident statistics for civil UAS (small or large) at the time 
of this research. 
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The researcher examined UAS accidents data between January 1, 2002 and 
September 26, 2017 within the NTSB aviation accident database by conducting a keyword 
search using six common terms related to unmanned aircraft. The common terms were 
drone, UAS, unmanned, UAV, remote pilot, and remote control. A keyword search was 
conducted because the NTSB did not provide a search option for UAS as an aircraft 
category. The search yielded eight UAS accidents. Six of the accidents involved public-
use aircraft and resulted in no fatalities or injuries. Two of the accidents involved civil-use 
aircraft that were granted approval by the FAA to operate under a waiver and exemption 
from regulations, and resulted in no injuries or fatalities. 
Because the NTSB did not publish UAS accident statistics at the time of this 
research, and relatively few accidents were identified within the NTSB aviation accident 
database, the researcher examined incident data for UAS published by the FAA. Between 
November 13, 2014 and August 20, 2015, the FAA reported there were 764 UAS incidents 
in the United States (FAA, 2015). However, the FAA identified no injuries in any of these 
incidents that involved reported sightings of UAS operating in the NAS, or operating near 
other aircraft in the NAS (FAA, 2015). 
Without accurate accident/incident statistics, it is realistically unknown if UAS are 
any more, or less, safe than other modes of transportation, to include modes within aviation. 
However, throughout the unmanned aircraft publicity section of the review of literature 
chapter, negative publicity was identified that depicted unmanned aircraft to be unsafe and 
to pose a hazardous threat to the safety of other aircraft within the NAS. Yet, at the time of 
the review of literature, no known injuries or fatalities were identified related to the 
operation of either a large or small civil unmanned aircraft, not including hobbyists. To a 
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further point, given the current FAA incident statistics, it is also unknown if small UAS 
present any more of a mid-air collision hazard and subsequent safety risk to other aircraft 
within the NAS than birds. 
The researcher notes the related impact of this finding is primarily the lack of a 
proper assessment and comparison of UAS accident rates against other modes of 
transportation, to include other modes within aviation. As a result, it is ultimately unknown 
if UAS are any more, or less, safe than other modes of transportation, to include modes 
within aviation. Because public policy, law and rule making are dependent upon such data, 
a latent impact is that the government may be focused in the wrong area of transportation 
accident prevention. This lack of empirical analysis by the government also leaves room 
for media speculation and negative publicity about UAS. Furthermore, negative publicity 
about UAS based on the lack of aircraft accident statistics may have a misleading effect on 
public perceptions of UAS safety.  
As detailed in the recommendations section of chapter five, the researcher 
recommends that the government track this data, determine an applicable accident rate, and 
conduct further research into the comparison of UAS accident rates versus other modes of 
aviation in order to determine if UAS are any more or less safe. Another recommendation 
made by the researcher, is for the NTSB to develop a search option for UAS as an aircraft 
category within the aviation accident database to allow the public and academia to conduct 
an adequate search of aircraft accident database information. Finding three will be 
examined next.   
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Finding 3 
The third finding that was identified during the researcher’s review of relevant 
literature was the aspect of common themes related to aircraft accident causes. The review 
of literature revealed that aircraft accidents can be categorized into five common causal 
themes; the man or human element; the machine or aircraft and related components; the 
surrounding natural environment in which the aircraft is operated; the man-made system 
of rules, regulations, practices and procedures in which the aircraft and its operators and 
maintainers must abide by to ensure safe operations; and, the security or malicious 
activities that lead to an accident. These five common themes were identified within the 
aircraft accident causes and unmanned aircraft publicity sections of the review of literature 
chapter of this dissertation. 
During review of accident causes, the researcher found that these concepts dated as 
far back as 1948 in the book published by the Northwestern University Traffic Institute, 
titled the Accident Investigation Manual. The Accident Investigation Manual (1948) 
identified four causal factors to highway accidents in its readings; the man, the machine, 
the environment, and the system in which the accident occurred. 
Each of these four concepts were also found to be universally applicable to aviation 
as similarly identified in the following literature detailed within the aircraft accident causes 
section of the review of literature chapter; the book titled, Aircraft Accident Investigation 
written in 2006 by Wood and Sweginnis; the book titled, Aircraft Accident Reconstruction 
and Litigation written in 2011 by McCormick and Papadakis; and the report titled, 
Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents of Worldwide Operations from 
1959 to 2016 published in 2017 by Boeing Commercial Airplanes.  
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Although these readings detailed the man, the machine, the environment and the 
system as common themes in accident causal factors, the topic of security arose as a 
common theme during review of unmanned aircraft publicity as detailed in the unmanned 
publicity section of the review of literature chapter. 
Identified as an area of negative publicity about UAS that can negatively affect 
public opinion, security was identified as a legitimate threat and concern to air safety. 
Meaning, UAS can be used for malicious purposes and UAS also have physical and 
software vulnerabilities open to malicious hackers. Of greatest credibility within this 
section of the review of literature, the researcher identified information published by the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) about the threats that UAS pose to public 
safety. Specifically, when UAS are used for criminal purposes or when UAS system 
vulnerabilities are taken advantage of by hackers for malicious intent.  
DHS specifically noted that UAS can be used by terrorists and other criminals to 
conduct such malicious and criminal activity as illegal spying, carrying weapons or 
dangerous payloads such as explosives or chemicals used to attack the public or 
government, as well as disrupting and harassing the public or law enforcement (DHS, 
2017). As a result of this government published information identifying security as a threat 
to the public and aviation safety, the researcher elected not to simply place security as a 
mitigatable hazard into one of the other four common theme categories, and to not simply 
discount it as unpreventable and un-mitigatable. Instead, based on the credible information 
published by the DHS, the researcher elected to add it to the list of common themes of 
accident causes; the man, the machine, the environment, the system, and security. 
A positive related impact, categorization of accident causes into common themes is 
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critical to root cause analysis and accident prevention. Thus, it is a positive benefit to 
accident investigation, reconstruction, pattern identification and analysis. Similarly, 
identification of common themes had a positive related impact on this research because it 
allowed the researcher to analyze the level of knowledge that research subjects had about 
factors that affect aviation safety against a known industry standard for common themes in 
accident causes. 
 
Findings Related to Exposure of the Research Subjects to the Manned Air Traffic System 
Following data collection, the researcher identified two findings related to the 
research subjects’ exposure to the manned air traffic system, identified in this section as 
findings four and five. These findings were; 4) observations related to the research 
subjects’ background, experience and education in aviation, and 5) observations related to 
the research subjects’ participation in the manned air traffic system as passengers. Finding 
four will be examined first. 
 
Finding 4 
The fourth finding identified observations related to the research subjects’ 
background, experience and education in aviation. The researcher examined and compared 
the 25 research subjects’ responses to two demographic questions that identified their 
background, experience and education in aviation. These were question one in the first part 
of the data collection instrument, and question one in the second part of the data collection 
instrument. The purpose of this inquiry was to identify if the subjects had a knowledge of 
aviation that was attained through their technical background and experience, and/or 
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technical training and/or academic education in the field of aviation. To include, a 
background, experience and education as an aircraft pilot or mechanic.  
Question one in the first part of the data collection instrument qualitatively explored 
this exposure to the manned air traffic system by asking the subjects an open-ended 
question to generally describe their background, experience and education in aviation. The 
results of this analysis were a categorization of the subjects into two groups; 1) the first 
group that consisted of 12 subjects who indicated they did not have a background, 
experience and/or education in aviation; and, 2) the second group that consisted of 13 
subjects who indicated they had a background, experience and/or education in aviation. 
The second group will be examined because the first group indicated it had no background, 
experience and/or education in aviation. 
The same descriptors listed in Table 4.3 will be used to qualitatively describe the 
number of research subjects in each of the individual first and second groups. However, 
throughout the remainder of this chapter, Table 4.6 will be used when qualitatively 
describing the collective, or combined number of subjects out of all 25 research subjects. 
Table 4.6  
  Descriptors of All Research Subject Quantities 
Descriptor Collective Number of All Research Subjects 
Some 1 to 8 out of 25 
Less Than Half 9 to 12 out of 25 
More Than Half 13 out of 25 
Most 14 to 22 out of 25 
Nearly All 23 to 24 out of 25 
All 25 out of 25 
 
The 13 research subjects’ in the second group who indicated they had a background, 
experience and/or education in aviation consisted of the following:  
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• Background and experience: 
o Three (3 out of 13) subjects described a background and experience 
in both piloting manned aircraft and in aviation maintenance.  
o Five (5 out of 13) indicated they only had experience in aviation 
maintenance.  
o One (5 out of 13) was a commercial aircraft flight attendant.  
o One (1 out of 13) was an airline ticket and loading agent.  
o One (1 out of 13) was an air traffic controller. 
o One (1 out of 13) was a commercial pilot.  
o One (1 out of 13) provided administrative support in airmen 
toxicology investigations of aircraft accidents.  
• Education in aviation: 
o Twelve (12 out of 13) subjects indicated having technical and/or 
academic education in aviation subject matter 
§ All (12 out of 12) indicated they had aviation technical 
education. 
§ Four (4 out of 12) indicated they also had additional 
undergraduate and graduate college academic degrees in 
aviation related subject matter.  
o One (1 out of 13) subject, the airline ticket and loading agent, 
indicated having neither technical nor academic aviation education. 
Of significance, the researcher observed that all 25 research subjects indicated they 
had previously flown as passengers in a commercial aircraft, while some had flown as 
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passengers in small non-commercial aircraft. Responses to this question provided evidence 
that all 25 research subjects were exposed to the manned air traffic system as passengers 
in commercial aircraft, while more than half (13 out of 25) subjects had exposure other 
than being a passenger. The related impacts and recommendations will be examined at the 
end of this section. Question one in the second part of the data collection instrument will 
be examined next. 
Question one in the second part of the data collection instrument explored a similar 
exposure to the manned air traffic system by asking the research subjects a close-ended 
question to determine if they were an aircraft pilot or mechanic. As identified in question 
one of the first part of the data collection instrument, the first group (12 out of 25 of the 
subjects) indicated it had no background, experience, or education in aviation subject 
matter. The responses to this question yielded the same results for the first group, as none 
of the subjects indicated they were a pilot or mechanic. 
However, out of the 13 research subjects in the second group who indicated they 
had a background, experience, or education in aviation subject matter, most indicated they 
were specifically a pilot, mechanic, or both as follows: 
• Some (3 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they were only a pilot. 
• A few (5 out of 13) subjects indicated they were only a mechanic.  
• One (1 out of 13) indicated being both a pilot and mechanic. 
The researcher identified that responses to question one of the second part of the 
data collection instrument not only aligned with responses to question one of the first part 
of the data collection instrument, it further clarified whether the subjects were an aircraft 
pilot or an aircraft mechanic. Additionally, examination of these responses provided 
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evidence that all 25 research subjects were exposed to the manned air traffic system as 
passengers in commercial aircraft, while more than half (13 out of 25) subjects had further 
exposure other than being a passenger.  
The researcher notes the related impact of this finding of exposure to the manned 
commercial aviation system to be the potential for research subject bias towards manned 
aviation versus unmanned aviation, based on manned aviation’s relatively good safety 
record. As detailed within the manned aircraft accident data and statistics section of the 
review of literature chapter of this dissertation, it was noted by the researcher that there 
were 415 fatalities in aviation accidents in 2015, compared to the 35,092 in highway, 716 
railways, and 683 marine modes of transportation in the United States during 2015 (NTSB, 
2015b). Detailing manned aviation as a relatively safe mode of transportation in 2015 
compared to the number of fatalities that occurred, the NTSB published the following total 
number of flight hours; 17,820,000 hours flown in Part 121 commercial aviation; 3,909,000 
hours flown in Part 135 commercial aviation; and, 20,576,000 hours flown in general 
aviation under Part 91 (NTSB, 2015c). 
Specifically, this data reflects 0.155/0.260 accidents per 100,000 flight hours for 
§121 scheduled/nonscheduled air carrier operations respectively, and zero fatal accidents; 
1.458/1.07 accidents and 0.292/0.20 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours for §135 
commuter/on-demand air carrier operations respectively; and, 5.85 accidents and 1.09 fatal 
accidents per 100,000 flight hours for general aviation operations (NTSB, 2015c).  
Because the related impacts of this finding suggest that exposure to the relatively 
safe manned aviation system can cause a bias from passengers towards manned aircraft 
versus unmanned aircraft, the researcher recommends that the government, unmanned 
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aircraft operators and unmanned aircraft manufacturers explore these suggestions and 
similarly expose potential customers of unmanned aircraft and the public in order to elicit 
trust in unmanned aircraft. The researcher details this recommendation in chapter five.  
Finding five will be examined next. 
 
Finding 5 
Finding five identified observations related to the research subjects’ participation 
in the manned air traffic system as passengers. Question three in the second part of the data 
collection instrument explored a similar exposure to the manned air traffic system as 
identified in the evidence observed in finding four, which indicated that all 25 research 
subjects had flown in manned commercial aircraft. Question three asked the research 
subjects to identify how often they flew as passengers in a commercially manned aircraft 
to establish their amount of exposure.  
Out of the 12 research subjects in the first group who indicated they had no 
background, experience, or education in aviation subject matter:  
• Some (3 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated they flew as passengers 
in commercially manned aircraft four or more times per year.  
• Some (3 out of 12) of the subjects indicated they flew as passengers in 
commercially manned aircraft at least two to three times per year. 
• Half (6 out of 12) indicated they had flown as passengers in commercially 
manned aircraft in the past, but it was less than two to three times per year. 
Out of the 13 research subjects in the second group who indicated they had a 
background, experience, or education in aviation subject matter:  
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• Less than half (6 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they flew as 
passengers in commercially manned aircraft four or more times per year.  
• Some (4 out of 13) of the subjects indicated they flew as passengers in 
commercially manned aircraft at least two to three times per year. 
• Some (3 out of 13) indicated they had flown as passengers in commercial 
manned aircraft in the past, but it was less than two to three times per year. 
The researcher identified that the research subjects’ responses to question three in 
the second part of the data collection instrument aligned with and validated their responses 
to question one in the first part of the data collection instrument. In that, all 25 research 
subjects indicated that they had flown in commercially manned aircraft. The researcher 
further identified the frequency, or amount of exposure the research subjects had to the 
manned commercial aviation system. In that, most of the subjects (16 out of 25) flew at 
least two to three times per year, while less than half (9 out of 25) flew four or more times 
per year. 
The researcher notes the related impact of this finding of exposure to the manned 
commercial aviation system to be the potential for research subject bias towards manned 
aviation versus unmanned aviation, based on manned aviation’s relatively good safety 
record as detailed in finding four.  
Because the related impacts of this finding suggest that exposure to the relatively 
safe manned aviation system can cause a bias from passengers towards manned aircraft 
versus unmanned aircraft, the researcher recommends that the government, unmanned 
aircraft operators and unmanned aircraft manufacturers explore these suggestions and 
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similarly expose potential customers of unmanned aircraft and the public in order to elicit 
trust in unmanned aircraft. The researcher details this recommendation in chapter five. 
 
Findings Related to Factors that Affect Research Subject Trust in Unmanned Manned 
Aviation Safety 
Following data collection, the researcher identified three findings related to the 
factors that affected the research subjects’ trust in unmanned aviation safety, identified here 
as findings six, seven, and eight.  The findings that were identified were; 6) the research 
subjects’ level of trust in unmanned aircraft safety, 7) the factors that affected the research 
subjects’ trust in unmanned aircraft, and 8) factors related to publicity of UAS. Finding six 
will be examined first. 
 
Finding 6 
Finding six identified the research subjects’ level of trust in unmanned aircraft 
safety. The researcher examined and compared the 25 research subjects’ responses to 
question three in the first part of the data collection instrument, which asked the research 
subjects to describe their level of trust in unmanned aircraft safety. The finding also 
examined the research subjects’ responses to questions 11 and 12 in the second part of the 
data collection instrument, which identified their willingness to fly as passengers in 
unmanned aircraft. The purpose of this inquiry was to answer the first main question 
desired to be answered by this research study listed in chapter five of this dissertation, 
which sought to determine if the research subjects trusted UAS safety.  Question three will 
be examined first. 
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Analysis of question three yielded four possible responses from the research 
subjects for large and small unmanned aircraft. The responses were a high, medium, low, 
or no level of trust. As previously noted, the 25 research subjects were categorized into two 
groups; the 12 research subjects in the first group who indicated they had no background, 
experience, or education in aviation subject matter; and, the 13 research subjects in the 
second group who indicated they had a background, experience and/or education in 
aviation subject matter. Large unmanned aircraft will be examined first. 
For large unmanned aircraft, responses from the 12 research subjects in the first 
group indicated that some (2 out of 12) had a medium level of trust or higher for large 
unmanned aircraft safety, while most (10 out of 12) had a low or no level of trust. 
Responses from the 13 research subjects in the second group indicated that most (10 out of 
13) had a medium level of trust or higher for large unmanned aircraft safety, while a some 
(3 out of 13) had a low or no level of trust.  
Further analysis revealed that the first group had less trust than the second group in 
the concept of large unmanned aircraft safety. While, more than half (13 out of 25) of all 
research subjects had a low or no level of trust in the concept of large unmanned aircraft, 
some (6 out of 25) had a medium level of trust, and some (6 out of 25) had a high level of 
trust. Of significance, most (19 out of 25) of the research subjects had a medium level of 
trust or lower in the concept of large unmanned aircraft safety.  
For small unmanned aircraft, responses from the 12 research subjects in the first 
group indicated that half (6 out of 12) had a medium level of trust or higher, while half (6 
out of 12) had a low or no level of trust. Response from the 13 research subjects in the 
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second group indicated that a few (5 out of 13) had a medium level of trust or higher, while 
a majority (8 out of 13) had a low or no level of trust.  
Further analysis revealed that the first group had more trust than the second group 
in the concept of small unmanned aircraft safety. While, most (14 out of 25) of the research 
subjects had a low or no level of trust in the concept of small unmanned aircraft, less than 
half (9 out of 25) had a medium level of trust, and some (2 out of 25) had a high level of 
trust. Of significance, nearly all (23 out of 25) of the research subjects had a medium level 
of trust or lower in the concept of small unmanned aircraft safety. Questions 11 and 12 will 
be examined next. 
Analysis of questions 11 and 12 in the second part of the data collection instrument 
examined the research subjects’ willingness to fly as passengers in unmanned aircraft. 
Question 11 asked the research subjects if they would volunteer to be the first person to fly 
in an unmanned aircraft, while question 12 asked the research subjects if they would fly as 
a passenger in an unmanned aircraft if it were proven safe and reliable. Question 11 will 
be examined first. 
Analysis of question 11 yielded three possible responses that were categorized as 
either no, maybe, or yes. As previously noted, the 25 research subjects were categorized 
into two groups; the 12 research subjects in the first group who indicated they had no 
background, experience, or education in aviation subject matter; and, the 13 research 
subjects in the second group who indicated they had a background, experience and/or 
education in aviation subject matter.  
When asked if they would volunteer to be the first person to fly in an unmanned 
aircraft, responses from the 12 research subjects in the first group indicated that most (8 
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out of 12) of the subjects responded no, some (2 out of 12) responded maybe, and some (2 
out of 12) responded yes. Responses from the 13 research subjects in the second group 
indicated that slightly more than half (7 out of 13) of the subjects responded no, some (4 
out of 13) responded maybe, while some (2 out of 13) responded yes.  
Further analysis revealed that more than half (13 out of 25) of the research subjects 
responded no, they would not volunteer to be the first person to fly in an unmanned aircraft. 
Some (6 out of 25) responded maybe. And, some (4 out of 25) responded yes, they would 
volunteer to be the first person to fly in an unmanned aircraft.  
Analysis of question 12 yielded two possible responses that were categorized as 
either maybe, or yes. As previously noted, the 25 research subjects were categorized into 
two groups; the 12 research subjects in the first group and the 13 research subjects in the 
second group as previously described in this section. 
When asked if the they would fly as a passenger in an unmanned aircraft once it 
was proven safe and reliable, responses from the 12 research subjects in the first group 
indicated that less than half (5 out of 12) of the subjects responded maybe, while a majority 
(7 out of 12) responded yes. Responses from the 13 research subjects in the second group 
indicated that only two (2 out of 13) of the subjects responded maybe, while most (11 out 
of 13) responded yes. 
Further analysis revealed that most (18 out of 25) of the research subjects responded 
yes, they would fly as a passenger in an unmanned aircraft once it was proven safe and 
reliable, while some (7 out of 25) indicated maybe. It was noted that none of the subjects 
responded no. 
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Analyzing responses to the three data collection instrument questions, the 
researcher notes the related impacts were the identification of the research subjects’ trust 
in large and small unmanned aircraft, as well as their willingness to fly in unmanned aircraft 
as passengers. These related impacts aligned with the purpose of this inquiry to answer the 
first main question desired to be answered by this research study listed in chapter five of 
this dissertation, which sought to determine if the research subjects trusted UAS safety. 
Impact analysis revealed that most (19 out of 25) of the research subjects had a 
medium level of trust or lower in the concept of large unmanned aircraft safety, while 
nearly all (23 out of 25) of the research subjects had a medium level of trust or lower in the 
concept of small unmanned aircraft safety. The researcher makes the assessment that these 
results indicate a certain level of distrust of both large and small unmanned aircraft, given 
the argument that anything less than a high level of trust would be a level of distrust. 
Secondly, the impact analysis revealed that more than half (13 out of 25) of the 
research subjects responded no, they would not volunteer to be the first person to fly in an 
unmanned aircraft as a passenger, while some (6 out of 25) responded maybe, or were 
otherwise undecided. Combined, the researcher makes the assessment that these responses 
indicate most (19 out of 25) of the research subjects had a certain level of distrust in 
unmanned aircraft to be the first person to fly in one, given the argument that anything 
other than a response of yes would be a level of distrust. 
Lastly, the impact analysis revealed that most (18 out of 25) of the research subjects 
responded yes, they would fly as a passenger in an unmanned aircraft once it was proven 
safe and reliable, while some (7 out of 25) indicated maybe. The researcher makes the 
assessment that the overall results indicate most of research subjects trusted unmanned 
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aircraft, once proven safe and reliable, given the argument that any response other than yes 
indicated distrust. Finding seven will be examined next. 
 
Finding 7 
Finding seven identified the factors that affected the research subjects’ trust in 
unmanned aircraft. The researcher examined and compared the 25 research subjects’ 
responses to question four in the first part of the data collection instrument. The purpose 
of this inquiry was to answer the second main question sought to be answered by the 
research study listed in chapter five of this dissertation, which was to identify the factors 
that affect the research subjects’ trust in UAS safety.  
Question four in the first part of data collection instrument asked the research 
subjects to identify the factors that affected their trust of unmanned aircraft. Their 
qualitative descriptions of these factors were analyzed and categorized into the five 
common causal themes that affect aviation safety that were identified in finding three of 
this section; the man, the machine, the environment, the system and security.  
As previously noted, the 25 research subjects were categorized into two groups; the 
12 research subjects in the first group who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter; and, the 13 research subjects in the second group 
who indicated they had a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject 
matter.  
Responses from the 12 research subjects in the first group indicated that most (8 
out of 12) of the subjects only identified two common themes in describing the factors that 
affect their trust of unmanned aircraft, some (3 out of 12) identified one common theme, 
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while one (1 out of 12) did not identify any common themes. Further analyzed, it was 
observed that all (12 out of 12) of the research subjects identified two or less factors. 
Collectively, the first group identified four common themes as factors that affected their 
trust of unmanned aircraft; the man, the machine, the system, and security.  
The responses from the 13 research subjects in the second group indicated that one 
(1 out of 13) of the subjects identified four common themes in describing the factors that 
affected their trust of unmanned aircraft, less than half (6 out of 13) of the subjects 
identified three common themes, and less than half (6 out of 13) identified two common 
themes. Further analyzed, it was observed that nearly all (12 out of 13) of the research 
subjects identified three or less factors. Collectively, the second group identified four 
common themes as factors that affected their trust of unmanned aircraft; the man, the 
machine, the environment, and the system. 
Analyzing responses to question four in the first part of the data collection 
instrument, the researcher notes the related impacts were the identification of the factors 
that affected the research subjects’ trust of unmanned aircraft. This aligned with the 
purpose of this inquiry, which was to answer the second main question sought to be 
answered by the research study listed in chapter five of this dissertation, to determine the 
factors that affect the research subjects’ trust in UAS safety.  
The first group collectively identified four common themes as factors that affected 
their trust of unmanned aircraft; the man, the machine, the system, and security. While, the 
second group collectively identified four common themes as factors that affected their trust 
of unmanned aircraft; the man, the machine, the environment, and the system. Combined, 
the 25 research subjects collectively identified all five common themes in description of 
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the factors that affect their trust in unmanned aircraft; the man, the machine, the 
environment, the system, and security. However, nearly all (23 out of 25) of the research 
subjects individually only identified three or less of the five common causal themes. 
Finding eight will be examined next. 
 
Finding 8 
Finding eight identified factors related to the publicity of UAS. The researcher 
examined and compared the 25 research subjects’ responses to question eight in the first 
part of the data collection instrument. The purpose of this inquiry was to answer the fifth 
main question sought to be answered by the research study listed in chapter five of this 
dissertation, which was to determine the effect that UAS publicity has had on the research 
subjects’ willingness to fly as passengers in UAS. 
Question eight in the first part of the data collection instrument asked the research 
subjects to describe what had been publicized about UAS by the government and media, 
and how the publicity had affected their opinions about UAS. The researcher captured and 
categorized the qualitative data identifying how publicity had affected the research 
subjects’ overall opinions about UAS. The responses were categorized as either “positive”, 
“negative”, or “neutral”. 
The researcher observed that some (2 out of the 25) of the research subjects were 
unaware of any government or media publicity about UAS, less than half (11 out of the 25) 
of the subjects recalled specific publicity that affected their opinions, and less than half (12 
out of 25) had formed opinions about UAS based on a conglomerate of publicity without 
being able to fully articulate any specific publicity that affected their opinion. 
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The research data, for those research subjects (11 out of 25) who indicated that 
specific publicity affected their overall opinions about UAS, reflected the following 
qualitative information. Two (2 out of 11) research subjects indicated that specific publicity 
about UAS positively affected their opinions and was categorized as “positive”. Six (6 out 
of 11) subjects indicated that specific publicity about UAS had a negative effect on their 
opinions, and was categorized as “negative”. Three (3 out of 11) subjects indicated that 
specific publicity about UAS had a neutral effect on their opinions, and was categorized as 
“neutral”.  
The research data, for those research subjects (12 out of 25) who indicated that the 
conglomerate of publicity affected their overall opinions about UAS, reflected the 
following qualitative information. All (12 out of 12) of the research subjects indicated that 
the conglomerate of publicity about UAS negatively affected their opinions.  
 
Findings Related to the Research Subjects’ Perceived Knowledge of Factors that Affect 
Unmanned Aviation Safety 
Following data collection, the researcher identified two findings related to the 
research subjects’ perceived knowledge of factors that affect unmanned aviation safety, 
identified here as findings nine and ten. The findings that were identified were; 9) 
qualitative descriptors of the research subjects’ perceived level of knowledge about 
unmanned aircraft safety; and, 10) comparison of reality to the research subjects’ perceived 
knowledge of technical aspects of aviation safety. Finding nine will be examined first. 
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Finding 9 
Finding nine identified qualitative descriptors of the research subjects’ perceived 
level of knowledge about unmanned aircraft safety. The researcher examined and 
compared the 25 research subjects’ responses to question six in the first part of the data 
collection instrument, which asked the subjects to describe their knowledge of factors that 
affect unmanned aircraft safety. The purpose of this inquiry was to answer the third main 
question desired to be answered by this research study listed in chapter five of this 
dissertation, which sought to determine if the research subjects knew and understood the 
factors that affect UAS safety.  
Question six in the first part of the data collection instrument asked the research 
subjects to describe their level of knowledge about the factors that affect unmanned aircraft 
safety. These factors were identified in finding seven, which detailed categorization of the 
subjects’ qualitative descriptions into five common themes; the man, the machine, the 
environment, the system and security.  
Based on the number of common themes each research subject identified in their 
qualitative response to the question, the researcher assigned a qualitative descriptor to 
describe their perceived level of knowledge about unmanned aircraft safety. These 
knowledge level descriptors were; a novice, having described one common theme; 
intermediate, having described two common themes; advanced, having described three 
common themes; expert, having described four common themes; and superior, having 
described five common themes.  
As previously noted, the 25 research subjects were categorized into two groups; the 
12 research subjects in the first group who indicated they had no background, experience, 
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or education in aviation subject matter; and, the 13 research subjects in the second group 
who indicated they had a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject 
matter.  
Responses from the 12 research subjects in the first group indicated that some (3 
out of 12) of the subjects identified one common theme and were assigned a level of novice. 
While, most (9 out of 12) of the subjects described no level of knowledge.  
Responses from the 13 research subjects in the second group indicated that some 
(2 out of 13) of the subjects identified five common themes and were assigned a level of 
superior. One (1 out of 13) subject identified four common themes and was assigned a level 
of expert. Some (2 out of 13) identified three common themes and were assigned a level of 
Advanced. Some (4 out of 13) identified two common themes and were assigned a level of 
Intermediate. One (1 out of 13) subject identified one common theme and was assigned a 
level of novice. And, some (3 out of 13) of the subjects described no level of knowledge. 
Analyzing responses to question six in the first part of the data collection 
instrument, the researcher notes the related impacts were the identification of the research 
subjects’ collective level of knowledge about the factors that affect unmanned aircraft 
safety. This aligned with the purpose of this inquiry, which was to answer the third main 
question desired to be answered by this research study listed in chapter five of this 
dissertation, which sought to determine if the research subjects knew and understood the 
factors that affect UAS safety. 
The researcher observed that, collectively, most (20 out of 25) of the research 
subjects described an intermediate or less level of knowledge of factors that affect 
unmanned aircraft safety by identifying two or less common themes. While, some (5 out 
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of 25) of the subjects described an advanced or greater level of knowledge of factors that 
affect unmanned aircraft safety by identifying three to five common themes. Finding ten 
will be examined next. 
 
Finding 10 
Finding ten identified the research subjects’ perceived knowledge of the technical 
aspects of aviation safety compared to the reality of those technical aspects. The researcher 
examined and compared the 25 research subjects’ responses to questions four through 10 
of the second part of the data collection instrument, which examined their specific 
knowledge of the technical regulatory requirements for the operation and maintenance of 
unmanned aircraft. The purpose of this inquiry was to answer the third main question 
desired to be answered by this research study listed in chapter five of this dissertation, 
which sought to determine if the research subjects knew and understood the factors that 
affect UAS safety.   
As previously noted, the 25 research subjects were categorized into two groups; the 
12 research subjects in the first group who indicated they had no background, experience, 
or education in aviation subject matter; and, the 13 research subjects in the second group 
who indicated they had a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject 
matter. Question four will be examined first. 
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Question 4 
Question four asked the research subjects if UAS were regulated and overseen for 
safety the same as manned aircraft. Their responses were categorized as either “I don’t 
know”, “No”, or “Yes”.  
The researcher observed that, collectively, some (8 out of 25) of the research 
subjects answered correctly, while most (17 out of 25) of the research subjects did not 
know the correct answer. 
After review of relevant literature, the researcher notes the overall correct answer 
to be no, they are not regulated and overseen for safety the same as manned aircraft. 
Because, at the time of this research, no regulations were promulgated for the operation of 
large civil UAS, passenger carrying or not. Additionally, small civil UAS regulations 
published under 14 CFR Part 107 were not as extensive and restrictive in content and nature 
as those regulations published throughout all other 14 CFR parts for the certification, 
operation and airworthiness of manned aircraft.  
Out of the 12 research subjects in the first group, most (10 out of 12) of the research 
subjects indicated they did not know, while two (2 out of 12) of the subjects indicated no. 
Out of the 13 research subjects in the second group, some (4 out of 13) of the research 
subjects indicated they did not know, less than half (6 out of 13) of the subjects indicated 
no, while three (3 out of 13) indicated yes. Question five will be examined next. 
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Question 5 
Question five asked the research subjects if UAS were considered to be as 
technically reliable and safe as manned aircraft. Their responses were categorized as either 
“I don’t know”, “No”, or “Yes”.  
The researcher observed that, collectively, less than half (12 out of 25) of the 
research subjects answered correctly, while more than half (13 out of 25) did not know the 
correct answer. 
After review of relevant literature, the researcher notes the overall correct answer 
to be no, for two reasons. First, as noted in the previous examination of regulation and 
oversight listed in Question 4, UAS are not regulated and overseen for safety the same as 
manned aircraft because no regulations have been promulgated for the operation of large 
civil UAS and small civil UAS regulations published under 14 CFR Part 107 are not as 
extensive and restrictive in content and nature as those regulations published throughout 
all other 14 CFR parts for the certification, operation and airworthiness of manned aircraft 
and airmen.  
Secondly, although there is an absence of regulations for the certification of UAS 
to ensure a comparable technical reliability and safety to manned aircraft, it is ultimately 
unknown if UAS are any more, or less safe than manned aircraft as noted in finding two of 
this section. Finding two identified an absence of accident/incident statistics for UAS in 
which to compare to manned aircraft accident/incident statistics.  
Out of the 12 research subjects in the first group, half (6 out of 12) of the research 
subjects indicated they did not know, a few (4 out of 12) of the subjects indicated no, and 
two (2 out of 12) indicated yes. Out of the 13 research subjects in the second group, two (2 
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out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they did not know, a majority (8 out of 13) of 
the subjects indicated no, and some (3 out of 13) indicated yes. Question six will be 
examined next. 
 
Question 6 
Question six asked the research subjects if UAS were licensed the same as manned 
aircraft. Their responses were categorized as either “I don’t know”, “No”, or “Yes”.  
The researcher observed that, collectively, less than half (9 out of 25) of the research 
subjects answered correctly, while most (16 out of 25) did not know the correct answer. 
After review of relevant literature, the researcher notes the overall correct answer 
to be no, for the following reasons related to the registration and marking, and aircraft 
manufacturing, certification, and airworthiness standards of both small and large civil 
UAS. First, regulations promulgated for the marking and registration, or licensing, of 
manned aircraft under 14 CFR Parts 45 and 47 were observed to be more extensive and 
restrictive than §48 that establishes marking and registration requirements for small UAS. 
In part, this is due to the larger size and specific location of marking requirements for 
registration numbers to be placed on manned aircraft under §45, as well as the proof of 
ownership requirement for registration under §47.  
Secondly, at the time of this research, no regulations were promulgated for aircraft 
manufacturing, certification, and airworthiness standards of both small and large civil UAS 
that could be similarly compared to manned aircraft or rotorcraft certification standards 
under §§21 through 36 to ensure compliance with the general operating and flight 
procedure under §91. 
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Out of the 12 research subjects in the first group, most (9 out of 12) of the research 
subjects indicated they did not know, while some (3 out of 12) of the subjects indicated no. 
Out of the 13 research subjects in the second group, less than half (6 out of 13) of the 
research subjects indicated they did not know, less than half (6 out of 13) of the subjects 
indicated no, while one (1 out of 13) indicated yes. Question seven will be examined next. 
 
Question 7 
Question seven asked the research subjects if UAS operators were licensed and 
trained the same as manned aircraft pilots. Their responses were categorized as either “I 
don’t know”, “No”, or “Yes”.  
The researcher observed that, collectively, some (7 out of 25) of the research 
subjects answered correctly, while most (18 out of 25) did not know the correct answer. 
After review of relevant literature, the researcher notes the correct answer to be no, 
UAS operators are not licensed, or certificated, and trained the same as manned aircraft 
pilots under 14 CFR Part 61. Because, at the time of this research, no regulations were 
promulgated for the certification of large civil UAS operators. Additionally, small civil 
UAS regulations published under 14 CFR Part 107 were not observed to be as extensive 
and restrictive in content and nature as those regulations published under 14 CFR Part 61 
that require specific medical qualifications, flight training, and flight time requirements for 
the type of pilot certificate and rating being sought. Similarly, Part 61 was observed to 
prescribe regulations specifically for pilots, flight and ground instructors of manned aircraft 
only, and noted the inapplicability of flight time flown under §107 small UAS operations 
to count towards aircraft flight time requirements under §61. 
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Out of the 12 research subjects in the first group, the majority (7 out of 12) of the 
research subjects indicated they did not know, while less than half (5 out of 12) of the 
subjects indicated no. Out of the 13 research subjects in the second group, most (9 out of 
13) of the research subjects indicated they did not know, two (2 out of 13) of the subjects 
indicated no, while two (2 out of 13) indicated they are licensed the same but they not 
trained the same as manned aircraft pilots. Question eight will be examined next. 
 
Question 8 
Question eight asked the research subjects if UAS were allowed to operate in the 
same airspace as manned aircraft. Their responses were categorized as either “I don’t 
know”, “No”, or “Yes”.  
The researcher observed that, collectively, less than half (10 out of 25) of the 
research subjects answered correctly, while most (15 out of 25) did not know the correct 
answer. 
After review of relevant literature, the researcher notes the correct answer to be no, 
UAS are not allowed to operate in the same airspace as manned aircraft. Because, at the 
time of this research, no regulations were promulgated for large civil UAS operations. And, 
regulations for small civil UAS operated under 14 CFR Part 107.37, §107.41, and §107.43 
required small UAS operators to adhere to the rules for right-of-way in order to prevent 
mid-air collisions, and to not be operated inside of class B, C, and D airspace, or within 
areas designated as an airport inside class E airspace that could cause a hazard to take-off, 
landing and approach for manned aircraft. Aside from these operational conditions, in 
accordance with §107.51, small UAS must never exceed an altitude of 400 feet AGL 
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outside of a structure. 
Out of the 12 research subjects in the first group, the majority (7 out of 12) of the 
research subjects indicated they did not know, a few (4 out of 12) of the subjects indicated 
no, and one (1 out of 12) indicated yes. Out of the 13 research subjects in the second group, 
some (4 out of 13) of the research subjects indicated they did not know, less than half (6 
out of 13) of the subjects indicated no, while some (3 out of 13) indicated yes. Question 
nine will be examined next. 
 
Question 9 
Question nine asked the research subjects if UAS mechanics were licensed the same 
as manned aircraft mechanics. Their responses were categorized as either “I don’t know”, 
“No”, or “Yes”.  
The researcher observed that, collectively, some (7 out of 25) of the research 
subjects answered correctly, while most (18 out of 25) did not know the correct answer. 
After review of relevant literature, the researcher notes the correct answer to be no, 
UAS mechanics are not licensed the same as manned aircraft mechanics. Because, at the 
time of this research, no regulations were promulgated under 14 CFR Part 65 for the 
certification of UAS mechanics. And, no regulations were promulgated for the 
airworthiness and maintenance of large UAS, passenger carrying or not. Additionally, 
small UAS regulations published under 14 CFR Part 107 did not require the certification 
of mechanics and were not observed to be as extensive and restrictive in content and nature 
as those regulations published throughout all other parts of 14 CFR for manned aircraft 
maintenance. 
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Out of the 12 research subjects in the first group, most (10 out of 12) of the research 
subjects indicated they did not know, while two (2 out of 12) of the subjects indicated no. 
Out of the 13 research subjects in the second group, slightly more than half (7 out of 13) 
of the research subjects indicated they did not know, a few (5 out of 13) of the subjects 
indicated no, while one (1 out of 13) indicated yes. Question ten will be examined next. 
 
Question 10 
Question ten asked the research subjects if UAS were required to be maintained the 
same as manned aircraft. Their responses were categorized as either “I don’t know”, “No”, 
or “Yes”.  
The researcher observed that, collectively, some (7 out of 25) of the research 
subjects answered correctly, while most (18 out of 25) did not know the correct answer. 
After review of relevant literature, the researcher notes the correct answer to be no, 
UAS are not required to be maintained the same as manned aircraft. Because, no 
regulations were promulgated for the airworthiness and maintenance of large UAS, 
passenger carrying or not. Additionally, small UAS regulations published under 14 CFR 
Part 107 were not observed to be as extensive and restrictive in content and nature as those 
regulations published throughout all other parts of 14 CFR for manned aircraft maintenance 
that require adherence, primarily, to the manned airworthiness and maintenance standards 
of 14 CFR Part 43 and 65. 
Out of the 12 research subjects in the first group, most (10 out of 12) of the research 
subjects indicated they did not know, while two (2 out of 12) of the subjects indicated no. 
Out of the 13 research subjects in the second group, slightly more than half (7 out of 13) 
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of the research subjects indicated they did not know, a few (5 out of 13) of the subjects 
indicated no, while one (1 out of 13) indicated yes. 
This section of the dissertation detailed the analysis of the data that was collected 
during the research interviews utilizing the data collection instrument. Specifically, the 
chapter detailed the demographics of the research subjects, analyzed the results of the data 
collection instrument, and discussed the research findings related to the common themes 
of the research. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The previous four chapters of this dissertation detailed the introduction of the 
research study, the researcher’s review of literature, the research methodologies used 
during this study, and provided the researcher’s analysis and findings of the data collection. 
This chapter summarizes the research study, answers the main research questions, submits 
recommendations to improve and advance aviation safety based on the research findings 
identified during the previous chapters, and concludes the study. 
 
Summary 
In summary and conclusion of this dissertation, the purpose of this research was to 
answer the six main research questions listed within this chapter by qualitatively studying 
the public’s trust and knowledge of UAS safety through data collection by interviewing 
research subjects using a data collection instrument. The researcher sought to determine 
whether the research subjects would be willing to fly as passengers in UAS. And, if 
publicity about unmanned aircraft influenced their perception about its safety. It was 
perceived this could affect their decision to travel as passengers in UAS. The researcher 
also examined interview data to identify if any observable Dunning-Kruger Effect existed 
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that would suggest the research subjects believed they had more knowledge about the 
factors that affect UAS safety than what they knew when deciding whether to fly as 
passengers in UAS. 
As a result, the researcher aligned the topics of the review of literature with the 
topics of the data collection instrument to obtain a better understanding and perspective in 
analyzing the research data, as well as to obtain a thorough understanding of the level of 
knowledge the research subjects had about aviation safety. The review of literature 
consisted of manned aviation regulations, small unmanned aircraft regulations, large 
unmanned aircraft regulations, aircraft accident statistics, aircraft accident causes, 
unmanned aircraft human factors, public trust in automation, unmanned aircraft publicity, 
and the Dunning-Kruger effect. 
This researcher used what Creswell (2012) described as purposeful sampling of a 
population to intentionally select research subjects in order to learn about the central 
concepts, themes or phenomenon of the study (p. 206). The researcher used Creswell’s 
purposeful sampling method by identifying a typical sample of the public who 1) did not 
have a technical background in manned or unmanned aviation, but was aware of the 
concepts of manned and unmanned aircraft and may or may not have flown in manned 
aircraft, and 2) did have a technical background in manned or unmanned aviation. After 
identifying and recruiting the initial number of research subjects, the researcher also used 
what Creswell defined as a snowball sampling method to identify and recruit additional 
research subjects, in which the initial research subjects recommended other people who fit 
the purposeful sampling profile identified by the researcher. The researcher recruited 25 
research subjects who consisted of 22 subjects in the purposeful sample category and three 
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subjects in the snowball sample category. 
The researcher used Creswell’s (2012) described process for collecting, analyzing 
and interpreting qualitative data that included; 1) collecting data by recording interviews, 
2) preparing recorded data from interviews by transcribing it into meaningful written text, 
3) reviewing the transcribed data to identify central themes and categories, and 4) coding 
the central themes and categories for analysis and interpretation detailed in the final 
dissertation report (p. 237).  
Because of the qualitative design of this study, the data collection instrument 
contained both open-ended and closed-end questions designed to determine; if the subjects 
trusted UAS safety; if the subjects had a knowledge of factors that affected UAS safety; if 
the subjects believed that UAS publicity affected their trust of UAS safety; and overall, if 
the subjects were willing to fly as passengers in UAS. Upon completing Creswell’s (2012) 
described process for collecting, analyzing and interpreting the qualitative data obtained 
from interviewing the research subjects, the researcher was able to answer the six main 
questions sought to be answered by this research study. 
 
Main Research Questions 
The researcher notes that the beneficiaries of this study are the regulatory, public, 
business, and academic stakeholders of the aviation industry. These beneficiaries will gain 
a greater understanding of the relationship between the public’s knowledge of factors that 
affect safe operations of UAS within the NAS, and the level of trust the public has in UAS 
safety. This understanding can be used to increase public trust and demand of UAS by 
making the UAS product safer, more reliable and efficient, which will foster its further 
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development and integration into the NAS as a viable alternative and replacement to 
manned aircraft. This section provides conclusion of the research study by answering each 
of the following main research questions. 
  
1. Do the research subjects trust UAS safety? 
To answer this main research question, the researcher analyzed finding six in the 
analysis and findings chapter, which identified the research subjects’ level of trust in 
unmanned aircraft safety. The researcher examined and compared the 25 research subjects’ 
responses to question three in the first part of the data collection instrument, which asked 
the research subjects to describe their level of trust in unmanned aircraft safety. The finding 
also examined the research subjects’ responses to questions 11 and 12 in the second part 
of the data collection instrument, which identified their willingness to fly as passengers in 
unmanned aircraft. Specifically, question 11 asked the research subjects if they would 
volunteer to be the first person to fly in an unmanned aircraft, while question 12 asked the 
research subjects if they would fly as a passenger in an unmanned aircraft if it were proven 
safe and reliable.  
Analyzing responses to the data collection instrument questions, the researcher 
noted the identification of the research subjects’ trust in large and small unmanned aircraft, 
as well as their willingness to fly in unmanned aircraft as passengers. As a result, the 
researcher was able to answer this main research question, which sought to determine if 
the research subjects trusted UAS safety. Question three will be examined first. 
Analysis of question three revealed that most (19 out of 25) of the research subjects 
had a medium level of trust or lower in the concept of large unmanned aircraft safety, while 
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nearly all (23 out of 25) of the research subjects had a medium level of trust or lower in the 
concept of small unmanned aircraft safety. The researcher made the assessment that the 
results indicated a certain level of distrust of both large and small unmanned aircraft, given 
the argument that anything less than a high level of trust would be a level of distrust. 
Question 11 will be examined next.  
Analysis of question 11 revealed that more than half (13 out of 25) of the research 
subjects responded no, they would not volunteer to be the first person to fly in an unmanned 
aircraft, while some (6 out of 25) responded maybe, or were otherwise undecided. 
Combined, the researcher made the assessment that the responses indicated most (19 out 
of 25) of the research subjects had a certain level of distrust in unmanned aircraft to be the 
first person to fly in one, given the argument that anything other than a response of yes 
would be a level of distrust. Question 12 will be examined last. 
Analysis of question 12 revealed that most (18 out of 25) of the research subjects 
responded yes, they would fly as a passenger in an unmanned aircraft once proven safe and 
reliable, while some (7 out of 25) indicated maybe. The researcher made the assessment 
that the overall results indicate most of research subjects trusted unmanned aircraft, once 
proven safe and reliable, given the argument that any response other than yes indicated 
distrust.  
 
2. What factors affect the research subjects’ trust in UAS safety? 
To answer this main research question, the researcher analyzed finding seven, 
which identified the factors that affected the research subjects’ trust in unmanned aircraft. 
The researcher examined and compared the 25 research subjects’ responses to question 
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four in the first part of the data collection instrument. Their qualitative descriptions of these 
factors were analyzed and categorized into five common causal themes that affect aviation 
safety, which were identified in finding three as; the man, the machine, the environment, 
the system and security.  
The 25 research subjects were categorized into two groups; the 12 research subjects 
in the first group who indicated they had no background, experience, or education in 
aviation subject matter; and, the 13 research subjects in the second group who indicated 
they had a background, experience and/or education in aviation subject matter.  
Analyzing responses to question four in the first part of the data collection 
instrument, the researcher noted the identification of the factors that affected the research 
subjects’ trust of unmanned aircraft. As a result, the researcher was able to answer this 
main research question, which was to determine the factors that affect the research 
subjects’ trust in UAS safety.  
The first group collectively identified four common themes as factors that affected 
their trust of unmanned aircraft; the man, the machine, the system, and security. While, the 
second group collectively identified four common themes as factors that affected their trust 
of unmanned aircraft; the man, the machine, the environment, and the system. Combined, 
the 25 research subjects collectively identified all five common themes in description of 
the factors that affect their trust in unmanned aircraft; the man, the machine, the 
environment, the system, and security. However, nearly all (23 out of 25) of the research 
subjects individually only identified three or less of the five common causal themes.  
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3. Do the research subjects know and understand the factors that affect UAS safety? 
To answer this main research question, the researcher analyzed findings nine and 
ten from the analysis and finding chapter of this dissertation. Where finding nine examined 
the research subjects’ description of their level of knowledge about the factors that affect 
unmanned aircraft safety, finding ten compared the research subjects’ knowledge of the 
technical aspects of aviation safety to the correct response to questions four through 10 of 
the second part of the data collection instrument. Finding nine will be examined first. 
Finding nine identified qualitative descriptors of the research subjects’ perceived 
level of knowledge about unmanned aircraft safety. The researcher examined and 
compared the 25 research subjects’ responses to question six in the first part of the data 
collection instrument, which asked the subjects to describe their knowledge of factors that 
affect unmanned aircraft safety. The factors were categorized into five common themes; 
the man, the machine, the environment, the system and security.  
Based on the number of common themes each research subject identified in their 
qualitative response to the question, the researcher assigned a qualitative descriptor to 
describe their perceived level of knowledge about unmanned aircraft safety. These 
knowledge level descriptors were; a novice, having described one common theme; 
intermediate, having described two common themes; advanced, having described three 
common themes; expert, having described four common themes; and superior, having 
described five common themes. Analyzing responses to question six in the first part of the 
data collection instrument, the researcher noted the identification of the research subjects’ 
collective level of knowledge about the factors that affect unmanned aircraft safety.  
207 
 
The researcher observed that, collectively, most (20 out of 25) of the research 
subjects described an intermediate level of knowledge or less about factors that affect 
unmanned aircraft safety by identifying two or less common themes. While, some (5 out 
of 25) of the subjects described an advanced or greater level of knowledge of factors that 
affect unmanned aircraft safety by identifying three to five common themes. Finding ten 
will be examined next. 
Finding ten identified the research subjects’ perceived knowledge of the technical 
aspects of aviation safety compared to the reality of those technical aspects. The researcher 
examined and compared the 25 research subjects’ responses to questions four through 10 
within the second part of the data collection instrument, which examined their specific 
knowledge of the technical regulatory requirements for the operation and maintenance of 
unmanned aircraft. Question four will be examined first.  
 
Question 4 
Question four asked the research subjects if UAS were regulated and overseen for 
safety the same as manned aircraft. The researcher observed that, collectively, some (8 out 
of 25) of the research subjects answered correctly, while most (17 out of 25) of the research 
subjects did not know the correct answer. 
 
Question 5 
Question five asked the research subjects if UAS were considered to be as 
technically reliable and safe as manned aircraft. The researcher observed that, collectively, 
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less than half (12 out of 25) of the research subjects answered correctly, while more than 
half (13 out of 25) did not know the correct answer. 
 
Question 6 
Question six asked the research subjects if UAS were licensed the same as manned 
aircraft. The researcher observed that, collectively, less than half (9 out of 25) of the 
research subjects answered correctly, while most (16 out of 25) did not know the correct 
answer. 
 
Question 7 
Question seven asked the research subjects if UAS operators were licensed and 
trained the same as manned aircraft pilots. The researcher observed that, collectively, some 
(7 out of 25) of the research subjects answered correctly, while most (18 out of 25) did not 
know the correct answer. 
 
Question 8 
Question eight asked the research subjects if UAS were allowed to operate in the 
same airspace as manned aircraft. The researcher observed that, collectively, less than half 
(10 out of 25) of the research subjects answered correctly, while most (15 out of 25) did 
not know the correct answer. 
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Question 9 
Question nine asked the research subjects if UAS mechanics were licensed the same 
as manned aircraft mechanics. The researcher observed that, collectively, some (7 out of 
25) of the research subjects answered correctly, while most (18 out of 25) did not know the 
correct answer. 
 
Question 10 
Question ten asked the research subjects if UAS were required to be maintained the 
same as manned aircraft. The researcher observed that, collectively, some (7 out of 25) of 
the research subjects answered correctly, while most (18 out of 25) did not know the correct 
answer. 
After analyzing findings nine and ten, the researcher was able to answer this main 
research question in the following manner. The data indicates that the research subjects did 
not fully know and understand the factors that affected UAS safety. The researcher 
observed that, collectively, most (20 out of 25) of the research subjects described an 
intermediate level of knowledge or less about factors that affect unmanned aircraft safety. 
When asked specific technical aviation safety questions, on average, most (16 out of 25) 
of the research subjects did not know the correct answer to questions four through 10 
regarding the technical regulatory requirements for the operation and maintenance of 
unmanned aircraft. 
 
4. What effect has the publicity of UAS had on the research subjects’ willingness to fly 
as passengers in UAS? 
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To answer this main research question, the researcher analyzed finding eight, which 
examined and compared the 25 research subjects’ responses to question eight in the first 
part of the data collection instrument that asked the subjects to identify what had been 
publicized about UAS by the government and media, and how the publicity had affected 
their opinions about UAS.  
The researcher also examined the research subjects’ responses to questions 11 and 
12 in the second part of the data collection instrument, which identified their willingness 
to fly as passengers in unmanned aircraft. Specifically, question 11 asked the research 
subjects if they would volunteer to be the first person to fly in an unmanned aircraft, while 
question 12 asked the research subjects if they would fly as a passenger in an unmanned 
aircraft if it were proven safe and reliable. As a result, the researcher was able to answer 
this main research question, which was to determine the effect that UAS publicity has had 
on the research subjects’ willingness to fly as passengers in UAS. Question eight will be 
examined first. 
Question eight in the first part of the data collection instrument asked the research 
subjects to describe what had been publicized about UAS by the government and media, 
and how the publicity had affected their opinions about UAS. The researcher observed that 
some (2 out of the 25) of the research subjects were unaware of any government or media 
publicity about UAS, while nearly all (23 out of the 25) of the subjects stated that publicity 
about UAS had affected their opinions. Their responses were categorized as either 
“positive”, “negative”, or “neutral”. 
The research data, for those research subjects (23 out of 25) who indicated that 
publicity had affected their opinions about UAS, reflected the following qualitative 
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information. Some (2 out of 25) of the research subjects indicated that publicity about UAS 
positively affected their opinions. Most (18 out of 25) of the subjects indicated that 
publicity about UAS had negatively affected their opinions. While, some (3 out of 25) of 
the subjects indicated that publicity about UAS had a neutral, or no effect on their opinions. 
Question 11 will be examined next. 
Analysis of question 11 revealed that more than half (13 out of 25) of the research 
subjects responded no, they would not volunteer to be the first person to fly in an unmanned 
aircraft, while some (6 out of 25) responded maybe. Combined, the researcher made the 
assessment that the responses indicated most (19 out of 25) of the research subjects had a 
certain level of distrust in unmanned aircraft, given the argument that anything other than 
a response of yes represented distrust. Question 12 will be examined last. 
However, analysis of question 12 revealed that most (18 out of 25) of the research 
subjects responded yes, they would fly as a passenger in an unmanned aircraft once proven 
safe and reliable. While, some (7 out of 25) indicated maybe. The researcher made the 
assessment that the overall results indicate most of research subjects trusted unmanned 
aircraft, once proven safe and reliable, given the argument that any response other than yes 
indicated distrust.  
The researcher determined that the data indicates the research subjects collectively 
changed their opinions about the decision to fly as passengers in unmanned aircraft when 
it was suggested that unmanned aircraft were proven safe and reliable. At first, it was 
observed that most (18 out of 25) of the research subjects indicated that publicity about 
UAS had negatively affected their opinions. While, correspondingly, nearly the same 
number (19 out of 25) of research subjects had a certain level of distrust in unmanned 
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aircraft to be the first person to fly as a passenger.  However, the exact same number (18 
out of 25) of research subjects indicated they would fly as a passenger in an unmanned 
aircraft once proven safe and reliable, which is a form of positive publicity about the safety 
and reliability of UAS. This data suggests that the publicity of UAS can have either a 
positive, negative, or neutral effect on the research subjects' opinions about UAS, as well 
as positive or negative influences on their willingness to fly as passengers in UAS. 
 
5. Is there a relationship between the research subjects’ trust and knowledge of UAS 
safety? 
To answer this main research question, the researcher further analyzed the first and 
third main research questions sought to be answered by this study. Which were, do the 
research subjects trust UAS safety, and do the research subjects know and understand the 
factors that affect UAS safety? Analysis of the first main research question will be 
summarized first, followed by the third main research question, and then the relationship 
between trust and knowledge will be examined.  
The first main research question sought to be answered by this study was, do the 
research subjects trust UAS safety? To summarize the answer, the researcher analyzed 
finding six in the analysis and findings chapter, which examined and compared the research 
subjects’ responses to question three in the first part of the data collection instrument, as 
well as their responses to questions 11 and 12 in the second part of the data collection 
instrument. Overall, the researcher made the assessment that the results of the data analysis 
indicated most (19 out of 25) of research subjects did not trust unmanned aircraft, and most 
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(19 out of 25) would not fly in an unmanned aircraft as a passenger unless it were proven 
safe and reliable. 
The third main question sought to be answered by this research study was, do the 
research subjects know and understand the factors that affect UAS safety? To summarize 
the answer, the researcher analyzed findings nine and ten from the analysis and finding 
chapter. Overall, the researcher made the assessment that the results of the data analysis 
indicated the research subjects did not fully know and understand the factors that affected 
UAS safety. The researcher observed that, collectively, most (20 out of 25) of the research 
subjects described an intermediate level of knowledge or less about factors that affect 
unmanned aircraft safety. And on average, most (16 out of 25) of the research subjects did 
not know the correct answers to questions four through 10 regarding the technical 
regulatory requirements for the operation and maintenance of unmanned aircraft. However, 
the researcher notes that because most (20 out of 25) of the research subjects described an 
intermediate level of knowledge or less about factors that affect unmanned aircraft safety, 
it is reasonable to assume that some of the subjects did not know the correct answer and 
could have guessed the correct answer to questions four through 10 in the second part of 
the data collection instrument, thus skewing the data. 
To summarize the data from the first and third main research questions, most (19 
out of 25) of research subjects did not trust unmanned aircraft, and most (19 out of 25) 
would not fly in an unmanned aircraft as a passenger unless it were proven safe and reliable. 
Yet, most (20 out of 25) of the research subjects described an intermediate level of 
knowledge or less about factors that affect unmanned aircraft safety, and most (16 out of 
25) did not know the correct answer to questions four through 10 regarding the technical 
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regulatory requirements for the operation and maintenance of unmanned aircraft. Further 
described, both trust and knowledge were observed to be relatively low. The relationship 
between low trust and low knowledge will be examined next. 
A potential bias towards manned aircraft, the researcher determined that the 
relationship between the research subjects’ low trust and low knowledge of UAS safety 
resides in: 1) their lack of exposure to publicity depicting unmanned aircraft to be relatively 
safe; as well as, 2) their exposure to the publicity of a relatively safe manned air traffic 
system; and overall, 3) the influence that publicity has on the subjects’ decisions to fly as 
passengers in either manned or unmanned aircraft, in the absence of knowledge about 
factors that affect aviation safety. Lack of exposure to publicity depicting unmanned 
aircraft to be relatively safe will be examined first. 
As identified in the fourth main research question, the researcher sought to identify 
the effect that publicity of UAS had on the research subjects’ willingness to fly as 
passengers in UAS. It was observed that most (18 out of 25) of the research subjects 
indicated that publicity about UAS had negatively affected their opinions. While, 
correspondingly, nearly the same number (19 out of 25) of research subjects had a certain 
level of distrust in unmanned aircraft causing an unwillingness to be the first person to fly 
as a passenger.  However, the exact same number (18 out of 25) of research subjects 
indicated they would fly as a passenger in an unmanned aircraft once proven safe and 
reliable, which is positive publicity about the safety and reliability of UAS. After analysis, 
the researcher determined that the data indicates the research subjects collectively changed 
their opinions about the decision to fly as passengers in unmanned aircraft when it was 
suggested that unmanned aircraft were proven safe and reliable. This positive influence, 
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being in the overall absence of the research subjects’ full knowledge about the factors that 
affect unmanned aircraft safety, as identified in the third main research question. Research 
subject exposure to the publicity of a relatively safe manned air traffic system will be 
examined next. 
The researcher noted that research subject exposure to the relatively safe manned 
aircraft system was identified in findings four and five of the analysis and findings chapter. 
Those findings were; finding 4, observations related to the research subjects’ background, 
experience and education in aviation, and finding 5, observations related to the research 
subjects’ participation in the manned air traffic system as passengers.  
The researcher observed that findings four and five both identified that all 25 
research subjects were exposed to the relatively safe manned air traffic system as 
passengers in commercial aircraft, while more than half (13 out of 25) of subjects had 
further exposure due to their background and experience in their aviation professions. 
Detailed in finding four, the researcher noted that manned aviation maintains relatively low 
fatal accident rates and the research subjects share in the benefit of that exposure when 
traveling as passengers, as the data reflects 0.155/0.260 accidents per 100,000 flight hours 
for §121 scheduled/nonscheduled air carrier operations respectively, and zero fatal 
accidents; and, 1.458/1.07 accidents and 0.292/0.20 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours 
for §135 commuter/on-demand air carrier operations respectively (NTSB, 2015c).  
 Additionally, finding five further identified the frequency, or amount of exposure, 
the research subjects had to the manned commercial aviation system. In that, most of the 
subjects (16 out of 25) infrequently flew at least two to three times per year, while less than 
half (9 out of 25) frequently flew four or more times per year. This data indicates that 
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decisions to fly as passengers in manned commercial aircraft are influenced by positive 
publicity, and the frequency is reinforced by repetitive exposure as passengers with 
continued low accident/fatal-accident rates. Interestingly, the researcher observed an 
overall similar low level of research subject knowledge about factors that affect manned 
aircraft safety, as compared to their knowledge about factors that affect unmanned aircraft 
safety. These will be examined next. 
Question seven in the first part of the data collection instrument asked the research 
subjects to describe their knowledge of factors that affect manned aircraft safety. The 
researcher observed that, collectively, most (16 out of 25) of the research subjects described 
an intermediate level of knowledge or less about the factors that affect manned aircraft 
safety. Yet, in the absence of a self-described full knowledge about the factors that affect 
manned aircraft safety, all 25 research subjects indicated they had chosen to fly as 
passengers in manned commercial aircraft. This data indicates, collectively, a high level of 
trust in manned aircraft safety, with a relative low level of knowledge about the factors that 
affect manned aircraft safety.  
In response to the fourth main research question, the researcher determined that the 
data indicates the research subjects collectively changed their opinions about the decision 
to fly as passengers in manned aircraft based on proven safety and reliability due to the 
influence of positive publicity, and by the frequency and reinforcement of repetitive 
exposure as passengers with continued low accident/fatal-accident rates. This being in the 
absence of a full knowledge about the factors that affect manned aircraft safety.  
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6. Will the Dunning-Kruger Effect be observed in the research findings? 
To answer this main research question, the researcher analyzed literature about the 
Dunning-Kruger effect listed in the review of literature chapter, as well as responses to the 
main research question answered within this chapter, and findings listed in the analysis and 
findings chapter. The literature about the Dunning-Kruger Effect will be summarized first.  
As previously identified in this dissertation, the researcher questioned if the 
Dunning-Kruger Effect would be observed in the research findings, which could suggest 
that people think more highly of their cognitive decision-making abilities even when they 
have limited knowledge in which to make a competent decision (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, 
p. 1121). As a result, the researcher reviewed the study by Kruger and Dunning (1999) 
published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology titled, Unskilled and 
Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated 
Self-Assessments. 
Kruger and Dunning (1999) maintained the belief and assumption that under-
skilled people overestimate and maintain higher opinions about their skills and abilities 
than skilled people in a particular knowledge area, suffering the ability to realize 
incompetence brought about by the lack knowledge or skill (p. 1121). They identified the 
result as an incorrect assumption of competence. The research pair explained this 
phenomenon with the relatable example of being competent to detect grammatically correct 
sentences. The premise being that, in order to detect errors in grammatically incorrect 
sentences, one must be competent in reading and writing grammatically correct sentences 
in the first place.  
This is similar to being able to assess whether unmanned aircraft are safe and 
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reliable, and basing the decision to fly as a passenger in an unmanned aircraft on that 
knowledge, or the lack thereof. The premise being that, in order to determine unmanned 
aircraft safety and reliability, one must be competent in the factors that affect unmanned 
aircraft safety, have direct knowledge of an associated accident rate and safety record, or 
benefit from the influences of positive publicity depicting it as safe and reliable in the 
absence of direct knowledge.  
Kruger and Dunning (1999) focused their research and predictions on the 
competence and metacognitive skills, which are the foundational knowledge and 
subsequent experiences one has about personal cognitive abilities. The authors predicted 
these to be lacking in the incompetent person, which are required skills for correctly 
assessing one’s own abilities for proper decision making (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 
1122). In reviewing the study, the researcher identified Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) four 
predictions based on their beliefs and assumptions about the metacognitive abilities of 
incompetent people (p. 1122): 
1. People who are incompetent will overestimate their own cognitive abilities 
more than those who are competent. 
2. People who are incompetent will be less likely than people who are 
competent to recognize competence in themselves and others. 
3. People who are incompetent will be less likely than people who are 
competent to learn from assessing the performance of other people, in order 
to assign a correct assessment of self-performance. 
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4. People who are incompetent can become competent by being taught about 
their errors, which provides them with the needed metacognitive skills to 
properly assess self-performance.  
In analysis of the fifth main research question answered within this chapter, the 
researcher determined that the relationship between the research subjects’ trust and 
knowledge of UAS safety resided in; 1) their lack of exposure to publicity depicting 
unmanned aircraft to be relatively safe; as well as, 2) their exposure to the publicity of a 
relatively safe manned air traffic system; and overall, 3) the influence that publicity has on 
the subjects’ decisions to fly as passengers in either manned or unmanned aircraft, in the 
absence of knowledge about factors that affect aviation safety. 
To summarize the fifth main research question, the research data indicated that the 
research subjects had a low level of trust and low level of knowledge of unmanned aircraft 
safety. After further analysis, the researcher determined that the data also indicated that the 
research subjects collectively changed their opinions about the decision to fly as passengers 
in unmanned aircraft when it was suggested that unmanned aircraft were proven safe and 
reliable, thus representing a form of positive publicity having positive influence on the 
research subjects. This positive influence being in the overall absence of the research 
subjects’ full knowledge about the factors that affect unmanned aircraft safety, as identified 
in the third main research question. Research subject exposure to the publicity of a 
relatively safe manned air traffic system will be examined next. 
The researcher noted that research subject exposure to the relatively safe manned 
aircraft system was identified in findings four and five of the analysis and findings chapter. 
Those findings were; finding 4, observations related to the research subjects’ background, 
220 
 
experience and education in aviation; and finding 5, observations related to the research 
subjects’ participation in the manned air traffic system as passengers.  
In analysis of the response to the fifth main research question, it was identified that 
all 25 research subjects were exposed to the relatively safe manned air traffic system as 
passengers in commercial aircraft, to include its publicized low accident rates. While, more 
than half of subjects had further exposure due to their background and experience in their 
aviation professions. Detailed in finding four, it was observed that manned aviation has 
maintained relatively low fatal accident rates and the research subjects share in the benefit 
of that exposure when traveling as passengers. Interestingly, however, the researcher 
observed that the research subjects had an overall similarly low level of research subject 
knowledge about factors that affect manned aircraft safety, as well as their knowledge 
about factors that affect unmanned aircraft safety.  
This was detailed in the analysis of question seven in the first part of the data 
collection instrument, which asked the research subjects to describe their knowledge of 
factors that affect manned aircraft safety. The researcher observed that, collectively, most 
of the research subjects described an intermediate level of knowledge or less about the 
factors that affect manned aircraft safety. Yet, in the absence of a self-described full 
knowledge about the factors that affect manned aircraft safety, all 25 research subjects 
indicated they had chosen to fly as passengers in manned commercial aircraft. Which 
indicates, collectively, a high level of trust in manned aircraft safety and a relatively low 
level of knowledge about the factors that affect manned aircraft safety, while having 
exposure to the safety of commercial manned aviation.  
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Additionally, finding five further identified the frequency, or amount of exposure, 
the research subjects had to the manned commercial aviation system. In that, most of the 
subjects infrequently flew at least two to three times per year, while less than half 
frequently flew four or more times per year. This information suggests that decisions to fly 
as passengers in manned commercial aircraft, while having relatively low knowledge about 
its safety, are influenced by positive publicity about its safety, reliability, and low 
accident/fatal-accident rates.  
In relation to Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) study, the researcher answered this 
main research question by assessing whether the central phenomenon of the Dunning-
Kruger Effect was observed in the research findings of this study. The researcher 
determined that Kruger and Dunning’s first and fourth predictions, and the research 
methods used to test those predictions, were more applicable to the qualitative design of 
this study than were the second and third predictions. As a result, predictions one and four 
were assessed. Predictions two and three, however, as well as the quantitative design of 
Kruger and Dunning’s research methods used to test them, were not applicable to the 
qualitative design of this study and were not assessed. Prediction one is examined first. 
Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) first prediction stated that people who are 
incompetent will overestimate their own cognitive abilities more than those who are 
competent. This prediction was observed during this research study given the researcher’s 
observations identified in response to the fifth main question sought to be answered by this 
research study.  
The researcher observed that most (19 out of 25) of research subjects did not trust 
unmanned aircraft, and most (19 out of 25) would not fly in an unmanned aircraft as a 
222 
 
passenger unless it were proven safe and reliable. Yet, most (20 out of 25) of the research 
subjects described an intermediate level of knowledge or less about factors that affect 
unmanned aircraft safety, and most (16 out of 25) did not know the correct answer to 
questions four through 10 regarding the technical regulatory requirements for the operation 
and maintenance of unmanned aircraft. Further described, the research subjects’ overall 
trust and knowledge of unmanned aircraft safety were observed to be low.  
The researcher made the observation during the review of literature that current 
FAA regulations were promulgated for the safe operation, maintenance, and certification 
of the manned aviation system. And, regulations promulgated for carrying passengers for 
commercial purposes were observed to be more prescriptive and required more safety 
measures than general aviation. As a result, it is expected that, although none existed at the 
time of this research, future regulations promulgated for transporting passengers for 
commercial purposes in unmanned aircraft will ensure an equivalent level of safety as 
manned aircraft. The fourth prediction will be examined next. 
Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) fourth prediction stated that people who are 
incompetent can become competent by being taught about their errors, which provides 
them with the needed metacognitive skills to properly assess self-performance. This 
prediction was observed during this research study given the researcher’s observations 
identified in response to the fifth main question sought to be answered by this research 
study.  
In addition to observing the research subjects’ low trust and low knowledge of 
unmanned aircraft safety, and the expectation that future regulations for transporting 
passengers for commercial purposes in unmanned aircraft would ensure an equivalent level 
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of safety as manned aircraft, the researcher observed that the research subjects collectively 
changed their opinions about the decision to fly as passengers in unmanned aircraft when 
it was suggested that unmanned aircraft were proven safe and reliable.  
At first, it was observed that most (18 out of 25) of the research subjects indicated 
that publicity about UAS had negatively affected their opinions. While, correspondingly, 
nearly the same number (19 out of 25) of research subjects had a certain level of distrust in 
unmanned aircraft which caused their unwillingness to be the first person to fly in one.  
However, the exact same number (18 out of 25) of research subjects indicated they would 
fly as a passenger in an unmanned aircraft once proven safe and reliable, which is a form 
of positive publicity about the safety and reliability of UAS. Recommendations to improve 
and advance aviation safety based on the research findings identified during this study and 
detailed within this chapter will be examined next. 
  
Recommendations 
During this research, the researcher identified the beneficiaries of this study who 
are the regulatory, public, business, and academic stakeholders of the aviation industry. 
Additionally, the researcher also identified findings affecting aviation safety and 
sustainability. As a result, the researcher makes the five recommendations listed in this 
section to improve and advance aviation safety and sustainability for the beneficiaries of 
this study. These recommendations are to; 1) enhance general aviation accident statistics; 
2) enhance unmanned aviation accident statistics; 3) enhance unmanned aircraft accident 
research; 4) increase public trust in unmanned aircraft; and 5) recommend further research. 
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Recommendation 1 – Enhance General Aviation Accident Statistics 
Detailed in finding one of the analysis and findings chapter, the first finding that 
was identified during the review of relevant literature was the FAA’s method of collecting 
flight hour data that the NTSB uses to calculate general aviation accident rates. The 
researcher identified, within the manned aircraft accident data and statistics section of the 
review of literature chapter of this dissertation, that the FAA’s methods do not accurately 
capture flight hour activity data for general aviation as it does for Parts 121 and 135 
commercial air carriers. As a result, the data in which the NTSB estimates general aviation 
accident rates are calculated based on voluntary submission of flight hour activity 
summaries by operators, which can be reported late, not reported at all, or contain 
inaccurate flight hour data (NTSB, 2015c). 
The researcher notes the related impacts of this finding are an inaccurate assessment 
and comparison of accident rates within aviation and across multiple modes of 
transportation. Resultantly, it is arguably and ultimately unknown if general aviation is any 
more, or less, safe than other modes of transportation, to include modes within aviation. 
So, public policy, law and rule making dependent upon this data may be focused in the 
wrong area of transportation accident prevention. Additionally, inaccurate aircraft accident 
statistics can have a misleading effect on public perceptions of general aviation safety.  
The researcher recommends that the government track this data accurately instead 
of estimating it, determine the applicable accident rate, and conduct further research into 
the comparison of general aviation accident rates to other modes of aviation in order to 
determine if general aviation is any more or less safe, then focus policy and rule making 
appropriately. Finding two will be examined next. 
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Recommendation 2 – Enhance Unmanned Aviation Accident Statistics  
Detailed in finding two of the analysis and findings chapter, the second finding that 
was identified during review of relevant literature was the lack of aircraft accident statistics 
for civil unmanned aircraft. The researcher identified, within the unmanned aircraft 
accident/incident data and statistics section of the review of literature chapter, that the FAA 
did not track and publish flight hour data for UAS. As a result, the NTSB did not publish 
accident statistics for civil UAS at the time of this research. 
Without accurate accident/incident statistics, it is arguably and realistically 
unknown if UAS are any more, or less, safe than other modes of transportation, to include 
modes within aviation. However, throughout the unmanned aircraft publicity section of the 
review of literature chapter, negative publicity was identified that depicted unmanned 
aircraft to be unsafe and pose a hazardous threat to the safety of other aircraft within the 
NAS. Yet, at the time of the review of literature, no known injuries or fatalities were 
identified related to the operation of either a large or small civil unmanned aircraft, not 
including hobbyists. To a further point, given the current FAA incident statistics, it is also 
unknown if small UAS present any more of a mid-air collision hazard and subsequent 
safety risk to other aircraft within the NAS than birds. 
The researcher notes the related impact of this finding is primarily the lack of a 
proper assessment and comparison of UAS accident statistics against other modes of 
transportation, to include other modes within aviation. As a result, it is arguably and 
ultimately unknown if UAS are any more, or less, safe than other modes of transportation, 
to include modes within aviation. Because public policy, law and rule making are 
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dependent upon such data, a latent impact is that the government may be focused in the 
wrong area of transportation accident prevention. This lack of empirical analysis by the 
government also leaves room for media speculation and negative publicity about UAS. 
Furthermore, negative publicity about UAS based on the lack of accurate accident statistics 
may have a misleading effect on public perceptions of UAS safety.  
The researcher recommends that the government track this data, determine an 
applicable accident rate, and conduct further research into the comparison of UAS accident 
rates versus other modes of aviation in order to determine if UAS are any more or less safe.  
 
Recommendation 3 – Enhance Unmanned Aircraft Accident Research  
Detailed in finding two of the analysis and findings chapter, the researcher 
examined UAS accident data between January 1, 2002 and September 26, 2017 within the 
NTSB aviation accident database by conducting a keyword search using six common terms 
related to unmanned aircraft.  A keyword search was conducted because the NTSB did not 
provide a search option for UAS as an aircraft category. As a result, the research notes that 
the related impacts of this finding are limited research options for the public and academia 
to conduct a thorough analysis of aircraft accident data.  
The researcher makes the recommendation that the NTSB develop a search option 
for UAS as an aircraft category within the aviation accident database in order to allow the 
public and academia to conduct an adequate search of aircraft accident database 
information. 
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Recommendation 4 – Increase Public Trust of Unmanned Aviation 
Findings four and five within the analysis and findings chapter both identified a 
potential bias towards manned aircraft travel versus future unmanned aircraft travel due to 
passenger exposure to the relatively safe manned aircraft system and its publicity, as well 
as the lack of exposure to a safe unmanned aircraft system and its publicity. To include, a 
passenger exposure to negative publicity about the safety of UAS, in the absence of 
accurate accident statistics. 
The related impacts of this finding suggest that exposure to the relatively safe 
manned aviation system can cause a bias from passengers towards manned aircraft versus 
unmanned aircraft, affecting the viability of UAS as a future mode of transportation. The 
researcher recommends the government, unmanned aircraft operators and unmanned 
aircraft manufacturers explore these suggestions and similarly expose potential customers 
of unmanned aircraft and the public in order to elicit trust in unmanned aircraft. 
 
Recommendation 5 – Recommended Further Research 
This study has led to new ideas, further questions and areas of opportunity for 
academic research. As a result, the researcher recommends further studies in the following 
areas to advance the safety, viability and sustainability of manned and unmanned aviation. 
1. A study into the correlations and differences between the public’s trust in 
unmanned air transportation and its trust in unmanned ground transportation. 
2. A study into the amount of exposure to positive publicity that is needed for a 
person to establish trust and become willing to travel as a passenger in 
unmanned air transportation. 
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3. A study into the amount of exposure to positive publicity that is needed for a 
person to establish trust and become willing to travel as a passenger in 
unmanned ground transportation. 
4. A study into the effects that passenger travel preferences, for either unmanned 
air transportation and/or unmanned ground transportation, would have on the 
current hub-and-spoke air transportation system model. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this dissertation detailed the introduction of the research study, the 
researcher’s review of literature, the research methodologies used during the study, the 
analysis and findings of the data collection, and summarized the research study by 
answering the main research questions, and submitting recommendations to improve and 
advance aviation safety for its beneficiaries. It represents the researcher’s own 
interpretations and analysis and do not reflect the opinions of Oklahoma State University 
or the researcher’s employer.    
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INTERVIEW GUIDE 
  
 
 
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
Hello Mr./Ms.__________________ (participants name). My name is Brian L. Rochester 
and I am conducting a research study for the Educational Doctoral degree requirements in 
Aviation and Space Science at Oklahoma State University. I would like to thank you for 
your voluntary participation in this research study.  
 
The purpose of this research is to qualitatively study the public’s trust and knowledge of 
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) safety, and determine whether, or not, the public would 
be willing to fly as passengers in UAS in the future. 
 
This interview will last approximately 45 minutes and will be recorded as stated in the 
Informed Consent Document that you signed, ensuring complete confidentiality and at no 
harm to you.  
 
I welcome your candid and honest responses and opinions to the questions asked during 
this interview. If any question makes you uncomfortable and/or you do not wish to answer 
it, please state so and the question will be skipped. If the process itself makes you 
uncomfortable in any way and you wish to end the interview, please state so and the 
interview will be stopped.  
 
You are free to take a break at any time during the interview.   
• Do you have any questions? If not, let’s begin. 
• Do I have permission to record this interview? 
• Researcher states, “I will now start recording this interview” and begins recording. 
• Researcher states, “Doctoral Research Study, Oklahoma State University, date 
(state the date), Title of Project: A Qualitative Inquiry into Public Perceptions of 
Unmanned Aviation Safety, Research Participant # (state participant number)”. 
 
Open-Ended Interview Questions and Statements: 
1. Please describe your background, experience and education in aviation [Is the 
participant male or female, and do they fall between the ages of (1) 18-35; (2) 36-50; and 
(3) over 50] 
2. Can you describe your level of trust in manned aircraft safety? 
3. Can you describe your level of trust in unmanned aircraft safety? 
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4. What factors affect your trust of unmanned aircraft? 
5. What factors affect your trust of manned aircraft? 
6. Can you describe your knowledge of factors that affect unmanned aircraft safety? 
7. Can you describe your knowledge of factors that affect manned aircraft safety? 
8. Can you describe what has been publicized about UAS by the government and media, 
and how this publicity has affected your opinions about UAS? 
 
Follow-on Closed-Ended Questions: 
1. Are you an aircraft pilot or mechanic? 
2. Do you, or anyone you know operate UAS? 
3. How often do you fly as a passenger in a commercially manned aircraft? 
4. Are UAS regulated and overseen for safety the same as manned aircraft? 
5. Are UAS considered to be as technically reliable and safe as manned aircraft? 
6. Are UAS licensed the same as manned aircraft? 
7. Are UAS operators licensed and trained the same as manned aircraft pilots? 
8. Are UAS allowed to operate in the same airspace as manned aircraft? 
9. Are UAS mechanics licensed the same as manned aircraft mechanics? 
10. Are UAS required to be maintained the same as manned aircraft? 
11. Would you volunteer to be the first person to fly in an unmanned aircraft? 
12. If proven safe and reliable, would you fly as a passenger in an unmanned aircraft? 
 13. Would you recommend another person who may be suitable for this study? 
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